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Abstract
This thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should’ is information-
sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative
epistemology. The doxastic ‘should’ is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should’
and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn’t believe everything you read online’.
In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should’
is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ are
relativized to information-states. After a short introductory chapter, I survey the
relevant semantics literature in chapter 2 and provide a simplified contextualist
semantics for the doxastic ‘should’, according to which the truth-conditions of
sentences containing the doxastic ‘should’ vary with the information-state provided
by their context of utterance.
In chapters 3 to 6, I discuss the different kinds of information-states the
doxastic ‘should’ can be relativzed to and how the respective relativization matters
for normative epistemology. Chapter 3 argues that the doxastic ‘should’ has a
subjective and an objective sense and that this distinction solves the apparent
conflict between subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm for belief. Chapter
4 addresses the question of how one should react to misleading higher-order
evidence. I propose that two seemingly opposing views on this issue, Steadfastness
and Concilliationism, are both correct. In a sense of ‘should’ that is relativized to
one’s first-order evidence, one should remain steadfast in the face of misleading
higher-order evidence, but in another sense, which is relativized to one’s higher-
order evidence, one shouldn’t. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that when we advise
others on what they should believe, we talk about what they should believe in
light of their and our joint evidence. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a
defence of contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ against truth-relativist
challenges.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Setting
Analytic epistemology has for a long time been concerned with knowledge and
the semantics of ‘knows’. As looking at the syllabus for almost any introductory
epistemology course shows, the question ‘What is knowledge?’ has been central
to analytic epistemology in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning
of the 21st. There is, however, another way to look at epistemology, according to
which the question ‘What should I believe?’ is at the heart of it (Berker 2013).
Construed in this way, epistemology is a deeply normative subject. Of course, the
question of whether we know possibly has wide-ranging normative implications,
as the literature on the norms for practical reasoning or assertion has shown.1
Furthermore, the concept of knowledge itself is often described as evaluative,
similar to thick value concepts like courage or honesty (Ridge 2007: 98). The
question of what we should believe is more straightforwardly normative, though,
and makes epistemology akin to ethics. Ethics, roughly, is concerned with which
action one should choose, whereas epistemology, on this picture, is concerned with
which doxastic attitudes one should adopt.
The question of which doxastic attitudes one should adopt is, without a doubt,
very important. Our actions matter, but so do our thoughts. Which beliefs we
hold, how we represent the world, influences how we navigate in it. However,
we do not only care about our beliefs because of their impact on how we act.
1See, among many others, Williamson (2000), Fantl and McGrath (2002), Hawthorne (2004),
and Stanley (2005).
1
True, justified, or rational beliefs also seem to have intrinsic value for us. Thus,
independent of whether the question of what one should believe is at the heart of
epistemology or not, it certainly merits our attention.
Even though the question has not been at the centre of epistemology, it has not
been ignored either. A famous treatment of it is Clifford’s (1877/1999) program-
matically named ‘Ethics of Belief’, in which he famously states that “it is wrong
always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence”
(ibid.: 77). Bayesian epistemology can be aptly described as being concerned with
determining which credence one should adopt in light of one’s evidence (Weisberg
2011: sec. 2.5). Furthermore, on a deontic reading of ‘justification’2, the debate
between internalists and externalists about justification is about what one is
permitted to believe. Finally, recent discussions about what the norm for belief
is, e.g., justification, knowledge, or truth, have moved the question of what we
should believe more into the spotlight of current epistemological theorizing.3
These examples from the literature should make clear that I am concerned
with the question of what one should believe according to epistemic norms, not
according to practical norms. If I offer you one million pounds to believe that there
is an elephant in the room, you probably have practical reasons to believe this
(Foley 1987: 211). However, you wouldn’t have epistemic reasons to believe this,
presumably because you have clear evidence that there is no elephant in the room.
It is notoriously difficult to define what exactly ‘epistemic’ means (Cohen ms).
For our purposes, it should suffice to say that epistemic norms are concerned with
which doxastic attitude one should believe in light of considerations pertaining
to truth, knowledge, justification, evidence, cognitive reliability, and the like.
Practical norms, on the other hand, are about what one should do in light of
practical considerations such as money, happiness, or what is morally right. They
can be divided into prudential norms, which are about about one should do to
further one’s interest, and moral norms. Let’s call ‘should’ where it expresses
epistemic norms doxastic and where it expresses practical norms ‘practical’.4
2This reading is controversial, though—see Alston (1988) and section 1.3 further below.
3For more on this debate, see chapter 3.
4It might be a bit confusing that I use the label doxastic to refer to ‘should’ where it expresses
epistemic normativity, and don’t speak of the epistemic ‘should’ instead. I do so to avoid the
impression that I’m talking about the epistemic modal ‘should’, as in ‘They should be here by
now’. Chrisman (2008) uses the same terminology.
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Some argue that we do not only have epistemic obligations to adopt certain
doxastic attitudes, but that we can also have epistemic obligations to perform
certain actions, like gathering evidence.5 While I do not want to deny that there
are such norms, I focus in this thesis entirely on epistemic norms pertaining to
doxastic attitudes, both the coarse-grained ones of belief, disbelief and suspension
of judgement, as well as credences.
Given the importance of the question of which doxastic attitude one should
adopt for epistemic reasons, it is surprising that there is not much work on the
semantics of sentences of the form ‘Subject S should have doxastic attitude D to
proposition P ’, where the ‘should’ expresses epistemic norms. Since one of the
key methods of analytic philosophy is to analyse the meaning of philosophically
interesting expressions, looking into the semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ is
something normative epistemologists should consider worthwhile. Lack of such
research is even more surprising given that the semantic analysis of ‘S knows P ’ has
played such a big role in epistemology in the last 20 or so years. Philosophers have
defended invariantist6, contextualist7, contrastivist8, relativist,9 and expressivist
semantics10 for ‘knows’. In ethics, research into the meaning of ‘should’ or ‘must’
has also been put to good use.11
The present thesis is a contribution to filling this gap in the literature. I
believe that a thorough analysis of the semantics of the doxastic ‘should’ can gain
interesting insights into a number of debates in epistemology. For example, within
Kratzer’s (1991) standard semantics for deontic modals like ‘should’ or ‘must’,
it is relatively easy to model a distinction between the doxastic ‘should’ and the
practical ‘should’. This is relevant for the question of what the relation between
epistemic and practical normativity is.12 Furthermore, the work that has been
done on the semantic distinction between ‘should’ and ‘must’ could throw some
5See, for example, Kornblith (1983), Booth (2006, 2009), Pollock (2008: 264), Field (2009:
259), and Goldman (2010: 18).
6See, for example, Unger (1984/2002) and Brown (2010)
7See, for example, Cohen (1986) and DeRose (1992).
8See, for example, Schaffer (2004).
9See MacFarlane (2005).
10See, for example, Chrisman (2006) and Ridge (2007).
11See, for example, Sloman (1970), Jackson (1991), Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), Bjo¨rnsson
and Finlay (2010), and Finlay (2014).
12For discussion of this question see, among others, Foley (1987: 210f.), Raz (2009), Littlejohn
(2012), Whiting (2014), and Worsnip (2015a).
3
light on whether there is something like epistemic supererogation, i.e., something
that one should, but not must, believe.13
However, I will focus on another semantic feature of ‘should’: its information-
sensitivity. This feature has received a lot of attention in the literature on
the semantics of deontic modals, in particular in discussion of the so-called
miners paradox.14 That ‘should’ is information-sensitive means that the semantic
evaluation of sentences containing ‘should’ can be dependent on contextually
provided information-states. According to contextualist semantics, this means
that the truth-conditions of a sentence of the form ‘S should do action A’ vary
with the information-state provided by the context in which it is uttered. As
a result, such a sentence can, for example, in one context mean that S should
do A in light of S’s evidence, and in another that S should do A in light of the
facts. The most prominent instance of this information-sensitivity of ‘should’
is the distinction between the subjective and the objective ‘should’, which is
well-known in ethics. However, some have argued that ‘should’ can be relativized
to information-states other than just the subject’s evidence and the facts—for
example to the combined evidence of speakers and their addresses.
The core idea of this thesis is to investigate to what degree the doxastic ‘should’
is information-sensitive and to explore the implications of this for a number of
debates in epistemology.
1.2 Overview of Chapters
The discussion of information-sensitivity in the semantics literature focuses almost
exclusively on cases where ‘should’ expresses practical norms.15 The practical
‘should’ and the doxastic ‘should’ are both instances of the deontic ‘should’. In
chapter 2, I explore new territory when I examine to what degree the semantic
models of the information-sensitivity of the deontic ‘should’ presented in the
literature, which have been developed with the practical ‘should’ in mind, also
work for the doxastic ‘should’. Looking at the proposed contextualist models
13Hedberg (2014) and McElwee (ms) discuss, and positively answer, this question.
14See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), Dowell (2013), Silk
(2014), and Willer (forthcoming).
15The only exceptions are MacFarlane (2014: 298) and Wedgwood (2007: ch. 5.2), who
mention this en passant.
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on the market, I will argue that Silk (2012), Dowell (2013), and Carr’s (2015)
models can account for the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’, but
Cariani et al. (2013) and Charlow’s (2013) models cannot. I close by presenting
a simplified version of Silk (2012), Dowell (2013), and Carr’s (2015) semantics,
according to which the truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘S should have
D to P ’ vary with contextually provided information-states and, roughly, mean
‘S should have D to P in light of i’, where i is the information-state provided by
the context of utterance. I call this position Doxastic Contextualism.
The idea that the doxasic ‘should’ is information-sensitive is almost com-
pletely novel in epistemology, and one of my main jobs in this thesis is hence to
provide evidence for Doxastic Contextualism. I will do so by pointing towards
certain practices of epistemic evaluation that I think are best explained by the
information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’, relying on our linguistic intuitions
and on metasemantic considerations. However, that the doxastic ‘should’ can be
relativized to different information-states is in and of itself not exciting news for
the epistemologist. The reason it matters for epistemology is that it can solve a
number of puzzles and apparent conflicts in recent debates, or so I will argue.
In chapter 3, I address the only instance of the information-sensitivity of
the doxastic ‘should’ that has received attention in epistemology: the subjec-
tive/objective distinction. The idea that what one should believe is somehow
sensitive to one’s body of evidence is almost uncontroversial among epistemologists.
I will present arguments that we also have a practice of talking about what one
should believe in the objective sense of ‘should’, i.e., in light of the facts. The
implication of this, contra Gibbons (2013) and others, is that the conflict between
the truth norm for belief and more subjective norms, like the justification norm for
belief, is only apparent since the first employs the objective sense of the doxastic
‘should’ in its formulation and the second the subjective sense.
In chapter 4, I will address a further kind of information-sensitivity, the
distinction between what one should believe in light of one’s first-order evidence
and what one should believe in light of one’s higher-order evidence. This has
interesting implications for the peer disagreement debate, as well as the more
general question of how one should react towards misleading higher-order evidence.
My claim is that those who argue that one should remain steadfast in light of
peer disagreement or other kinds of misleading higher-order evidence have this
5
first sense of the doxastic ‘should’ in mind (the one relativised to one’s first-order
evidence), whereas those who argue that one should be conciliatory and adjust
one’s doxastic attitude in light of misleading higher-order evidence employ the
second sense. The upshot is that we neither have to choose between steadfastness
and conciliationism in the peer disagreement debate nor between analogous views
in the higher-order evidence debate in more general.
In chapter 5, I turn to what I call the collective sense of the doxastic ‘should’.
I argue that in some contexts we talk about what a subject should believe in
light of the collective evidence, i.e., in light of their, i.e., the subject’s,16 and the
speaker’s combined evidence. We do so when we are giving epistemic advice,
which is, roughly, the practice of helping subjects who are deliberating about
what to believe. I provide an account of this practice, which has so far not been
discussed in the literature. Furthermore, I propose and argue for Collectivism,
the view that the collective doxastic ‘should’ is the one employed for this purpose,
rather than other possible senses like the subjective or objective doxastic ‘should’.
This tells us under which conditions epistemic advice is correct and thus helps us
to gain a better understanding of this hitherto under-researched practice. A more
direct implication of the insight that the doxastic ‘should’ can be relativized to
the collective evidence is that it solves a puzzle described by Turri (2012) in his
paper ‘A Puzzle about Withholding’, which he declares to be unsolvable. Chapter
6 discusses Collectivism further and explores what exactly collective evidence is;
whether epistemic advice of the form ‘You should believe P ’ is true only if P is
true; and examines possible connections between Collectivism and the literature
on group justification.
I hope that I will have provided convincing evidence for Doxastic Contextualism
in chapters 3 to 5. However, contextualist semantics for a number of terms, like
epistemic modals, ‘knows’, taste predicates, and deontic modals, have faced serious
criticism, especially from defenders of relativist semantics, but also from those
arguing in favour of invariantist semantics for these terms. Since chapters 3
to 5 should have severely undermined invariantism about the doxastic ‘should’,
I will, in chapter 7, defend Doxastic Contextualism against those challenges
against the backdrop of relativism. The first objection is that contextualist
semantics of the deontic ‘should’ can’t account for the practice of advice. I
16Here and throughout this thesis I use the singular ‘they’ to refer to indeterminate persons.
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argue that Dowell’s (2013) response to this objection, put forward in defense of a
contextualist semantics for the practical ‘should’, does not work for the doxastic
‘should’, and I suggest an alternative reply to defend Doxastic Contextualism. The
second objection is that contextualists struggle to explain linguistic phenomena
like disagreement, attitude reports, and retractions. I will offer different responses,
arguing for some of these phenomena that the data relativists provide is not as
convincing as it seems at first sight and for other phenomena that they are caused
by the semantic blindness of ordinary speakers.
1.3 Background Assumptions
Before we begin, I need to highlight two major assumptions I make in this thesis.
The first is that there are epistemic norms or, at the very least, that sentences of
the form ‘S should (doxastically) believe P ’ can be true. The second assumption
is that I work with a truth-conditional semantics for the doxastic ‘should’. In the
following, I will motivate these assumptions.
As I explained, I take the doxastic ‘should’ to express epistemic norms. If there
are no such norms, one could argue that there is also no such ‘should’ and that
this thesis is accordingly pointless. Now, there seem to be three kinds of reasons
why people might reject the idea that there are epistemic norms. First, Papineau
(2013) argues in his aptly named ‘There Are No Norms for Belief’ that there is no
sui generis epistemic normativity. He admits that it is true that when we have
the aim of having a true belief about a proposition P , we should do things that
help us achieve this aim, e.g., believe what is supported by our evidence. However,
when we don’t pursue this truth goal with respect to a proposition P , then our
doxastic attitude to P is not subject to any epistemic normative constraints. He
gives the example of John, who has untreatable cancer and evidence that this is
the case, but who maintains the false belief that he is fine and thereby avoids
the emotional pain that would come with having the belief that he’s terminally
ill. Papineau (2013: 68) thinks that John “has done nothing wrong at all” since
holding a true belief about his health is not in his interest. He claims that this
shows that there is no real epistemic normativity and that what we should believe
is rather determined by prudential considerations, not epistemic ones. If there
was epistemic normativity, it would be categorical and demand to be followed no
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matter what our interests are. 17
One way to reply to this is to contest Papineau’s (2013) judgement and
insist that John should not believe that he’s fine, even if it makes him happy.
Kelly (2003) considers cases similar to the one of John, where people do not
care about having true beliefs, as counterexamples to epistemic instrumentalism.
Epistemic instrumentalism claims that epistemic reasons derive their normative
force from epistemic goals, like the goal to have true beliefs. Kelly (2003) argues
that epistemic instrumentalism is mistaken precisely because we have epistemic
reason to believe what our evidence supports even if we don’t care to have a
true belief about the proposition in question. Thus, Kelly (2003) would argue
that John should believe that he has cancer and that this shows that epistemic
instrumentalism is wrong, and not that there are no epistemic norms.
Papineau (2013: 69) admits that there is a practice of epistemically evaluating
others, but contests that this implies that there is true epistemic normativity.
Given this, he could reply to Kelly (2003) that indeed, we might say of John that
he should believe that he has cancer, but that this doesn’t mean that John should
really believe this. What he really should believe is that he is fine since this would
make him happy. I think there are two possible replies to this. First, one could
argue that in a case like John’s there is no such thing as what he really should
believe. Rather, prudentially, in terms of what best serves his interest, John should
believe that he’s healthy, and doxastically, John should believe that he’s ill. On
this view, there are prudential and epistemic norms and one kind doesn’t trump
the other. Thus, something can be a proper norm or be ‘genuinely’ normative
without being such that it categorically prevails over other considerations. Some
argue that prudential reasons can stand in a similar relation to moral reasons.
It can be in my interest to do something that is morally wrong. According to a
position often attributed to Sidgwick, Henry (1874), in such situations there is
nothing we really should do or all-things-considered. Prudentially, we should do
17In his (2010), Nelson argues that there are no positive epistemic duties, i.e., that we can be
permitted to hold a belief, but never obliged to have one. If this was true, it would be a threat
to my project since I assume that sentences of the form ‘You should believe P ’ can be true. He
rests his argument on the assumption that when we positively should believe something this is
only so because we have a prudential interest in having a true belief about the subject matter at
hand (ibid.: 87). He concludes that when we should believe something this is hence not really
due to purely epistemic reasons. Accordingly, his position is basically the same as Papineau’s
(2013) and what I write in the following applies to him as well.
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what’s in our interest, but morally we should do what morality requires, and no
more can be said on this.
According to a second, more concessive reply, it is true that John really or
all-things-considered should believe that he’s healthy. However, doxastically he
should believe that he has cancer, but it just happens that prudential norms trump
epistemic norms. On this view, epistemic norms are maybe more akin to norms of
etiquette and a tier below ‘real’ norms like moral or prudential norms. Papineau
(2013) would take this to be basically his point: epistemic norms aren’t truly
normative. While I don’t favour this more concessive position (my sympathies
rather lie with the first reply), it wouldn’t make this thesis a useless investigation
if it turned out true. According to this position, sentences of the form ‘S should
have D to P ’ can be true, even though they don’t express ‘proper’ norms, just
like the sentence ‘You should eat with fork and knife’. My investigation of the
truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘S should have D to P ’ would still help to
resolve the kind of puzzles epistemologists have got themselves into by overlooking
the fact that the doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive, even though some
would consider these debates less interesting than expected since they are only
about second-tier norms.
A second argument against epistemic norms refers to the principle that ‘ought’
(or ‘should’) implies ‘can’. Alston (1988) famously argued that since we don’t
have control over our beliefs we can’t apply deontic concepts like ‘obligation’ or
‘permission’ to our beliefs. If I cannot help but believe P , it can’t be right that I
should believe ¬P (or P ).
This argument can be rebutted in at least two ways. First of all, some defend
direct doxastic voluntarism, i.e., the view that we have direct control over our
beliefs. For example, Ginet (2001) maintains that we can decide what to believe
in situations where our evidence is inconclusive. Montmarquet (1986) and Steup
(2000) claim that where our belief-formation is purely led by our evidence, our
belief should be considered as having been formed freely, just as actions that
are guided by good practical reasons should be considered free actions. Second,
others have denied that the doxastic ‘should’ implies ‘can’. Feldman (2000) puts
forward the idea that the doxastic ‘ought’ (or ‘should’) is a so-called role-‘ought’.
For example, even if a bad biology teacher is not capable of explaining natural
selection clearly to his students, he should do so nonetheless, qua his role as
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biology teacher. Similarly, if due to wishful thinking a mother cannot but believe
that her son did not commit a murder, even though her evidence clearly supports
this, she should nonetheless, qua her role as a believer, believe that he did commit
it. Chrisman (2008), in a somewhat similar spirit, suggests that the doxastic
‘ought’ (or ‘should’) is an ‘ought-to-be’, which describes what would be best,
rather than an ‘ought-to-do’, which ascribes obligations to agents, and that only
this latter ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Given that there is apparently quite a bit of
reasonable resistance to the idea that there are no epistemic norms because we
can’t control our beliefs, this argument is therefore hardly sufficient to discredit
the project of this thesis.
Finally, metaethical anti-realists will deny that there are epistemic norms
because they deny that there are any norms at all. For example, Olson (2011)
points out that Mackie’s (1977) famous argument from queerness equally applies
to epistemic norms. I don’t think though that I am necessarily committed to
some form of metaethical (or better: metanormative) realism. Expressivists like
Blackburn (1993) and Gibbard (2003) have propagated ‘quasi-realism’, the view
that strictly speaking there are no normative properties, but that normative sen-
tences can nonetheless be true and false, for example by advocating a deflationary
account of the truth-predicate. As I’ve pointed out above, this dissertation can
make a valuable contribution to the literature even if one assumes that there are
no ‘proper’ epistemic norms because they are more like etiquette norms as long
as sentences of the form ‘S should have D to P ’ can be true or false. The same
holds if there are no epistemic norms at all.
The second major assumption I make is that I work with a truth-conditional
semantics for the doxastic ‘should’. The main reason for this is convention. As I
will explain in a bit more detail in chapter 2, the standard semantics for deontic
modals is Kratzer’s, which happens to be developed within a truth-conditional
possible world semantics. Given the number of issues in epistemology that I cover
in this dissertation, I needed to decide on one semantic framework. It would
simply not be manageable to look at the issues I discuss through the lense of all
possible semantics accounts of the doxastic ‘should’.
There are good reasons why Kratzer’s is the standard account. The possible
world semantics it is formulated in has become standard in formal semantics since
it can model the compositionality of meaning particularly well, i.e., how complex
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linguistic expressions derive their meaning from the meaning of their parts (Heim
and Kratzer 1998). Not all alternative semantic accounts of deontic modals can
claim this. Expressivism, which I just mentioned, has traditionally been interpreted
as a semantic theory, according to which the meaning of normative sentences
consists in the non-cognitive attitudes they express. The Frege-Geach problem
is just an instance of expressivism’s more general difficulty with accounting for
compositionality, and hence this standard version of expressivism has become less
popular.18 Recently, some authors have therefore come to propose views that
are expressivist in spirit, but aren’t semantic accounts of normative language.
An example of this is Ridge (2014). According to his ‘ecumenical expressivism’,
sentences of the from ‘S should do A’ mean ‘In light of all acceptable standards,
S should do A’ and one’s normative attitudes determine what is meant by
‘acceptable’. On this view, the meaning of normative sentences is not the non-
cognitive attitudes they express, but these attitudes rather fix the truth-conditional
content of such sentences. This makes ecumenical expressivism a metasemantic,
not a semantic theory. Ridge (2014) relies on Kratzer’s account himself, so
ecumenical expressivism is perfectly compatible with assuming a truth-conditional
semantics for the doxastic ‘should’.
However, there are indubitably semantic theories for deontic modals that aren’t
truth-conditional but can handle compositionality. A non-truth-conditional theory
that is finding more and more recognition among philosophers is dynamic semantics.
It captures the meaning of sentences not in terms of their truth-conditions but in
how they affect the discourse if they are accepted by the discourse participants
(Yalcin 2012). Originally developed to deal with anaphora (Kamp 1981; Heim
1982), it has very recently been applied to deontic modals, too. Marra (2014)
proposes that the meaning of sentences containing deontic modals consists in
the potential change they have on ‘ideal world relations’ in the context of the
discourse. These relations are roughly the normative judgements accepted by
the discourse participants and the meaning of should-sentences is accordingly the
change they bring to these judgements if they are accepted. Starr (forthcoming)
combines expressivism and dynamic semantics and suggests that the meaning
of normative sentences is the potential effect they have on the (non-cognitive)
preferences of the discourse participants.
18See Schroeder (2008) for a comprehensive criticism of expressivism as a semantic theory.
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I can’t offer here a satisfying comparison of the advantages and disadvantages
of dynamic semantics and the truth-conditional semantics I will rely on throughout
this dissertation. As explained above, I need to focus on one semantic account of
the doxastic ‘should’ if I want to cover all the debates in normative epistemology
that I think can benefit from checking what the information-sensitivity of the
doxastic ‘should’ implies for them. So rather than looking at one issue in normative
epistemology with the help of a number of semantic theories, I have decided to
look at a number of issues in epistemology with the help of one semantic theory.
Effectively, this is a dissertation in epistemology that utilizies semantic research
rather than a dissertation in semantics. Given that I thus had to choose one
semantic theory, it seems right to go with the standard one.
That said, Willer (forthcoming: sec. 3.2) has argued that dynamic semantics
can account well for the information-sensitivity of deontic modals. Thus, the
phenomenon I am analysing here is not one that only truth-conditional semanticists
recognize. Which implications for normative epistemology could be drawn from a
dynamic semantic analysis of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’
is a question I can’t answer here and leave for further research.
To conclude, my assumption that there are epistemic norms, or at least that
sentences of the form ‘S should have D to P ’ can be true, is reasonable, and so is
my assumption that the semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ is truth-conditional.
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Chapter 2
The Semantics of the Doxastic
‘Should’
2.1 Introduction
This thesis investigates the implications of the information-sensitivity of the
doxastic ‘should’ for current debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic
‘should’ occurs in sentences of the form ‘Subject S should adopt doxastic attitude
D to proposition P ’. This ‘should’ is a kind of the more general deontic ‘should’,
which is a normative modal, roughly expressing what would be best or how things
ought to be. How things should be can be evaluated along different dimensions.
For example, the practical ‘should’ concerns what we should do in light of practical
norms. The doxastic ‘should’ expresses a different normative dimension, that
of epistemic normativity. What the practical and the doxastic ‘should’ have in
common is that they are instances of the deontic ‘should’.
The information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ is the phenomenon that
a sentence like ‘S should (doxastically) have D to P ’ is implicitly relativized to
information-states. On the contextualist semantics that I will put forward in this
chapter, this phenomenon is taken to be that such a sentence means, roughly, ‘in
light of i, S should have D to P ’, where i is the information-state provided by the
context in which the sentence is uttered. One could accept this semantics, but
posit that contexts of utterance always provide the same kind of information-state,
e.g., the subject’s. Contrary to this, I argue in this thesis that the doxastic ‘should’
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is fully information-sensitive and that contexts of utterance provide different kinds
of information-states. I call this view Doxastic Contextualism.
This chapter does two things. Several authors have tried to give a semantics
for the deontic ‘should’ that captures its information-sensitivity. However, all
of the suggested models focus on occurrences of the deontic ‘should’ where it
carries a practical sense. The first important contribution of this chapter is
that I show that Dowell (2013), Silk (2014) and Carr’s (2015) semantics can
also account for the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’. It is thus
not against the ‘general wisdom’ of current semantic theory to posit that the
doxastic ‘should’ is context-sensitive to information-states. However, I also show
that Cariani et al. (2013) and Charlow’s (2013) alternative models face some
difficulties with this. An interesting upshot of my discussion is consequently that
it gives semanticists one more parameter by which to judge semantic models of
information-sensitivity: as I will provide evidence in the next chapters that the
doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive, the failure of Cariani et al. (2013) and
Charlow’s (2013) semantics to capture this speaks against them and in favour of
the alternatives.
The second important thing I do in this chapter is to present a simplistic
contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ that accounts for the latter’s
information-sensitivity. My account is inspired by and in line with Dowell (2013),
Silk (2014) and Carr’s (2015) models, but lacks their detail. According to it, a
sentence of the form ‘S should have D to P ’ is true iff having D to P is supported
by the information-state i provided by the context in which the sentence is uttered.
To be clear, this chapter is not supposed to offer an argument in favour of
Doxastic Contextualism. Rather, the chapter explains Doxastic Contextualism
and shows how it can be integrated into the current literature on the semantics of
deontic modals. I will provide evidence for Doxastic Contextualism in chapters
3 to 5. However, as I have stated above, a contextualist semantics is only one
possible way to take account of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’.
As I suggested towards the end of chapter 1, dynamic semantics might also have
a way to account for the phenomenon that the doxastic ‘should’ is sensitive to
information-states and the evidence provided in chapters 3 to 5 could thus equally
be evidence for a dynamic semantics of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic
‘should’. For reasons of scope, I won’t assess such an account, or any other
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non-truth-conditional one, here and don’t claim that Doxastic Contextualism
is superior to it. That said, I will discuss one rival account of the information-
sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’, namely relativism, in chapter 7.
I will proceed as follows in the present chapter. Section 2.2 gives a quick
overview of modal expressions, the semantic category that ‘should’ falls into.
Section 2.3 explains Angelika Kratzer’s standard semantics for modal expressions,
in particular for the term ‘must’. Section 2.4 discusses several recent attempts at
developing Kratzer’s account of ‘must’ into a semantics for the deontic ‘should’.
Section 2.5 looks at the mentioned current contextualist semantic accounts of the
information-sensitivity of the deontic ‘should’, and in section 2.6 I show that some,
but not all of them, can capture the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’.
Section 2.7 presents my simplistic semantics for the information-sensitivity of
the doxastic ‘should’. In section 2.8, I turn to metasemantics and discuss which
features of a context determine what the information-state provided by this context
is.
2.2 Modality in Language
‘Should’ is a modal auxiliary like ‘must’ or ‘can’. It belongs to the big family of
modal expressions. Besides modal auxiliaries, there are modal verbs like ‘have
to’ or ‘need to’, modal adjectives like ‘possible’ or ‘necessary’, and modal nouns
like ‘possibility’ or ‘necessity’. There exist further ways to express modality in
English, like modal adverbs, verbal mood, and many others (Portner 2009: 4-8).
What all these expressions have in common is that they allow us to talk about
“situations which need not be real” (ibid.: 1). For example,
(1) It is possible that the Queen will become a 100 years old.
is true, even though it might turn out wrong that the Queen will live to her
100th birthday. This shared characteristic of modal expressions is also called
“displacement” (von Fintel and Heim 2011: 2).
A central feature of modality is that there are different “flavours” of it (Kratzer
1977). This is nicely illustrated by the following two sentences:
(2a) They must be in London by now as they left Edinburgh quite
early in the morning.
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(2b) You must honour your parents.
Both sentences contain ‘must’, but ‘must’ does not mean the same in them respec-
tively. The ‘must’ in (2a) is the one of epistemic modality, meaning something like
‘certainly’. The ‘must’ in (2b), however, is the one of deontic modality, roughly
meaning ‘morality requires that’. There are further modal flavours. Deontic
modality is a subtype of what some call priority modality. All subtypes of priority
modality concern what is best or preferred in terms of certain rankings: deontic
modality is about what is best in light of rules, like those of morality. Bouletic
modality concerns rankings based on one’s desires (2c), and teleological modality
what is best given one’s goals (2d).1
(2c) I must see this!
(2d) If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train.
A third major group of modals besides epistemic and priority modals are circum-
stantial or dynamic modals, which express what is possible given one’s abilities:
(2e) Mike can’t sing.
To sum up, a striking characteristic of modal expressions like ‘should’ is that they
don’t have a fixed meaning, but can express different dimensions of modality. We
will now turn to the standard semantics for modal terms by Angelika Kratzer,
which provides a formal framework that captures this central feature of modal
expressions.
2.3 Kratzer’s Standard Semantics for ‘Must’
In a series of articles (1977, 1981, 1991), Kratzer gives a semantics for modal
terms that is often described as the standard one. According to Portner (2009), it
deserves this title since it is the “working assumption in the semantics research”
and the theory “which a linguistically oriented semanticist is most likely to
recommend to students or colleagues who wish to learn about the theory of
1Different authors have suggested different taxonomies for types of modality. I am here
following Portner (2009: 135). I am not committed to his taxonomy. My aim is just to display
the diversity of modal flavours.
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modality” (ibid.: 47). Bronfman and Dowell (forthcoming) praise it as the “view
to beat” due to its “simple and highly unified explanations of a wide range of
language use”. Finlay (forthcoming) describes it as being “widely regarded as
orthodoxy.”
Kratzer herself does not provide an account for ‘should’ (Finlay 2014: 77, n.
64), but does so for the related ‘must’. In section 2.4, I will discuss semantics
specifically provided for ‘should’. These semantics are further developments of
Kratzer’s account of ‘must’ by other authors or can at least better be explained
in contrast to it. For this reason, I will here give a short explanation of Kratzer’s
semantics for ‘must’ first.
Kratzer’s account is a refinement of possible world semantics for modal expres-
sions. According to this semantics, modal expressions are propositional operators.
That is, they are functions that take propositions as arguments and assign them
truth-values. The proposition they take as argument is called the ‘prejacent’ in
the literature. Take the following example:
(3) Peter must pay his taxes.
The logical form of (3) is
(LF3) MUST (Peter pays his taxes),
where the proposition expressed by ‘Peter pays his taxes’ is the prejacent embedded
under the modal ‘must’ (von Fintel and Heim (2011: 30)). A central assumption
of possible world semantics for modal expressions is that modals are not just any
kind of propositional operator, but quantifiers. They take a proposition and map
it onto the truth-value 1 depending on whether the proposition holds at worlds
in a set of worlds the modal is quantifying over, the so-called ‘modal domain’.
Necessity modals like ‘must’ are universal quantifiers and map a proposition P to
1 iff P holds at all worlds in the modal domain. Possibility modals like ‘can’ or
‘might’ are existential quantifiers and map P to 1 iff P holds at some worlds in the
modal domain (ibid.). Modals of different flavours quantify over different domains
(ibid.: 32). Very roughly, the modal domain of epistemic modals consists of the
worlds compatible with the knowledge of the speaker, whereas deontic modals
quantify over all the worlds compatible with compliance with the relevant rules
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(ibid.: 33f.). We get the following lexical entries for the epistemic and deontic
‘must’:
Deontic Must Jmustdeontic φKc,w = 1 iff for all worlds v such that the rules
applying to w according to c are complied with at v, JφKc,v = 1.
Epistemic Must Jmustepistemic φKc,w = 1 iff for all worlds v such that v is
compatible with what the speaker of c knows at w, JφKc,v = 1.
A quick explanation of the notation is in order. The double brackets are inter-
pretation functions that map a linguistic expression onto its semantic value, i.e.,
in the case of sentences onto truth-values (ibid.: 5). Interpretation functions are
relativized to a context and a world. This reflects that sentences have truth-values
only relative to a world—a sentence is true at a world—and relative to a context
since sentences with indexical terms like ‘I’ or ‘here’ only express a particular
proposition relative to a context (ibid.: 7).2 Deontic Must says that the seman-
tic value of a sentence which consists of a deontic ‘must’ embedding a prejacent
φ is ‘1’ at a world w iff φ holds at all worlds in which the rules applying in w,
according to the context c where the sentence is uttered, are complied with. For
example, ‘Peter must pay his taxes’ is true in the actual world iff Peter pays his
taxes in all worlds where the rules of morality (or the fiscal legal rules), as they
apply to the actual world, are complied with.
Kratzer brought two main contributions to this general picture (Portner 2009:
47). First, on the above account, ‘must’ is ambiguous, which means that each
‘must’—the deontic, the epistemic, the bouletic, etc.—has its own lexical entry.
Kratzer (1977), on the other hand, provides a unified account, on which ‘must’
has a single lexical entry. Which modal flavour a particular ‘must’ expresses is a
function of the context of utterance of the relevant sentence. The set of worlds it
quantifies over is provided by what Kratzer calls “conversational backgrounds”,
functions given by the context. Which conversational backgrounds are provided by
the context determines which sets of worlds ‘must’ quantifies over and thus which
modal flavour it expresses. A modal like ‘must’ is therefore on this picture context-
2Moreover, sentences need to be relativized to a third parameter, an assignment function,
which assigns values to pronouns, traces, variables, etc. I’ll ignore this here since it is irrelevant
for our purposes.
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sensitive in a way similar to indexicals. To use Kaplan (1989b)’s terminology,
modals have a unified meaning in the sense that they have the same character, a
function from contexts to contents, but are context-sensitive since their character
assigns different contents to different contexts. The character of ‘I’ maps a context
to the speaker of the context. That is, ‘I’ has one character, but its content
varies with whoever is the speaker in the given context. Similarly, ‘must’ has one
character, which assigns different contexts different functions from propositions
to truth-values, depending on which set of worlds is provided by the respective
context as the modal domain for ‘must’.
The second contribution is the specific way in which in Kratzer’s model the
modal domain is determined. According to Kratzer (1981), context provides
two conversational backgrounds, two functions f and g, which take worlds as
an argument and assign them sets of propositions. The first function f is called
the modal base. Depending on the context, it assigns worlds different sets of
propositions. An epistemic modal base maps all the propositions known by the
speaker in a world onto that world. A circumstantial modal base assigns a world
certain facts that hold at that world (Kratzer 1991: 646). Following Carr (2015),
I will call the intersection of the propositions assigned by a modal base f , ∩f(w),
the modal background. The second function g, the ordering source, ranks the
worlds in the modal background. The ordering source does so by ranking the
worlds according to how close they are to the propositions in g(w), i.e., the set of
propositions assigned to w by g, which I will call the ordering background. For a
world v in the modal background to be best according to the ordering background
g(w), or short, to be g(w)-best, the following must hold: all propositions in the
ordering background that are true at any other world in the modal background
are also true at v and there are some propositions in the ordering background
that are true at v, but at no other worlds in the modal background. The set of
g(w)-best worlds in the modal background is the modal domain.3 Equipped with
3The assumption that every ordering source used by natural language induces a set of best
worlds is called the ‘limit assumption’ (Lewis 1973). It is controversial since there are possible
ordering sources that do not induce sets of best worlds. For example, think of an ordering source
reflecting King Midas’ wish to always be richer. Whatever number of gold coins he owns in a
world, there will always be a world in which he owns one more gold coin and which hence will
be better (Portner 2009: 65). Kratzer (1981) herself does not make the limit assumption and
therefore provides an analysis of ‘must’ which is more complex than the following Must in order
to accommodate ordering sources that don’t induce sets of best worlds. I ignore this complexity
here since it’s irrelevant for our purposes.
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this, we get the following lexical entry for ‘must’ (Portner 2009: 67):
Must Jmust φKc,f,g,w = 1 iff for all worlds v such that v is among the g(w)-best
worlds in ∩f(w), Jmust φKc,f,g,v = 1.
In other words, ‘must φ’ holds true at a world w iff ‘φ’ is true at all those worlds
in the intersection of the set of propositions assigned by the modal base to w
which are g(w)-best. Notice that the interpretation function is now also relativized
to a modal base f and an ordering source g. Where these parameters are not
determined by some linguistic material—for example by phrases like ‘in light of
the British tax laws’—they are determined by context (Bronfman and Dowell
forthcoming).
There are several reasons why Kratzer (1981, 1991) sees a necessity for a
second conversational background, an ordering source, on top of the modal base
to determine the modal domain. At first sight, one might think that a modal
base alone would do. For example, this one conversational background could in
contexts where the modal has a deontic flavour simply be a function to propositions
describing what the rules prescribe, or in context where the modal is epistemic
a function to the propositions known by the speaker. However, such a simpler
model cannot account for expressions of graded modality such as
(4) There is a slight possibility that they are not coming tonight.
(5) Eating vanilla ice cream is more desirable than eating chocolate
ice cream.
If we only have a modal base, we can only make coarse-grained distinctions
between worlds: between those that are epistemically possible and those that are
not or those in which what is desirable is achieved and those in which it is not.
But (4) and (5) require finer distinctions. We have to compare worlds in terms of
how likely or desirable they are. Since ordering sources can provide rankings along
these lines, they help to account for graded modality. A further advantage of two
conversational backgrounds is, according to Kratzer (1991: 642), that they can
better resolve certain deontic paradoxes involving modals and conditionals, e.g.,
the Samaritan Paradox, and account for deontic modals expressing inconsistent
rules.
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2.4 Semantics for the Deontic ‘Should’
‘Should’ and ‘must’ differ in meaning. For one, ‘must’ entails ‘should’, but not vice
versa, as the following examples indicate (Harman 1993; von Fintel and Iatridou
2008: 117).
(6a) You should visit your grandma, but it is not the case that you
must visit her.
(6b) #You must visit your grandma, but it is not the case that you
should do this.
Since ‘must’ is thus logically stronger than ‘should’, ‘must’ is often called a strong
necessity modal, whereas ‘should’ is labelled a weak necessity modal. Standardly,
philosophers describe the difference in meaning between the deontic ‘must’ and
the deontic ‘should’ as follows: ‘You should do A’ means that doing A is the best
of one’s options (where ‘A’ is a variable for an action, understood broadly, i.e.,
it can also stand in for doxastic attitudes). On the other hand, ‘you must do A’
means that doing A is the only option one has, for example in order to achieve one
of one’s goals (Sloman 1970: 390f.; Williams 1981: 125). Due to these differences
in meaning, we need a semantics for ‘should’ that is different from that for ‘must’.
The reader might wonder why I focus on the doxastic ‘should’ rather than
‘must’ in this thesis. If the standard semantics for modals, Kratzer’s, gives an
account of ‘must’, but not ‘should’, wouldn’t it be easier to investigate what
the implications of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘must’ are for
normative epistemology? I have three reasons for being concerned with the
doxastic ‘should’ instead. First, epistemologists seem to rather talk about what
we ‘should’ than what we ‘must’ believe. Since I want this investigation into
the semantics of epistemic-normative discourse to yield insights on debates in
normative epistemology, it is thus wise to focus on those aspects of discourse
which normative epistemologists are more likely to engage in. Second, from a
Google search of expressions like ‘You must believe P ’ it appears that they express
more often than expressions like ‘You should believe P ’ that the addressee should
believe P for non-epistemic reasons or at least not fully epistemic reasons, but
rather for practical reasons, like religious ones. Take the following verses from the
New International version of the Bible:
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But when you ask, you must believe and not doubt, because the one
who doubts is like a wave of the sea, blown and tossed by the wind.
That person should not expect to receive anything from the Lord.
(James 1:6-7)
An explanation of this could be that since ‘must’ is stronger, it expresses a more
stringent form of obligation or normative pressure and that epistemic concerns
rather seldom call for such an ‘urgent’ tone, unlike practical concerns. Third, and
most importantly, while information-sensitivity in weak deontic necessity modals
like ‘should’ has been widely discussed, it seems not to be a feature of strong
deontic necessity modals like ‘must’. Since I’m interested in the relevance of this
semantic feature for normative epistemology, I focus on ‘should’.
While Kratzer herself does not give a semantics for ‘should’, several authors
have done so. Some of these theories are quite straightforward developments of
Kratzer’s general framework for modals, where others diverge more radically from
it. In the following, I will present these theories, in order to be able to show later
in subsection 2.6.1 how the doxastic ‘should’ can be modelled within these current
semantic accounts of ‘should’.
First, there are a couple of authors who provide a semantics for ‘should’ that
keeps crucial elements of Kratzer’s theory. For example, von Fintel and Iatridou
(ms, 2008) suggest to account for the difference between ‘must’ and ‘should’ by
simply adding a third conversational background, a second ordering source. Let’s
call this secondary ordering source ‘h’.4 The conversational background h ranks
the g(w)-best worlds in ∩f(w). To see how this captures the difference between
‘should’ and ‘must’, take the following examples:
(7a) In order to travel from St Andrews to Edinburgh, you must leave
Fife.
(7b) In order to travel from St Andrews to Edinburgh, you should
take the train.
4These authors, and some of the others whose semantics for ‘should’ I will discuss in the
following, actually focus on ‘ought’. However, ‘ought’ and ‘should’ are extremely similar in
meaning and what applies to one of them in terms of information-sensitivity will apply to the
other, too. Cariani (2013: 73) calls ‘ought’ a “near-synonym” of ‘should’; Finlay (2014: 72)
simply describes them as synonymous.
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Von Fintel and Iatridou suggest that in the case of such teleological modals the
primary ordering source g simply assigns that proposition to a world w that
describes the state of affairs mentioned by the ‘in order to’-phrase. In light of
this ordering source, those worlds are best in which the subject achieves the goal
described by the phrase. Thus, assuming that w is the actual world, it holds that
the subject must leave Fife since in all the g(w)-best-worlds in the set of worlds
determined by the modal base f(w), the subject leaves Fife.5 This captures the
sense of ‘must’ as being similar to ‘only’: leaving Fife is the only option for the
subject to travel to Edinburgh (in comparison to the option of not leaving Fife).
The second ordering source h ranks all these g(w)-best-worlds by the standard of
how well the goal is achieved in these worlds, for example, whether it was done
in a cheap and comfortable way. If (7b) is true, this means that in all worlds
where the subject travels from St Andrews to Edinburgh in the most preferable
way, the subject takes the train. This account of ‘should’ aims at modelling the
idea that ‘should’ is akin to ‘best’. A further advantage of this semantics is that
the set of worlds ‘should’ quantifies over is a proper subset of the set of worlds
‘must’ quantifies over since the former set only contains the h(w)-best worlds in
the latter set. It follows that ‘must’ entails ‘should’, but not vice versa, just as
usually assumed (von Fintel and Iatridou 2008: 119). Von Fintel and Iatridou
(2008) focus on teleological modals, and only discuss deontic modals on the side.
They suggest though that a similar picture might be applicable to deontic modals,
where the secondary ordering source reflects less coercive norms than the primary
one.6
Another proposal in the tradition of Kratzer is Alex Silk’s (2012), according
to which weak necessity modals are conditional strong necessity modals. The idea
is that ‘it should be that P ’ means roughly ‘if certain conditions C obtain, it
must be that P ’, where the meaning of ‘must’ in the consequent is taken to be
as suggested by Kratzer. The idea behind this account is that a characteristic
feature of ‘should’ is that even if it should be that P , it is not the case that P
has to obtain no matter what. For example, ‘you should keep your promises’ does
5This rests on the assumption that f(w) is either circumstantial, i.e., reflects the geographical
facts concerning Fife, or the epistemic modal background of a speaker who knows about these
facts.
6Charlow (2013) endorses von Fintel and Iatridou’s proposal to introduce a second ordering
source.
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not mean that you have to keep your promises whatever may be. If saving one’s
life demands breaking a promise, keeping the promise is not required, but ‘you
should keep your promises’ nevertheless holds true. This analysis also has the
advantage that it predicts that ‘must’ entails ‘should’, but not vice versa. If ‘you
must do A’ means that doing A is required under any circumstances, it of course
entails that doing A is required under the specific circumstances C under which
it is required according to the truth of ‘you should do A’.
An alternative, second strategy is to deviate more strongly from Kratzer’s
model. Finlay (2014: Ch.3; forthcoming) suggests to understand ‘should’ not
as a universal quantifier akin to ‘all’, but rather as alike to ‘most’. Where ‘you
must do A’ means that you do A in all worlds of the relevant domain, ‘you should
do A’ means that you do so in most of them. Again, this captures that ‘must’
entails ‘should’ since ‘all’ entails ‘most’. Besides changing the modal force of
the quantifier expressed by ‘should’ in contrast to ‘must’, Finlay only posits one
conversational background, rather than two as Kratzer does. The modal domain
this parameter creates consists of a modal background ∩f(w), updated with a
contextually salient goal or end z. ‘It should be that P ’ means on this account
that in most worlds in the modal background in which the goal z is achieved,
P rather than any of a set of contextually salient alternatives to P is the case
(Finlay 2014: 73). ‘It should be that P ’ is accordingly the case iff it is more likely
that the relevant goal z is achieved if P rather than any of certain alternatives to
P occurs. This captures the thought that ‘should’ is a bit like ‘best’, in the sense
that it describes what is the best means to achieve a particular end.
I would like to point out that all these semantic accounts for ‘should’ have in
common that ‘should’ is context-sensitive according to them. This holds of the
Kratzer-style inspired accounts by von Fintel and Iatridou as well as by Charlow
since the conversational backgrounds (three in their case) are determined by
context. On Silk’s account, ‘should’ is context-sensitive since the meaning of
‘should’ is, inter alia, composed of the meaning of ‘must’, which is context-sensitive,
and because the specific condition C, under which one is required to do A if ‘You
should do A’ holds, is also contextually provided. Finally, the goal z that is part
of the truth-conditions of should-sentences according to Finlay is also given by
the context.
On all these semantics, context does not only fix whether ‘should’ expresses
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epistemic or priority modality, but also which kind of priority modality or, even
more specific, deontic modality it expresses. For example, ‘should’ can express
what would be best or ideal in light of legal rules, the rules of morality or the
rules of tennis. Depending on the particular theory, this is either a function of
the ordering sources or of the ends that are contextually provided.
2.5 Information-Sensitivity
After having discussed some prominent semantic theories of the deontic ‘should’
(more or less) within the Kratzerian tradition, I will now turn to a characteristic of
the deontic ‘should’ that is at the centre of this thesis: its information-sensitivity.
I first explain what information-sensitivity is and then present how semantic
theories in the literature account for it.
2.5.1 The Phenomenon
An information-state is usually considered to be a set of worlds (Kolodny and
MacFarlane 2010: 130). Alternatively, information-states could be modelled as
probability distributions over propositions, as suggested by, for example, Yalcin
(2011: 299) and Wedgwood (forthcoming: sec. 3). As I use the term ‘information-
state’, an information-states can represent a subject’s or a collective’s body of
evidence, but can also just represent all facts, which might not be anybody’s
evidence (or only God’s).
The idea that the deontic ‘should’ is information-sensitive amounts on a
contextualist treatment of this phenomenon to the claim that sentences of the
form ‘S should do A’ roughly mean ‘in light of information-state i, S should do
A’, where i is provided by the context in which the sentence is uttered. That
is, there is no such thing as what one should do simpliciter, but only what one
should do in light of an information-state. Furthermore, there must be at least
two information-states i1 and i2 which are such that at least one instance of ‘S
should do A’ is true in light of i1, but false in light of i2 (Kolodny and MacFarlane
2010: 133). Finally, for the deontic ‘should’ to be fully information-sensitive, there
also have to be at least two contexts that provide these two information-states i1
and i2. Otherwise, it would only be possible, but never actually occur, that an
instance of ‘S should do A’ is true if uttered in one and false if uttered in another
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context of utterance. In the following, ‘information-sensitivity’ always means full
information-sensitivity.
Before moving on to particular instances of information-sensitivity, it needs
to be pointed out that the phenomenon need not be modelled by contextualist
semantics. Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and in particular MacFarlane (2014:
ch. 11) propose a relativist semantics for the deontic ‘should’, which captures
its information-sensitivity as follows. Sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ are
not true simpliciter, but only relative to so-called ‘contexts of assessment’. A
context of assessment is, as the name suggests, a context from which a sentence
is truth-evaluated, which is often not the same context as the one in which it
was uttered, as when I evaluate a sentence you uttered. One of the contextual
parameters of contexts of assessments are information-states. ‘S should do A’ can
hence be true relative to one context of assessment, but false relative to another.
The main differences between contextualist and relativist semantics of the
deontic ‘should’ with respect to information-sensitivity are accordingly the fol-
lowing two: First, contextualism entails that ‘S should do A’ expresses different
propositions when uttered at two contexts with two different information-states
i1 and i2. In the first context, it means ‘S should do A in light of i1’ and in the
second ‘S should do A in light of i2’. According to relativism, the sentence always
expresses the same proposition. Second, for contextualists, if ‘S should do A’ is
uttered in a context, it is true or false simpliciter. For relativists, it is only true or
false relative to contexts of assessment. In the remainder of this chapter, and in
fact in chapters 3 to 6 as well, I will only discuss information-sensitivity through
the lense of contextualism. I will return to relativism in chapter 7. Besides
relativism, a dynamic semantics of the deontic ‘should’ can also give an account
of its information-sensitivity (Willer forthcoming: sec. 3.2). As explained above,
I ignore dynamic semantics in this thesis for reasons of scope.
Let’s move on to particular instances of information-sensitivity. The distinction
between the subjective and the objective ‘should’, as it is often made in ethics7
and also by some authors in epistemology8, can be seen as one. What a subject
S should do in the objective sense of ‘should’ is what S should do in light of
7See Ross (1939), Prichard (1932), Ewing (1953), Brandt (1963), Jackson (1986), and Parfit
(2011).
8See Brandt (1967), Gibbard (2005), and Wedgwood (forthcoming).
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the relevant facts, and what S should do in the subjective sense, is what S
should do in light of their evidence. The subjective and the objective ‘should’
can accordingly be seen as results of relativizing the deontic ‘should’ to different
information-states.9
In the recent literature on the semantics for the deontic ‘should’, it has been
pointed out that we also sometimes talk about what others should do in light of
our collective evidence, i.e., their and our joint evidence.10 Such occasions seem
to arise when we’re giving advice. Here is a much discussed example:
Miners.11 Ten miners are trapped either in shaft 1 or in shaft 2.
Floodwaters threaten to flood the shafts. Sean has enough sandbags
to block one shaft, but not both. If Sean blocks one shaft, all the
water will go into the other shaft, killing any miners inside it. If Sean
blocks neither shaft, both shafts will fill halfway with water, and just
one miner, the lowest in the shaft where the miners are, will be killed.
Sean does not know in which shaft the miners are. He says:
(8) I should block neither shaft.
A physicist, who knows that the miners are in shaft 1, hears this and
says to Sean:
(9) No, you should block shaft 1.
Intuitively, (8) and (9) are both correct. One way to explain this is that (8) is
true since in light of Sean’s evidence, he should block neither shaft, and that (9)
is true since in light of Sean’s and the physicist’s collective evidence, Sean should
block shaft 1. Since the physicist is giving advice, she’s not talking about what
Sean should do in light of just his evidence, but rather what he should do in
light of their combined evidence, which includes her better-informed evidence.12
9For more on this, see chapter 3.
10See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), and Dowell (2013).
11This case is introduced to the current debate about the information-sensitivity of deontic
modals by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010). They credit Parfit (ms) and Regan (1980).
12In chapter 5, I will argue that in advice cases like this, the advisee, here Sean, is actually
also talking to the collective evidence, and that (8) is false. This does not undermine that there
is a subjective ‘should’ as there are other cases where speakers talk relative to the subject’s
evidence. See, for example, Miners-CCTV in subsection 2.5.3 and Nostalgia in subsection
2.6.2 below.
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If this is the accurate explanation of the meaning of (9), Miners is a case in
which ‘should’ is neither subjective nor objective, but relativized to the collective
evidence. Contextualism brings order to this “profusion” (Jackson 1991: 471) of
‘should’s. It models them as different instances of one lexical entry for ‘should’,
which result from ‘should’ being relativized to different contextually provided
information-states.
Many authors argue that a specific theory capturing the information-sensitivity
of ‘should’ is needed since Kratzer’s standard account of modals, in its original
version, cannot do this.13 The ordering source g is realistic in that it ranks worlds
in light of the facts, not in light of some agent’s less-than-omniscient information-
state. For example, the standard Kratzerian ordering source in the context of
Sean’s utterance ranks the worlds in the modal background relative to an ordering
background containing the proposition <All miners are saved>14.15 Worlds where
Sean blocks the shaft in which the miners are are closer to this ideal than worlds
where Sean blocks neither shaft. Thus, it is not true in all the best-ranked worlds
that Sean blocks neither shaft. It follows that Kratzer’s theory can’t account for
the truth of (8).
One might think that one could model information-sensitivity in Kratzer’s
semantics by assuming that the modal base of an information-sensitive ‘should’
is epistemic, not circumstantial. That is, rather than containing all the worlds
compatible with a certain realistic, i.e., true, description of how the world is in
relevant features (e.g., that the miners are in shaft 1), it contains all the worlds
compatible with what the speaker knows. This way, we can get the subject’s
information-state to play a role in the truth-conditions of a sentence containing
‘should’, at least where the subject is also the speaker, as in the case of (8).
However, this won’t get the results we need. The set of worlds compatible with
what Sean knows contain both worlds where the miners are in shaft 1 and where
they are in shaft 2. The worlds where the miners are in shaft 1 and Sean blocks
shaft 1 and those where they are in shaft 2 and Sean blocks shaft 2 will be higher
13See Dowell (2013: 150), Cariani et al. (2013: 244), and Charlow (2013: 2303). For an
objection to this, see Silk (2014: 709).
14Throughout this thesis, I use angle brackets to mark propositions.
15I’m ignoring here the additional complexities arising from modifying Kratzer’s theory of
‘must’ so that it works for ‘should’. Even when they are accounted for, the point about Kratzerian
ordering sources being realistic stands.
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ranked than those where he blocks neither shaft, since in the former kinds of
worlds he saves 10 miners, where in the latter only 9. Thus, making the modal
base epistemic rather than circumstantial won’t help (Cariani et al. 2013: 235).
2.5.2 Option 1: Information-Sensitive Ordering Sources
Dowell (2012, 2013) suggests supplementing Kratzer’s semantics by making the
ordering source of the subjective ‘should’ dependent on information-states. In
cases like (8), where a should-sentence is true since it is true in light of a subject’s
information-state, but not in light of the facts, the ordering source ranks worlds
in light of the subject’s evidence, not in light of the facts. An ordering source
sensitive to Sean’s lack of knowledge about the whereabouts of the miners is
thought to rank a world where he blocks neither shaft higher than one where he
blocks one of the shafts, even if the miners happen to be in that shaft. On this
picture, the subjective ‘should’ is contextually sensitive to information-states in
the sense that it is contextually sensitive to ordering sources, which again are
sensitive to contextually salient information-states.
Before I move on to other suggestions of how to alter Kratzer’s semantics to
accommodate information-sensitivity, a note on terminology. Dowell (2013: 158)
draws the distinction between the subjective and objective deontic ‘should’ such
that the hallmark of the subjective ‘should’ is that it is information-sensitive,
whereas the objective ‘should’ isn’t since its ordering source is realistic. On my
terminology, and the one of Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 117) and Wedgwood
(forthcoming: sec. 4), on the other hand, the deontic ‘should’ is in general
information-sensitive and the subjective and the objective ‘should’ are both
instances of this information-sensitivity. The objective ‘should’ is also relativized
to an information-state, but one that represents all the facts. I call this the
fully realistic information-state. This might not be anybody’s information-state
(or only God’s), but since information-sensitivity is a merely technical term, I
don’t see why we shouldn’t construe the objective ‘should’ as a limiting case of
information-sensitivity.
Dowell does not provide any motivation for her terminology, except that
Angelika Kratzer suggested this to her in personal communication (Dowell 2013:
158, n. 22), and I don’t think that there is some substantial disagreement here.
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Dowell defines the objective ‘should’ as having an ordering source that is insensitive
to somebody’s information-state, which is the same as having a ordering source
that is sensitive to the fully realistic information-state. Thus, this all comes
down to what we understand as an information-state. Following Kolodny and
MacFarlane (2010: 117) and Wedgwood (forthcoming: sec. 4), I use the term in a
more flexible fashion.
A further remark on terminology: when I speak of the subjective ‘should’, I
only mean cases where ‘should’ is relativized to the subject’s information-state,
unlike Dowell, who calls any instance of the deontic ‘should’ that is relativized to
an information-state that represents somebody’s evidence, be it the subject’s, the
speaker’s or the collective evidence, ‘subjective’. Where ‘should’ is relativized to,
for example, the collective evidence, I call it collective. Again, I think this is a
merely terminological issue and that nothing major hinges on this.16
Jennifer Carr (2015) argues that Dowell’s twist on Kratzer’s semantics has
the problem that it does not get the following sentence right:
(10) If they are in shaft 1, I should block shaft 1.
Our intuition is supposed to be that (10) is correct. But imagine we are in a
context in which Sean’s information-state is salient. In this context, (10) will turn
out wrong. On Kratzer’s standard account of conditionals, the ‘if’-clause of an
indicative conditional restricts the modal base of the modal in the consequent.
The truth-conditions for an indicative conditional with a necessity modal in the
consequent read on this picture as follows (Kratzer 1991: 648):
If JIf φ, should ψKw,c,f,g = 1 iff JshouldψKw,c,f+,g = 1, where for any world v, w,
f+(w) = f(w) ∪ { v : JφKc,f,g,v = 1 }.
The expression with the curly brackets represents the set of worlds in which ‘φ’,
the antecedent, is true. Thus, (10) is true at w iff Sean is blocking shaft 1 in all
the g(w)-best worlds in the set that contains all and only those worlds in the
modal background ∩f(w) in which the miners are in shaft 1. But this is not the
case since ‘should’ is subjective and the ordering source g therefore ranks worlds
16For more on the subjective and objective ‘should’, see chapter 3. For more on the collective
‘should’, see chapters 5 and 6.
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in which Sean blocks neither shaft still higher than those where Sean blocks shaft
1. One might argue that whenever (10) is uttered, the context changes such that
‘should’ becomes objective. In light of a realistic ordering, worlds where Sean
blocks shaft 1 are ranked best. Carr replies that, intuitively, there is no change
in the contextually salient priorities, i.e., in the ordering source, in the following
discourse where (8) precedes (10):
(8) I should block neither shaft.
(10) If they are in shaft 1, I should block shaft 1.
Silk (2014) defends a proposal along the lines of Dowell, even though in a formally
far more detailed manner. He suggests that the ordering sources g does not
only take a world of evaluation as an argument, but also a contextually provided
information-state, which ranks worlds in light of it. The problem Carr describes
for Dowell’s account is avoided by the assumption that an ‘if’-clause updates
not only the modal background of the ‘should’ in the consequent, but also the
information-state that g takes as an argument.17 It would restrict this information-
state to worlds in which the miners are in shaft 1. An ordering source which is
determined by this updated information-state will rank those worlds best where
Sean blocks shaft 1, which will make (10) true (Silk 2014: 707).
Carr’s (2015) own proposal is to have three, instead of two parameters. The
first parameter is an information-state, which is in her model a pair of a modal
background, i.e., the intersection of the propositions the modal base is mapped
on to, and a probability function that assigns probabilities to the worlds in this
modal background. The second parameter is a value function, which maps worlds
to numbers, i.e., evaluates them. The third parameter is a decision rule. Decision
rules rank the worlds in the modal background based on the probability function
and the value function. For example, if the decision rule is to maximize expected
utility, it ranks those worlds in the modal background best which according to the
probability function of the first parameter and the value function of the second
have the highest expected utility. (8) is predicted to be true on this account if we
assume that the decision rule that is provided by the context in combination with
Sean’s information-state ranks worlds in which he blocks neither shaft highest.
17In cases where the modal background is epistemic, the information-state and the modal
background will be identical.
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This will, for example, be the case if the principle is to maximize expected utility.
Since Sean has no clue whether the miners are in shaft 1 or 2, Sean’s probability
distribution assigns the propositions <The miners are in shaft 1> and <The
miners are in shaft 2> a probability of 0.5, respectively. Assuming that the value
function assigns saving all miners a value of, let’s say, 10, and saving 9 a value of
9, blocking neither shaft has an expected utility of 9 and blocking shaft 1 and
blocking shaft 2 respectively an expected utility of 5.
(10) is correct, too, because the ‘if’-clause updates the information-state such
that (i) the modal background is restricted to worlds where the miners are in
shaft 1 and (ii) the probability function Pr is updated to Pr∗=Pr(· | The miners
are in shaft 1). This updated information-state will assign a probability of 1 to
the propositions that the miners are in shaft 1. If the decision rule is, again,
to maximize expected utility, this will yield the result that blocking shaft 1 is
ranked highest and (10) accordingly true because blocking shaft 1 has the highest
expected utility out of all alternative actions relative to the probability function
Pr∗.
Notice that Carr’s account avoids any kind of commitment to a specific decision
rule. It is not part of her semantics that the decision rule in the context of (8) or
(10) is, for example, maximization of expected utility. Rather, she argues that the
reason (8) and (10) are true is because the contexts of their utterance provide
decision rules that make (8) and (10) true. The decision rule does not have to be
‘Maximize expected utility!’ Which decision theoretic principle ‘should’ expresses
in these contexts is on Carr’s picture a matter of metasemantics, i.e., of how
contextual parameters are resolved, not of the semantics of ‘should’ itself. This
will be of relevance in the next subsection when we look at alternatives to Carr’s
(2015) account.
Despite these differences, Carr’s (2015) theory incorporates information-
sensitivity in a fashion very similar to Dowell (2013) and Silk’s (2014). As
Carr (2015: 705) points out, her decision rules are generalizations of Kratzer-like
ordering source; they perform the same function of ordering worlds in the modal
background. Like Dowell (2013) and Silk (2014), Carr (2015) makes this ordering
sensitive to a contextually provided information-state. The three hence account for
the information-sensitivity of ‘should’ in the same way: the contextually provided
ordering source ranks in light of a contextually provided information-state.
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The reader might have noticed that all of these three different theories gloss
over the distinction between ‘must’ and ‘should’. They all work within Kratzer’s
standard semantics for ‘must’ and ignore the additional technical steps necessary
to account for ‘should’, such as adding a second ordering source (von Fintel and
Iatridou ms, 2008), treating ‘should’-sentences as hidden conditionals (Silk 2012),
or changing the modal force of the quantifier (Finlay 2014, forthcoming). The
same is true of the theories we’ll turn to in the next subsection. I assume the
authors do so for the sake of simplicity and because it is reasonably clear how
their treatments of information-sensitivity can be applied to the more complex
semantic accounts of ‘should’. For example, all these accounts of ‘should’ rely
on ordering sources in some way or another, so the treatments of information-
sensitivity discussed in the present subsection can be applied to these accounts by
making the relevant ordering sources information-sensitive. In the remainder of
this chapter, I will follow these authors’ lead: in the next section 2.6, where I will
discuss the doxastic ‘should’, I will first explain how the semantic accounts for
the deontic ‘should’ mentioned can be applied to the doxastic ‘must’ and ‘should’;
but when I explain, in the next step, how the models of information-sensitivity
discussed here and in the next subsection can be applied to the doxastic ‘should’,
I will ignore the difference between ‘must’ and ‘should’. This will save us getting
into a lot of irrelevant complications.
2.5.3 Option 2: DP Models
Cariani et al. (2013) deviate farther from Kratzer’s account by adding a third
parameter, a decision problem. I therefore call their model and the very similar
one by Charlow (2013) decision problem models—or short, DP models. A decision
problem is a function from a world to a set of ‘choosable’ actions. Choosable
actions are those actions that an agent can do knowingly. For example, if I am
faced with the problem of whether to turn right or left in world w, this decision
problem will map w onto the following set of propositions: {<I turn left>, <I turn
right>}. It is crucial that the modal background is epistemic, not circumstantial
on Cariani et al.’s account. That is, the modal background is the set of worlds
compatible with the speaker’s knowledge. The decision problem forms a partition
on the modal background by dividing it into cells representing the actions that
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are choosable for the agent. In the miners case, this is the decision set ∆miners:
∆miners: {<Sean blocks shaft 1>, <Sean blocks shaft 2>, <Sean
blocks neither shaft>}.
It is important that the proposition <Sean saves all miners> is not an element of
it. This is so since saving all miners is not an action that Sean can do knowingly,
given his ignorance about where the miners are. Finally, Cariani et al. (2013: 231)
represent the ordering background for the miners case as the set Γminers:
Γminers: {<All miners are saved>, <At least 9 miners are saved>,
<At least 8 miners are saved>,..., <At least 1 miner is saved>}
Γminers ranks those propositions in the decision set ∆miners highest that entail
the most of the propositions in Γminers. Consequently, the proposition <blocking
neither shaft> is ranked highest since it entails all propositions in Γminers except
for <All miners are saved>. The other two propositions entail none of the
propositions in Γminers. Remember that the modal background is epistemic and
thus contains both worlds where the miners are in shaft 1 and worlds where they
are in shaft 2. Thus, the cell <Sean blocks shaft 1> of the modal background
contains both worlds where Sean blocks shaft 1 and the miners are in shaft 1
and worlds where he blocks shaft 1 and they are in shaft 2. Thus, <Sean blocks
shaft 1> entails none of the propositions in Γminers since it also holds at worlds
where no miners are saved. The same holds for <Sean blocks shaft 2>. Therefore,
<Sean blocks neither shaft> is ranked highest and (8) turns out true.18
(10) is also correct since its ‘if’-clause restricts the modal background of
the ‘should’ in the consequent to worlds where the miners are in shaft 1. The
propositions describing Sean’s choosable actions within this modal background
thus all only contain worlds in which the miners are in shaft 1. The proposition
<Sean blocks shaft 1>, which is part of this restricted decision set, therefore
entails all propositions in the ordering background. If Sean blocks shaft 1 and the
18Charlow (2013) pursues a similar strategy. Following von Fintel and Iatridou (ms, 2008)’s
suggestion to add a second ordering source to the semantics for ‘should’, he claims that the second
ordering source ranks actions in contexts where the ‘should’ is sensitive to an information-state
on basis of whether they are choosable in Cariani et al.’s sense. Blocking neither shaft is then said
to be the action which is the highest ranked if the first ordering source, which ranks according to
how many lives are saved, and the second one are merged.
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miners are in shaft 1, this is guaranteed to save all 10 miners, and thus at least 9
miners, etc. The proposition is accordingly ranked highest and (10) true.
The information-sensitivity of ‘should’ is in this theory captured by the fact
that which actions are choosable depends (i) on the knowledge, i.e., the information-
state, of the subject the respective should-sentence is about and (ii) the epistemic
modal background.
Carr (2015) objects to this proposal by Cariani et al. (2013) (and the similar
one by Charlow 2013) that it carries a commitment to a specific decision-theoretic
principle. ‘Sean should block shaft 1’ will turn out false even if Sean knows that
there is an objective chance of 97% that the miners are in shaft 1. In this case,
he cannot knowingly perform the action of saving all 10 miners since for this he
would need to know that they are in shaft 1, which he doesn’t. The action <Sean
blocks shaft 1> contains some worlds in which the miners are in shaft 2 since his
knowledge does not rule this possibility out, even though he considers it highly
unlikely. Again, blocking neither shaft will thus be the highest ranked action since
it entails the most propositions in the ordering background.
This consequence of Cariani et al.’s account expresses a commitment to the
decision-theoretic principle Maximin, which requires choosing that action whose
worst possible outcome is the best among the worst possible outcomes of all
alternative actions. Blocking shaft 1 has in the described scenario the highest
expected utility (0.97 × 10 lives saved) compared to the alternative options of
blocking neither shaft (1.0× 9 lives saved) and blocking shaft 1 (0.03× 10 lives
saved). However, the worst possible outcome of blocking shaft 1 or blocking shaft
2, which is that no miners are saved, is worse than the worst possible outcome
of blocking neither shaft, which is that 9 miners are saved. So Cariani et al.’s
semantics has a commitment built into it to the Maximin principle, rather than
for example the principle of maximizing expected utility. As Carr argues, however,
such normative issues shouldn’t be part of the semantics of the term ‘should’. In
other words, which decision-theoretic principle is correct should not be a matter
of the meaning of ‘should’.19
I think there is a further problem with DP models: they cannot account for
cases where the speaker is speaking relative to an information-state that is not
their own. Consider the following variant of Miners:
19For an argument against this claim see Charlow (forthcoming).
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Miners-CCTV. Everything is as in Miners, except that the physicist
is not at the mine, but watches Sean via CCTV. After Sean utters (8),
the physicist says:
(11) Yes, Sean should block neither shaft. Given what he knows, this
is the only responsible thing to do.
The first sentence of (11) rings true, since the physicist apparently means by it
that Sean should block neither shaft in light of his evidence, even though she
knows that the miners are in shaft 1. According to DP models, (11) is false
though. To see this, let’s remember what the decision set is:
∆miners: {<Sean blocks shaft 1>, <Sean blocks shaft 2>, <Sean
blocks neither shaft>}.
As ∆miners is a partition on the epistemic modal background, which is the set
of worlds compatible with the speaker’s, i.e., the physicist’s, knowledge, <Sean
blocks shaft 1> only contains worlds in which the miners are in shaft 1. It follows
that, just as in Miners, <Sean blocks shaft 1> entails all propositions in the
ordering background Γminers and that it is hence ranked the highest. It follows
that (11) is false as <Sean blocks neither shaft> is not ranked highest.
In reply to this problem, a defender of a DP model could give up the assumption
that the epistemic modal background must be the set of worlds compatible with
the speaker’s knowledge. For example, assume that when the physicist utters
(11), the epistemic modal background is the set of worlds compatible with Sean’s
knowledge, rather than hers; the reason for this could be that the physicist is
trying to talk about what Sean should do in light of his knowledge, rather than
in light of hers. If the decision set ∆miners is a partition on Sean’s, rather than
the physicist’s, epistemic background, <Sean blocks shaft 1> will contain both
worlds where the miners are in shaft 1 and where they are in shaft 2. As a result,
<Sean blocks shaft 1> won’t entail <All miners are saved> and thus won’t be
the highest ranked cell, but rather <Sean blocks neither shaft> will.
To sum up, we have seen that Cariani et al. (2013) and Charlow’s (2013)
DP models struggle to account for cases where a better-informed speaker talks
about what an agent should do in light of their inferior evidence. While the just
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suggested move might fix this for the practical ‘should’, I will argue in the next
section that it does not for the doxastic ‘should’.
2.6 Semantics for the Doxastic ‘Should’
Ideally, I would like to stay neutral between all these theories. It does not matter
much for my aim of investigating the implications of the information-sensitivity
of the doxastic ‘should’ how this phenomenon is exactly semantically modelled.
All I need for my purposes is that there is some way to do it. In this section, I
want to show how (some of) the theories discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5 can
be applied to the doxastic ‘should’. Subsection 2.6.1 explains how within those
theories ‘should’ comes to express epistemic normativity. Subsection 2.6.2 argues
that Dowell (2013), Silk (2014) and Carr’s (2015) semantic models can account
for information-sensitivity in the doxastic ‘should’, whereas Cariani et al. (2013)
and Charlow’s (2013) have difficulties with this.
2.6.1 Doxastic Ordering Sources
First, we need to understand how ‘should’ comes to express epistemic normativity.
The general idea that I suggest is straightforward: on Kratzer’s semantics for
‘must’, the flavour of modality that ‘must’ carries is partly determined by the
ordering source that is provided by the context in which ‘must’ occurs. ‘S must
do A’ occurring at c means that morality demands that S does A if the ordering
source provided by c ranks worlds according to whether S acts in accordance
with moral norms. Similarly, ‘S must believe P ’ occurring at c means that S is
epistemically required to believe P if c provides an ordering source that ranks
worlds according to whether S’s doxastic attitudes satisfy epistemic norms. In the
introduction I have characterized epistemic norms as being about what one should
believe in light of considerations pertaining to truth, knowledge, justification,
evidence, cognitive reliability, and the like. For example, a doxastic ordering
source could be such that it contains all and only worlds where the relevant subject
S believes all and only true propositions. This ordering source would reflect the
truth norm according to which one should believe a proposition P iff P . In the
following, I will refer to any ordering sources that reflects an epistemic norm as
doxastic.
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It depends on the particulars of your favourite semantics for the deontic ‘should’
how the story about how the doxastic ‘must’ expresses epistemic normativity
carries over to the doxastic ‘should’. The options mentioned in section 2.4 were:
• Two ordering sources (von Fintel and Iatridou ms, 2008): ‘S should do A’ is
true at a context c iff S does A in all those g(w)-best worlds in the modal
background ∩f(w) that are ranked best by the secondary ordering source h,
where f , g, and h are provided by c.
• Conditional strong necessity modals (Silk 2012): ‘S should do A’ is true at
a context iff ‘If specific condition C obtains, S must do A’ is true at c.
• Most-quantifier (Finlay 2014, forthcoming): ‘S should do A’ is true at a
context c iff S does A in most worlds in the modal background ∩f(w)
updated by the goal z, where f and z are provided by c.
All these can be used as semantic models for the doxastic ‘should’. I suggest
that on von Fintel and Iatridou (ms, 2008)’s account, ‘S should do A’ uttered
at a context c expresses epistemic normativity if the two ordering sources g and
h provided by c rank worlds according to epistemic norms. This assumes that
there are two different kinds of epistemic norms, more coercive ones, that are
reflected by the primary ordering source, and less coercive ones, reflected by
the secondary ordering source. If there is no such distinction among epistemic
norms, then von Fintel and Iatridou’s (2008) account leaves two options. First,
one could conclude that there is no real distinction between the doxastic ‘should’
and ‘must’ and that they basically mean the same. A second, alternative option
is to say that the doxastic ‘should’ is not a deontic, but another kind of modal.
Von Fintel and Iatridou don’t agree on whether the non-epistemic ‘should’ is
a deontic modal anyway (von Fintel and Iatridou 2008: 128). One of them
suggests that it is rather a teleological modal. If we apply this interpretation to
the doxastic ‘should’, we have an alternative account of under which conditions
‘should’ expresses epistemic normativity: when the ordering sources rank worlds
according to whether the subject’s doxastic attitudes in those worlds are what
they need to be like in order for the subject to achieve a certain epistemic goal,
e.g., true belief or knowledge. The primary ordering source simply ranks all those
worlds best in which this epistemic goal is achieved. The secondary ordering
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source ranks all those worlds best in which the goal is achieved in the best manner.
There might be no conceivable notion of achieving an epistemic goal in a better
or worse manner, in which case we would end up, again, with the conclusion
that there is no distinction between what one, doxastically, should and what one,
doxastically, must believe.
On Finlay’s account, the update of the modal background by a goal z effectively
works as a ranking of the worlds in the modal background by an ordering source
which ranks worlds in light of whether z is achieved in these worlds. ‘Should’ is
doxastic on such an account if the contextually salient goal is an epistemic goal,
similar to the view suggested by the second possible reading of von Fintel and
Iatridou (ms, 2008),
Finally, on Silk’s account of ‘should’ as a conditional strong necessity modal,
‘should’ is doxastic if the ordering source determining the modal flavour of the
‘must’ that occurs in the consequent of the conditional stating the truth-conditions
for should-sentences is doxastic.
If we ignore the details of the specific accounts, what remains is that ‘should’
is doxastic if the ordering source(s) or goal supplied by the context in which
it is uttered reflect(s) an epistemic norm or norms. I want to stay neutral on
what these epistemic norms are. I will suggest some candidates in section 2.7,
but the simplistic semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ that I will present there
is purposively designed such that it’s flexible enough to accommodate as many
different epistemic norms as possible. In the spirit of Carr’s remark that it is not
the job of semantics to settle normative debates, it seems wrong to build a certain
kind of epistemic norm into the semantics for the doxastic ‘should’.
Before moving on to the issue of information-sensitivity, let me shortly address
a question that might have come up in this subsection. As von Fintel and Iatridou’s
(2008) and also Finlay’s (2014, forthcoming) discussion of ‘should’ suggest, we
could classify the doxastic ‘should’ as a teleological rather than a deontic modal.
If it is a teleological modal, it expresses which doxastic attitude one has to adopt
in order to achieve an epistemic goal or telos, for example to believe only true
propositions or only propositions one knows. Two remarks. First, I’m hesitant to
categorize the doxastic ‘should’ as a teleological modal since this would amount
to the claim that it is a semantic truth that epistemic instrumentalism is correct.
This is the view that epistemic norms are instrumental norms, which tell us what
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the means are to achieve certain epistemic ends. As this view is very controversial
in epistemology,20 I think we should reject, again in the spirit of Carr’s (2015)
objection to Cariani (2013) and Charlow (2013), a semantics that would commit
us to a particular view on this issue. If we consider the doxastic ‘should’ to be
deontic we leave this open, since the rules expressed by deontic modals can be
either instrumental or not. Second, it does not matter too much for the purposes
of this PhD thesis whether the doxastic ‘should’ is deontic or teleological. What
matters is whether it is information-sensitive, and it can be information-sensitive
as a teleological modal just as well as it can be as a deontic modal. We can
relativize what should be done in order to achieve a goal z to different sets of
evidence. What one should do in order to achieve the goal of saving as many
miners as possible in light of ignorance about where the miners are differs from
what one should do for this purpose in light of knowing that they are in shaft 1.
2.6.2 Information-Sensitivity of the Doxastic ‘Should’
Let’s now turn to information-sensitivity. The following two types of semantic
accounts of the information-sensitivity of the deontic ‘should’ were discussed in
section 2.5:
• Information-sensitive ordering source (Dowell 2013, Silk 2014; Carr 2015):
Ordering sources rank in light of the contextually salient information-state.
• Decision problem (Cariani et al. 2013; Charlow 2013): The ordering source
does not rank worlds, but propositions that are classes of a partition on the
epistemic modal background and represent those actions the subject can
knowingly do.
I will discuss these two types in turn and claim that the first can incorporate the
information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’, while the second can’t.
What it means for a doxastic ordering source to rank in light of an information-
state will depend on the exact nature of this ordering source. Here is just one
option: a plausible epistemic norm is that one should proportion one’s belief
to one’s evidence. Making the ordering source reflecting this norm sensitive to
a contextually provided information-state i can be done if the ordering source
20For powerful objections to it, see Kelly (2003), Jenkins (2007), and Berker (2013).
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ranks those worlds highest in which the subject S is holding those beliefs that are
proportioned to i, be that S’s evidence or another body of evidence. Alternatively,
an ordering source might reflect the knowledge norm according to which one
should believe a proposition P iff one is in a position to know that P . An ordering
source reflecting this norm can be made sensitive to a contextually provided
information-state i by designing it such that it ranks those worlds best where
all of the subject S’s beliefs are such that if S held those beliefs on basis of i,
they would be knowledge. I show in section 3.2 how my semantics of the doxastic
‘should’, which is supposed to be a simplified version of Dowell (2013), Silk (2014)
and Carr’s (2015), can reflect these and other epistemic norms and make them
information-sensitive.
While Dowell (2013), Silk (2014) and Carr’s (2015) semantics of the deontic
‘should’ hence can account for the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’,
Cariani et al. (2013) and Charlow (2013)’s decision problem models—or short, DP
models—can’t. They capture information-sensitivity in their semantics by ranking
propositions that are cells of a partition on the epistemic modal background
induced by a decision problem. These propositions represent the actions the
subject can knowingly do. If we want to apply this model to the doxastic ‘should’
what needs to be ranked are not propositions representing actions, but propositions
representing doxastic attitudes. So let the propositions to be ranked be such that
they describe which doxastic attitudes the subject can adopt knowingly. Under
normal circumstances, these will be just any doxastic attitudes the subject can
adopt, as most of the time when we, let’s say, suspend judgement on whether P ,
we are in a position to know that we do so.
In subsection 2.5.3, we have already seen that DP models have difficulties
with cases where the speaker is speaking relative to an information-state that is
inferior to their own. This is not only so with respect to the practical ‘should’,
but also with respect to the doxastic ‘should’:
Nostalgia. Renaud looks back at a situation at time t, when his
evidence clearly supported disbelieving Q. We both know now that
this evidence was misleading, and that Q is true. I say to Renaud:
(12) Don’t beat yourself up. Disbelieving Q is what you should have
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done at the time.21
The second sentence of (12) rings true, since I apparently mean by it that Renaud
should have disbelieved Q in light of the evidence he had at t. Just like (11)
in Miners-CCTV, (12) is false though, according to DP models. To see this,
let’s start with the assumption that the doxastic ordering source is ‘realistic’ and
reflects an adequacy norm, which ranks doxastic attitudes by how ‘close’ they get
to the truth. The adequacy norm will induce an ordering background along the
following lines:
Γadequacy: {<Renaud has a true belief about whether Q>; <Renaud
does not have a false belief about whether Q>}
The decision set will look like this:
∆nostalgia: {<Renaud believes Q>; <Renaud suspends judgement
about whether Q>; <Renaud disbelieves Q>}
From all the doxastic attitudes Renaud can knowingly adopt, believing Q will
be the highest ranked by Γadequacy. If Q is true, <Renaud believes Q> entails
both <Renaud has a true belief about whether Q> and <Renaud does not have a
false belief about whether Q>. In contrast, <Renaud suspends judgement about
whether Q> only entails <Renaud does not have a false belief about whether
Q> and <Renaud disbelieves Q> entails none. It is important to notice that
these entailment relations only hold because the decision set is a partition on
the epistemic modal background. Because I know Q, <Renaud believes Q> only
contains worlds where Q is the case and hence entails <Renaud has a true belief
about whether Q>. If I did not know Q, <Renaud believes Q> would also contain
¬Q-worlds and the entailment relation wouldn’t hold.
One might think that using a different ordering source will solve the issue for
DP models. A natural candidate would be an ordering source that reflects the
evidential norm. Its ordering background would look roughly as follows:
Γevidence: {<Renaud adopts the doxastic attitude supported by his
evidence>; <Renaud doesn’t adopt the opposite of the doxastic atti-
tude supported by his evidence> }
21This example is adapted from MacFarlane (2014: 298).
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This ordering source will make (12) true since <Renaud disbelieves Q> entails
all propositions in Γevidence. But this just moves the bump in the rug. As I argue
extensively in section 3.3, the doxastic ‘should’ can have an objective reading.
Now, imagine that I want to talk about which doxastic attitude Renaud should
have objectively, i.e., in light of the facts, and utter:
(13) Renaud should believe Q.
The problem is that Γevidence makes (13) false since <Renaud believes Q> won’t
be highest ranked as it entails none of the propositions in Γevidence: remember
that Renaud’s evidence at t supported disbelieving Q. One could of course suggest
that the ordering source shifts with the contextually provided information-state.
That is, where the speaker uses the objective doxastic ‘should’, the ordering
source is Γadequacy and where they use the subjective ‘should’, Γevidence is the
ordering source. Moreover, we would have to add further ordering sources to
account for sensitivity to other information-states, as for example the collective
evidence. While this is a viable proposal, it will simply collapse DP models into
the kind of model Dowell (2013), Silk (2012) or Carr (2015) suggest: the ordering
source has become information-sensitive since it changes with the contextually
provided information-state. A defining feature of DP models was, however, that
the ordering source is not information-sensitive.
As suggested in subsection 2.5.3, a defender of a DP model could give up
the assumption that the epistemic modal background must be the set of worlds
compatible with the speaker’s knowledge. For example, assume that when I utter
(12) the epistemic modal background is the set of worlds compatible with Renaud’s
knowledge at t, rather than mine; the reason for this could be that I’m trying to
talk about what Renaud should have believed at t in light of what he knew at the
time, rather than in light of what I know now. If the decision set ∆nostalgia is a
partition on Renaud’s, rather than my, epistemic background, <Renaud believes
Q> will contain Q- and ¬Q-worlds since Renaud neither knew Q nor ¬Q. As
a result, <Renaud believes Q> won’t entail <Renaud has a true belief about
whether Q> because in some of the worlds in <Renaud believes Q> Renaud
believes falsely.
However, while this avoids that <Renaud believes Q> is ranked highest, it
does not make (12) true. For this, we need <Renaud disbelieves Q> to be ranked
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highest and thus to entail more propositions in Γadequacy than the other available
doxastic attitudes. But it doesn’t. Since the epistemic background contains some
Q-worlds, <Renaud disbelieves Q> does also not entail <Renaud has a true
belief about whether Q>. Since <Renaud believes Q> and <Renaud disbelieves
Q> in fact don’t entail any of the propositions in Γadequacy, <Renaud suspends
judgement about whether Q> at least entails <Renaud does not have a false belief
about whether Q>, which makes it the highest ranked proposition in ∆nostalgia.
To sum up, Cariani et al. (2013) and Charlow (2013)’s models might be able
to capture cases where a better-informed speaker talks about what an agent
should practically do in light of the agent’s inferior evidence if they give up on
the assumption that the epistemic modal background is always the speaker’s.
However, this move will not help them with respect to the doxastic ‘should’.
One way to go here is to say that since their semantics for the information-
sensitivity of the practical ‘should’ is to be preferred (for whatever reasons)
and we should assume uniformity in the semantic models for the doxastic and
practical ‘should’ (after all, they are both just instances of the deontic ‘should’),
the difficulty of incorporating a sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ to a subject’s
inferior information-state into their models shows that the doxastic ‘should’ is
not information-sensitive in this way.
I think this conclusion is premature. First, uniformity in our semantic models is
certainly an important theoretical value, but can be outweighed by considerations
of empirical adequacy, i.e., the goal to respect linguistic intuitions. Second, as we
have seen, models according to which the doxastic ordering source is information-
sensitive are not limited in the same way as DP models. Nostalgia thus gives us
actually a reason to prefer these accounts over DP models since they get us both:
uniformity and empirical adequacy. That the DP models might not be the best of
the available options anyway is supported by Carr’s objections to them, which I
have discussed in section 2.5. To conclude, the incapacity of the DP models to
account, to the full degree, for the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’
rather counts against them, than against the claim that the doxastic ‘should’ is
information-sensitive to this degree.
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2.7 A Simplified Semantic Account of the Doxastic
‘Should’
Let’s take stock: whereas Dowell (2013), Silk (2014) and Carr’s (2015) semantics
for the deontic ‘should’ can capture the information-sensitivity of the doxastic
‘should’, Cariani et al. (2013) and Charlow’s (2013) struggle to do this. The
important insight is that it’s not in conflict with the “general wisdom” of current
semantic theory to assume that the doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive.
In the following chapters, I will present evidence for the assumption that the
doxastic ‘should’ is sensitive to a variety of information-states and discuss how
this assumption can be applied to normative epistemology. For this purpose, I
will need an account of the truth-conditions of sentences involving the doxastic
‘should’ that can accommodate its information-sensitivity. I will work with the
following one:
Doxastic Should For any context of utterance c that provides a doxastic or-
dering source, any subject S, doxastic attitude D, proposition P , and information-
state i, ‘S should have D to P ’ is true at c iff having D to P reflects accurately
how much i supports P , where i is the information-state provided by c.
I will spend the remainder of this subsection explaining this account and replying
to potential objections.
Let’s start with the notation. What an information-state is I have already
explained above; I will have a few more comments on this below. It should be
clear what contexts of utterance, propositions, and subjects are. By ‘doxastic
attitudes’ I mean both the coarse-grained ones—belief, disbelief, and suspension
of judgement—as well as credences. I take the attitudes of believing P and
disbelieving ¬P to be equivalent.
I suggest that Doxastic Should is compatible with all the semantic theories
discussed in subsection 2.5.2, which allow for full information-sensitivity of the
doxastic ‘should’. Remember that on these ‘S should have D to P ’ is true at
a context c that provides a doxastic ordering source g iff S has D to P in all
worlds which are highest ranked by g in light of the information-state i provided
by c. Whatever doxastic ordering source g a semanticist might suggest, Doxastic
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Should is flexible enough to be specified in such a way that the condition that
having D to P accurately reflects how much i supports P is equivalent to the
condition that in all those worlds that are ranked highest by g in light of i, S
has D to P . This is at least so if the doxastic ordering source g is plausible in
the sense that it reflects a familiar epistemic norm. As I argue below, Doxastic
Should is that flexible since we have freedom in determining what goes into the
information-state i and what it means for D to P to accurately reflect how much
i supports P . Therefore, Doxastic Should can accommodate a wide variety of
familiar epistemic norms, i.e., can be specified such that these norms turn out true.
It can hence account for any information-sensitive ordering source a theorist might
suggest, given that the ordering source reflects one of these familiar epistemic
norms.
However, Doxastic Should is only a simplified version of the semantic
theories that allow for full information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’. Where
most of these theories (Silk 2014 and Carr’s 2015) provide us with a semantic
value for the doxastic ‘should’ itself, Doxastic Should only provides us with the
truth-conditions for sentences in which a doxastic ‘should’ occurs unembedded.
Therefore, it does not tell us how to deduce the meaning of sentences in which the
doxastic ‘should’ is embedded, for example under propositional attitude verbs like
‘said’ or ‘believes’ or under the conditional ‘if’. That is, Doxastic Should only
gives us limited instructions about the compositionality of the doxastic ‘should’
and how its semantic value interacts with the semantic values of other terms in
a sentence in composing the meaning of a sentence. Since we will almost only
be considering unembedded occurrences of the doxastic ‘should’ in this thesis,
this is no great loss.22 I’ve decided to go with such a simplistic semantics in
order to avoid unnecessary technical complexities. It is important to keep in
mind though that Doxastic Should is precisely this—a simplified version of the
semantics that allow for the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’—and
not an alternative to them. The reader therefore does not have to worry whether
embeddings of the doxastic ‘should’ can be taken care of by an information-
sensitive contextualist semantics. They can. The only reason I operate in this
thesis with Doxastic Should, which cannot deal with embeddings, is that it
22I shortly address embedded occurrences in chapter 7, but won’t need a formal semantic
model of the doxastic ‘should’ for this discussion.
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makes things easier.
As already indicated, the reason why Doxastic Should can incorporate a
variety of epistemic norms is that it leaves us freedom with respect to (i) what
goes into the information-state and (ii) how we define what it means that D to
P ‘accurately reflects’ how much i supports P . For example, Doxastic Should
can accommodate the view that the truth norm for belief is the only epistemic
norm, i.e., that the doxastic ‘should’ is strictly objective.23 On this view, i is
in every context the fully realistic information-state, which represents all the
facts. If information-states are sets of worlds, this is the singleton containing the
actual world. Where P is true in the actual world, the information-state entails P
and where P is false, it entails ¬P . If we stipulate that (fully) believing P most
accurately reflects an information-state entailing P , Doxastic Should amounts
on this view to:
Truth-TC. For any context of utterance c that provides a doxastic ordering
source, any subject S, and proposition P , ‘S should believe P ’ is true at c iff P is
true.
Similarly, Doxastic Should can account for a ‘universal’ evidentialism, according
to which the only epistemic norm is that subjects should adopt the doxastic
attitude that is supported by their evidence.24 On universal evidentialism, all
contexts supply the subject’s evidence as the information-state.
The claim that I will defend though is Doxastic Contextualism. This is the
view that contexts provide different kinds of information-states and hence that the
doxastic ‘should’ is fully information-sensitive in the sense explained in subsection
2.5.1.
A worry one might have is that Doxastic Should favours evidentialist inter-
pretations of the subjective doxastic ‘should’. An evidentialist interpretation of
the subjective doxastic ‘should’ states that one should subjectively have D to P iff
one’s evidence supports having D to P . If we identify a subject’s information-state
with their evidence, Doxastic Should would indeed be committed to such an
23I will come back to the truth norm in section 3.2.
24Feldman (2000) defends the view that a subject S should have D to P iff S’s evidence
supports D to P . I don’t know whether Feldman thinks that this is the only epistemic norm. I
will come back to evidentialism in section 3.2.
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evidentialist interpretation. In this case, it would be incompatible with norms
according to which what one (subjectively) should believe is not simply what
one’s evidence supports. For example, the knowledge norm requires that we don’t
believe what we don’t know, so it requires that we don’t believe P if P is false,
even if believing P is supported by our (in such a case misleading) evidence.
Furthermore, the reliabilist norm that one should (subjectively) believe P iff one’s
belief that P was reliably formed also clashes with said evidentialist reading of
the doxastic ‘should’.25 The fact that we’re free in determining what goes into
the information-state comes here to our rescue again. Since ‘information-state’
is a technical term, it need not mean ‘evidence’ and hence Doxastic Should is
not committed to an evidentialist reading. As I will show in subsection 3.4.1,
by stipulating that one’s information-state is identical to the propositions one
is in a position to know or to facts about the reliability of one’s belief-forming
processes, Doxastic Should can make the knowledge or reliabilist norm come
out true, too. As the reader can see, Doxastic Should is at least flexible enough
to accommodate the familiar truth, knowledge, evidentialist, and reliabilist norms
for belief.
I haven’t yet explained what it means for an information-state i to support
a target proposition P and how we measure the strength of this relation. One
natural idea is that the strength is proportionate to the evidential probability
of P on i, i.e., the conditional probability of P on i according to the ‘objective’
probability function (Williamson 2000: ch. 10.1). A problem with this idea
is that as every logically true proposition has a probability of 1, and thus also
the conditional probability of any logical truth on information-state is 1, any
information-state would support any logical truth to the maximum amount. It
would follow that for every P that is logically true, ‘I should believe P ’ would
be true in every context, whatever the contextually provided information-state
is. This is intuitively wrong. It does not only make false predictions about the
truth-values of doxastic-should sentences, but also seems to give a wrong picture
of evidential support itself. It sounds odd to say that everybody has evidence in
support of all logical truths. Views that reduce evidential support to inferential
relations, rather than evidential probability, meet a similar fate. The strongest
possible inferential relation is entailment. Hence every logical truth would be fully
25For more on these norms, see subsection 3.4.1.
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evidentially supported by every true information-state, since every logical truths
is entailed by any truth.26
How to specify what evidential support is is a vexed problem that any epis-
temological theory that makes use of the notion faces. Feldman (1995) claims
that the traditional view on this issue is that the evidential support relation is a
brute relation, which cannot be defined in other terms.27 I don’t take a stance on
whether the notion of evidential support can be reduced or not, and I will simply
rely on an intuitive notion of evidential support in the following. We should not
require more than this for the purposes of this thesis.
While I do not have to say much about what evidential support is, I need to
make clear that just because i entailing P or P having a high probability on i is
not sufficient for i to strongly support P , it is nonetheless often the case that i
supporting P is constituted by such deductive or probabilistic relations between i
and P . For example, imagine you have drawn 100 balls out of a bag and 90 of
them were black. The proposition <The next ball you draw will be black> has
a probability of 90% on this evidence. It seems that the evidence supports the
target proposition strongly due to this probabilistic relation in this situation and
that a high credence in the proposition, a credence of 0.9 to be precise, accurately
reflects this support relation.
A note on terminology: For the sake of brevity, I will sometimes speak of a
doxastic attitude to a proposition P being licensed by an information-state i if
the doxastic attitude accurately reflects the support relation between i and P .
Given the focus on the notion of evidential support in Doxastic Should,
one might be concerned that Doxastic Should can’t account for pragmatic
encroachment, the alleged phenomenon that a subject’s epistemic status does not
only depend on the subject’s evidence, but also on the subject’s practical stakes.
For example, Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005) argue that whether one knows
a proposition P partly depends on how relevant it is for one’s practical concerns
26Notice that this problem with inferential or probabilistic accounts of evidential support
is not motivated by an internalist requirement that an agent needs to be aware of a relation
between a body of evidence e and a proposition P for e to support P . That is, the problem is
not supposed to be that we’re not aware of how our evidence supports all logical truths, even
though it does. After all, the existence of an evidential relation between e and P and an agent’s
awareness of this are distinct issues. Rather, it seems simply absurd to say that all bodies of
evidence are evidence for all logical truths.
27He counts Lehrer and Cohen (1983) and Fumerton (1990) as proponents of the view. Kelly
(2007) makes the same point.
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whether P is true. Regarding justification, Fantl and McGrath (2002) claim that
whether one’s evidence meets the threshold for being justified in believing P is
dependent on how practically significant it is for one whether P is true. If one is
convinced by their arguments, one is probably sympathetic to the view that there
is pragmatic encroachment on what one should believe, too. Doxastic Should
can allow for this view, for example, if the information-state is chosen in the
above described way so that Doxastic Should makes the knowledge norm true.
If we combine this with the assumption that there is pragmatic encroachment on
knowledge, we get the result that there is also pragmatic encroachment on what
one should believe. Alternatively, we can modify Doxastic Should such that ‘S
should have D to P ’ is true iff having D to P accurately reflects (i) how much
the contextually provided information-state i supports P and (ii) how much is at
stake for S with respect to whether P is true. This modified account allows it to
be the case that ‘S should believe P ’ is true if P has a modestly high evidential
probability on i and, practically speaking, it doesn’t matter much for S whether
P holds, but false if i evidentially supports P to the same degree, but a lot hinges,
for S, on whether P is true. I will stay neutral here with respect to the question of
whether there is pragmatic encroachment on whether one should believe something
and hence on whether Doxastic Should needs to be modified in the described
way. This question is orthogonal to my main claim that the doxastic ‘should’ is
information-sensitive and that this can solve a number of problems in normative
epistemology. Hence, I will put the issue of pragmatic encroachment aside in the
following.
2.8 Metasemantics
Doxastic Should tells us how we get the truth-conditions of a doxastic-should
sentence from its parts and the information-state provided by the context in
which the sentence is uttered. Being therefore a (very limited) theory about the
compositionality of the doxastic ‘should’, i.e., the rules by which its semantic
value contributes to the semantic value of a linguistic expression it is a part of, it
is hence a form of descriptive semantics. One of the questions that foundational
semantics or metasemantics is concerned with, in contrast, is how contexts provide
the contextual parameters that feed into the composition of the meaning of
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linguistic expressions at these contexts.28 In the following chapters, we will often
be concerned with the question which information-state is provided by a particular
context. One tool we will use to answer this question is our linguistic intuitions.
If a sentence is intuitively true, and is so only if one particular information-
state is contextually provided, it speaks in favour of this information-state being
contextually provided. However, we do not always have clear linguistic intuitions,
and the linguistic intuitions of two competent speakers can clash. Hence, we don’t
want to rely on them alone. Some theoretical considerations on the metasemantical
question of how information-states are chosen would be very helpful.
Janice Dowell (2011, 2012, 2013) gives an account of the metasemantics of
epistemic and deontic modals. As she points out, the issue of how context provides
contextual parameters comes up with regard to other context-sensitive expressions,
too, and a lot of research has been done on this. A much contested issue is, for
example, which contextual feature determines the reference of demonstratives like
‘this’ or ‘that’. On the one hand, speaker intentions seem to play an important
role. Imagine I stand in front of a painting and say ‘This is beautiful’. That I
had the painting in mind and intended to refer to it by the demonstrative ‘this’
seems to explain why the semantic value of ‘this’ is the painting. On the other
hand, intentions probably can’t do all the work. Kaplan (1978: 239) gives a case
in which he points behind him to a picture, which he thinks is of Carnap, but
in fact shows Spiro Agnew (the 39th US Vice President), and says: “[That] is a
picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century”. While he
intended to refer to a picture of Carnap, it doesn’t seem like he succeeded. As
Kaplan (1989b) argues, what fixes the reference here might not be the speaker’s
intention, but rather his demonstration. If Kaplan is pointing towards a picture of
Agnew, this picture is what ‘that’ refers to, and not the picture of Carnap he has
in mind. This claim is supported by the consideration that what ‘that’ refers to is
part of what is said by Kaplan’s utterance. As the audience can’t possibly know
what Kaplan’s intention is, the audience couldn’t know what has been said if this
intention fixed the reference of ‘that’. But what is said is supposed to be what
is communicated between discourse participants and Kaplan’s audience should
28The distinction between descriptive and foundational semantics is from Stalnaker (1997).
(Kaplan, 1989a: 573f.) makes a similar distinction between semantics and metasemantics. I will
speak of ‘metasemantics’ in the following, since it is the more commonly used term.
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therefore be capable or recovering what has been said (Dowell 2011: 4).
The issues here are complex, and I don’t want to get to deeply into them.
What is worth pointing out though is that even if intentions fix the reference of
demonstratives, speakers need to rely on certain extra-intentional cues in order
to clearly communicate what they have in mind. Having changed his position
in Kaplan (1989a), Kaplan proposes that speaker intentions do fix reference.
However, demonstrations are needed to convey these intentions to the audience
such that the audience can pick up on what has been said.29
As Dowell (2011, 2013) points out, parallel issues arise with respect to the
information-sensitivity of epistemic and deontic modals. As I have explained
above, modals are treated as quantifiers in standard semantic theories. ‘Ordinary’
quantifiers, as in ‘Every beer is in the bucket’, rely on context to determine the
modal domain they are quantifying over (Stanley and Gendler Szabo´ 2000). As
in the case of demonstratives, speaker intentions seem to play a role here. Since
information-states function as restrictions on the modal domain of deontic modals,
it is natural to think that which information-state is provided by a context to
do the restricting work is up to the speaker, just as it is up to the speaker to fix
the domain of ordinary quantifiers. Remember the following case from subsection
2.6.2:
Nostalgia. Renaud looks back at a situation at time t, when his
evidence clearly supported disbelieving Q. We both know now that
this evidence was misleading, and that Q is true. I say to Renaud:
(12) Don’t beat yourself up. Disbelieving Q is what you should have
done at the time.
What I seem to mean by the second sentence of (12) is that Renaud should have
disbelieved Q in light of the evidence he had at t. In the terms of Doxastic
Should, the contextually provided information-state is Renaud’s evidence at t. A
plausible explanation for this being the context’s information-state is that I want
to speak relative to Renaud’s evidence. The reason I intend to speak relative to
his evidence is that I’m trying to evaluate whether he was epistemically rational
29Perry (2009) develops Kaplan’s (1989a) account further. For further discussion of the role
of speaker intentions in fixing the semantic value of demonstratives, see, among others, Gauker
(2008), Stokke (2010), and King (2014).
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when he came to disbelieve Q, in other words, whether he had evidence for what
he believed. But now consider the following variant of Nostalgia.
Progress. Renaud and I are looking back at the same situation at
time t as in Nostalgia. We have just discussed what is required to
be epistemically rational, which is to form one’s doxastic attitudes
on basis of the evidence one has at the time when one forms those
attitudes. However, without telling him, I’m looking at Renaud’s past
situation not in terms of what would have been epistemically rational
for him to believe, but what would have been the best for him to
believe given what we know now. Thus, I’m intending to speak to our
current evidence, when I say:
(14) Renaud, you should have believed Q.
What I mean by (14) is ‘In light of our current evidence, Renaud should have
believed Q.’ But is this what I said? After all, Renaud couldn’t tell. We’ve just
been discussing epistemic rationality, so it’s plausible for him to assume that what
I intended was to speak relative to his evidence at the time (and came to the
wrong conclusion about what this evidence supported).
The context in which I utter (14) violates what Dowell (2011: 1, 2013: 150)
calls the “publicity constraint” on contexts. This constraint requires of a context
that it is “capable of publicly manifesting a speaker’s parameter-determining
intentions” to a reasonable audience (Dowell 2013: 1). The relevant features of
the context in which I utter (14) do not manifest my relevant intentions. Given
that we’ve just been discussing epistemic rationality, epistemic rationality is
conversationally salient. This is one of the context’s features, and it indicates that
I’m intending to speak relative to the evidence Renaud had at t.
It is not clear to me whether Dowell thinks that violating this constraint (i)
leads to the context failing to provide an information-state or (ii) only leads to
the context failing to signal to a reasonable audience which information-state has
in fact been provided by the context in virtue of the speaker’s (my) intention. In
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any case, I don’t need to commit to one of these two options here. 30
Besides conversational salience, the pragmatic purpose of an utterance can
also indicate a speaker’s intentions. That a speaker utters a doxastic-should
sentence for the pragmatic purpose of evaluating your epistemic rationality is good
evidence that they are intending to speak to your information-state, given what
epistemic rationality requires. If they want to evaluate your epistemic rationality,
they should talk about which doxastic attitude you should have in light of your
evidence. Therefore, even if this is not a speaker’s actual intention, it is reasonable
for an audience to assume that the speaker is talking relative to the addressee’s
evidence if they are engaged in evaluating the addressee’s rationality.
One might be convinced by the argument that contextual features must be
recognizable to the audience in order for them to determine which parameter is
provided by the context. In this case, one could argue that the publicity constraint
is not only necessary for a context to provide a parameter—as according to option
(i)—but also sufficient.31 On this account, if the pragmatic purpose of an utterance
is clearly to evaluate an agent’s epistemic rationality, but the speaker is mistaken
about which information-state she should refer to and intends to refer to a wrong
one, then the information-state provided is the one that is suited best for the goal
of evaluating epistemic rationality, and not the one the speaker has in mind.
To sum up, we have three different contextual features that could determine
the context’s information-state or at least have a signalling function with respect
to which the contextually provided information-state is: the speaker’s intention,
the utterance’s pragmatic purpose and what’s conversationally salient. What to
do now? I won’t commit to one of these features being the one that determines
the context’s information-state since the question of how context parameters are
fixed is notoriously difficult and applies to many other context-sensitive terms.
Rather, when judging what is the contextually provided information-state, I will
consider all of these three contextual features.
30That Dowell states that her account is inspired by Kaplan (1989a) indicates that she would
favour option (ii). However, there are other formulations in Dowell (2011, 2013), which suggest
the opposite. King (2014) defends a view akin to (i) with respect to demonstratives, according to
which it is necessary for an object to be the semantic value of a demonstrative that a competent
hearer can recognize that this object is the semantic value.
31Gauker (2008) defends such a view with respect to demonstratives.
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2.9 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the current literature on the semantics for the deontic
‘should’. Since this literature focuses on the practical ‘should’, I had to show that
the discussed theories also give us a semantics for the doxastic ‘should’. I argued
that only some of them, Dowell (2013), Silk (2014) and Carr’s (2015), can account
for information-sensitivity in the doxastic ‘should’, and that others, the very
similar proposals of Cariani et al. (2013) and Charlow (2013), can’t. Furthermore,
I presented a simplistic semantics for the doxastic ‘should’, compatible with Dowell
(2013), Silk (2014) and Carr’s (2015) theories, according to which doxastic-should
sentences are sensitive to contextually provided information-states. I coined the
view that such sentences are relativized to different kinds of information-states in
different contexts Doxastic Contextualism and I will provide evidence for it in the
following chapters 3 to 5. Finally, I explained which contextual features can play
a role in determining which information-state a context provides.
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Chapter 3
The Subjective and the
Objective Doxastic ‘Should’
3.1 Introduction
My aim in this chapter is to provide a first piece of evidence for Doxastic Contex-
tualism by presenting a first instance of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic
‘should’: the distinction between the subjective and the objective doxastic ‘should’.
A parallel distinction for the moral ‘should’ is well-known in ethics, but it has
also been discussed in epistemology with respect to the doxastic ‘should’. In
section 3.2, I show that this distinction can be integrated into the model for
the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ that I have introduced in
chapter 2. While it is widely accepted that there is a sense of the doxastic ‘should’
that is subjective, there will be more resistance to the idea that the there is an
objective doxastic ‘should’. Therefore, I will present five arguments supporting
the idea that there is such a ‘should’. Among other things, I argue that we use the
objective doxastic ‘should’ in everyday discourse to describe what’s epistemically
best (section 3.3).
In section 3.4, I explain how attention to this distinction can be of use to
epistemologists. A number of authors have proposed a truth norm for belief
according to which one should believe a proposition P iff P is true. This norm is
apparently in conflict with other norms discussed in the literature, which make
whether one should believe P not (only) dependent on whether P , but (also) on
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one’s epistemic situation with respect to P , for example whether one’s evidence
supports P or whether one knows P . In what follows, I will call such norms
subjective. I claim that the ‘should’ in the formulation of the truth norm is
objective, whereas the ‘should’ in the formulation of the other norms is subjective.
One upshot of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ with respect to
the debate about the truth norm and its apparent rivals is thus that these norms
are actually not in conflict. In section 3.5 I reply to four possible objections. The
first three all attack, in some way or other, the truth norm and hence suggest that
the conflict should be resolved by giving up the truth norm. I will defend the truth
norm against these objections. The fourth objection, by Gibbons (2013), criticizes
that distinguishing between the subjective and objective doxastic ‘should’ ducks
the question of which of the two senses of ‘should’ guides doxastic deliberation. I
reply that I am happy to grant that the objective doxastic ‘should’ is not guiding.
This fits with the point I made in section 3.3 that we use the objective ‘should’ in
ordinary discourse to describe what’s epistemically best.
3.2 The Subjective/Objective Distinction
The distinction between the subjective and objective ‘should’ is often used by
those who work on ethics or theories of rationality, i.e., those who are concerned
with what we practically should do. It is roughly the distinction between what a
subject should do in light of their epistemic perspective and what a subject should
do in light of the facts.1 Imagine that you’re in a hotel room and the hotel is on
fire, but you’re not aware of it. In some sense of ‘should’, you should jump out of
the window (assuming there is no other safe exit). Since the hotel is on fire, this is
the best available action for you. In some other sense of ‘should’, you should not
jump. Given that you don’t know that the hotel is on fire, it would be irrational
of you to simply jump out of the window.2 We seem to have a puzzle: on one
hand, you should jump out of the window. On the other hand, you should not.
Distinguishing between the subjective and objective ‘should’ solves the puzzle:
subjectively, in light of your evidence, you should not jump out of the window.
1See Ross (1939), Prichard (1932), Ewing (1953), Brandt (1963), Jackson (1986), Parfit
(2011), Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), and Wedgwood (forthcoming).
2This example is from Parfit (1997: 99).
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Objectively, in light of the fact that the hotel is on fire, you should jump out of
the window.
Drawing the same distinction in epistemology is less common, but some
authors have done so.3 It is the analogous distinction between what one should
believe in light of the facts and what one should believe in light of one’s epistemic
perspective.4
The facts that the objective sense of the practical ‘should’ is relativized to are
often described as all the facts.5 I assume the same for the objective doxastic
‘should’. Which doxastic attitude one objectively should adopt towards a specific
proposition P depends only on one fact in the set of all true propositions. If
this set contains P , i.e., if P is true, one objectively should believe P . If this set
contains ¬P , i.e., if P is false, one objectively should believe ¬P (or disbelieve
P ). We can give the following corresponding definition of the objective doxastic
‘should’:
Objective Doxastic Should For any subject S, proposition P , and time t, S
should objectively believe P at t iff P is true.6
Of course, the ‘should’ in this definition is supposed to be doxastic. That is, it
does not state that one should, for practical reasons, objectively believe P iff
P . I claim that the objective doxastic ‘should’ occurs in the formulation of the
truth-norm:
3See Brandt (1967), Gibbard (2005), and Wedgwood (2007: ch. 5.2).
4There is a quite widely discussed distinction between subjective and objective justification,
which is not to be confused with the distinction that I have in mind here. Roughly, one is
objectively justified to have a doxastic attitude D to a proposition P iff one is actually justified
to have D to P ; and one is subjectively justified to have D to P iff one (justifiably) believes
that one is objectively justified to have D to P . (See Goldman 1986: 73; Pollock 1979: 109f.;
Alston 1985: 62; Kornblith 1985: 264; Moser 1985: 62; and Kvanvig 1984: 71.) Sometimes,
this distinction is also described as a distinction between a subjective and objective ‘should’ in
epistemology, where the first expresses what one should believe in light of the actual evidence
or reasons one has, and the second expresses what one should believe in light of what one
(justifiably) believes one’s evidence or reasons to be (Pollock 1979: 109f.; Kornblith 1985: 264;
and Moser 1985: 62). I do not want to deny that there is such a distinction between senses of
‘justification’ or ‘should’. In fact, I think that this distinction can be accommodated by the model
for the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ that I have suggested in chapter 2. While
I am accordingly not opposed to the distinction between subjective and objective justification, it
is not the distinction between subjective and objective ‘should’ that I am after here.
5See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 117). Similarly, Wedgwood (forthcoming: sec. 4)
speaks of the objective ‘should’ as relativized to an “omniscient” information-state.
6If propositions are time-indexical, we need to at ‘at t’ to the right of the biconditional.
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Truth For any subject S, proposition P , and time t, S should believe P at t iff
P is true.7
The subjective doxastic ‘should’ expresses, roughly, what one should believe in
light of one’s evidence. I suggest the following definition:
Subjective Doxastic Should For any subject S, proposition P , doxastic
attitude D and time t, S should subjectively adopt doxastic attitude D to P at t
iff having D to P reflects accurately how much S’s information-state at t supports
P .
I have chosen the technical term ‘information-state’ instead of evidence on purpose.
This allows Subjective Doxastic Should to be open to different accounts of
the subjective doxastic ‘should’. In subsection 3.4.1, I will argue that due to this
flexibility many epistemic norms in the literature that I call subjective can be
interpreted as being formulated in terms of the doxastic subjective ‘should’. A
subjective epistemic norm makes what a subject should believe dependent on the
subject’s epistemic perspective. A good example is the following norm:
Evidentialism For any subject S, proposition P , doxastic attitude D and time
t, S should have D to P at t iff D to P is supported by S’s evidence at t.8
It is easy to see that Evidentialism comes out true on a subjective reading of
‘should’ if we assume that the subject’s ‘information-state’ that is mentioned in
Subjective Doxastic Should is the subject’s evidence.
The subjective/objective distinction can easily be accommodated by the model
for the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ that I presented in chapter
2:
Doxastic Should For any context of utterance c that provides a doxastic
ordering source, ‘S should have doxastic attitude D to P ’ is true at c iff having D
7I will discuss the norm in more detail in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
8See Feldman (2000: 678). For the sake of brevity, I will drop the quantification over
propositions, subjects, doxastic attitudes, and times and the reference to times in most of my
formulation of norms in the following. Unless otherwise stated, the reader should take them to
be implicit.
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to P reflects accurately how much i supports P , where i is the information-state
provided by c.9
The doxastic ‘should’ takes on a subjective sense where the contextually provided
information-state i is S’s information-state (whatever that exactly is) at the
time t of which the speaker says that S should have D to P then. It takes on
an objective sense where i is all the facts. As mentioned in subsection 2.5.2, I
will call this latter information-state the fully realistic information-state. If we
look at the objective doxastic ‘should’ in this way, it is a limiting case of the
information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’.10
On this picture, the doxastic ‘should’ is strictly speaking not ambiguous
between two senses. Rather, it is akin to an indexical like ‘I’. The sentence “I
am hungry” has different truth-conditions in different contexts, i.e., when uttered
by different speakers, but we wouldn’t say that ‘I’ has different senses. To put it
in Kaplan’s (1989a, 1989b) standard terminology for indexicals, ‘I’ has different
contents in different contexts, i.e., refers to different persons, but only one character.
That is, there is a unique rule according to which ‘I’ is mapped in a context to a
content. Analogously, ‘should’ has different contents in different contexts and can,
for example, mean ‘should in light of the subject’s evidence’ in one context and
‘should in light of the facts’ in another. However, it has one character, i.e., there
is one rule determining which content ‘should’ has in a context.
What unites context-sensitive and ambiguous terms is that both kinds of terms
can have multiple meanings. What distinguishes them is that context-sensitivity
is characterized “by interaction with (extra-linguistic) context” (Sennet 2016),
whereas ambiguity is not. That is, which specific meaning (content, in Kaplan’s
terms) a context-sensitive term has is a function of the context in which the term
occurs. Strictly ambiguous terms can easily be distinguished from context-sensitive
ones since the former have multiple meanings that are unrelated, as in the case of
‘bark’, which is ambiguous between the sound dogs make and the outermost layer
of trees.11 It is harder to distinguish context-sensitive and polysemous terms. The
9For the sake of brevity, I have dropped the quantification over subjects, doxastic attitudes,
propositions, and information-states in my formulation of the truth-conditions of doxastic-should
sentences here and in the following, except where I deem it helpful to make it explicit.
10As I also mention in subsection 2.5.2, Dowell (2013) construes the objective ‘should’ as
information-insensitive. As I explain there, her position is only superficially at odds with mine.
11See Gross (2001: 9).
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multiple meanings of polysemous terms are somehow related, for example in the
form of a type-token relation, as in the following case:
(1) He left the bank 5 minutes ago. He left the bank 5 years ago.
‘Bank’ in the first sentence refers to a specific building, whereas in the second
sentence it refers to an institution that owns this building.
It is clear that the subjective/objective distinction is not a form of strict
ambiguity. Furthermore, what speaks in favour of it being context-sensitive
rather than polysemous is that we can give a semantic model of the doxastic
‘should’—like the ones discussed in section 2.6—that gives us a unique rule that
fixes a contextual parameter, i.e., an information-state, to the subjective and
objective meanings of the doxastic ‘should’. Thus, we can give a plausible semantic
treatment of the doxastic ‘should’ on which the subjective/objective distinction is
the result of interaction with linguistic context.
I could go into a deeper linguistic analysis here to settle the issue whether the
subjective/objective distinction is a form of ambiguity or context-sensitivity. I
don’t think that this is necessary though. What matters to the discussion in this
chapter is that ‘should’ can carry a subjective and objective meaning. Whether
this is so in the form of different Kaplanian contents due to context-sensitivity or
in the form of different senses due to ambiguity is not important. Furthermore,
it is also not decisive for the general project of my thesis. My claim is that the
doxastic ‘should’ is relativized to different information-states and that this fact has
interesting implications for normative epistemology. Whether the relativizability
to information-states is a form of ambiguity or context-sensitivity is, in the light
of the purposes of the project, a mere technicality.12
3.3 The Objective Doxastic ‘Should’
In this section, I want to present positive arguments in favour of my claim that
there is an objective doxastic ‘should’. This won’t be all I have to say in support
of the objective doxastic ‘should’. I will defend the truth norm against common
12Even though I favour the view that the subjective/objective distinction is a form of context-
sensitivity, I will continue using the term ‘sense’ for the sake of simplicity.
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objections to it in section 3.5, which amounts to a defence of the objective doxastic
‘should’.
There are few who would deny that there is a subjective doxastic ‘should’ in the
sense intended here.13 As Gibbons (2013: 33) points out, epistemologists think of
norms as mostly subjective, as being determined by the subject’s perspective and
not by external facts alone. Even on the most ‘objective’ of all subjective norms,
the knowledge norm, which makes whether one should believe a proposition P
sensitive to the external fact of whether P is true, one’s epistemic perspective,
namely, whether one is justified, plays a role in determining whether one should
believe P .14
That there is a subjective doxastic ‘should’ is also supported by linguistic
evidence. Consider this case from the previous chapter:
Nostalgia. Renaud looks back at a situation at time t, when his
evidence clearly supported disbelieving Q. We both know now that
this evidence was misleading, and that Q is true. I say to Renaud:
(2) Don’t beat yourself up. Disbelieving Q is what you should have
done at the time.
The second sentence in (2) rings true. This indicates that there is a doxastic
‘should’ in English that is relativized to the subject’s information-state, and not
the facts.
If you’re a fan of something akin to the knowledge norm of belief, the following
example might be more to your taste. Imagine that you recklessly believe a
proposition P without having evidence for it, which (luckily for you) is actually
true. It seems appropriate for me, who knows P , to say to you:
(3) You should not believe P ; you don’t know P !
If the doxastic ‘should’ only had an objective, but not a subjective sense, then (3)
would be false. However, (3) sounds true.
13True, there are those who think that there are no epistemic norms. I’ve addressed this
position in the introductory chapter 1 and will ignore it here.
14In the following, I will often use the formulation ‘what one should believe’ as shorthand for
the more complex formulation ‘which doxastic attitude one should adopt’. This is not supposed
to mean that what is said only applies to the coarse-grained attitude of belief but not to other
doxastic attitudes such as credences.
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Let’s turn to the objective ‘should’. I suspect that here we might face more
resistance than in the case of the subjective ‘should’. The flip side of the fact
that epistemologists think about normativity mostly from a subjective standpoint
is that the notion of what one objectively should believe might sound strange
to many. Feldman (1988) discusses Brandt (1967), who was, to my knowledge,
the first who drew the distinction between what one should believe subjectively
and what one should believe objectively, i.e., in light of the facts. Feldman (1988:
409) claims that this distinction is actually alien to epistemology and that Brandt
“mentions no one who does draw it in this way and I [Feldman] have found no
one who does so.” Feldman then goes on to argue that the subjective/objective
distinction that matters in philosophy is the one between subjective and objective
justification, i.e., a distinction between different notions of what one subjectively
should believe.15
The claim that the doxastic ‘should’ has an objective sense is in need of
support. I will thus present five arguments in support of it in the following. I
don’t expect that every reader will be convinced by every argument, but if you
just accept one of them, you have compelling reason to believe that the doxastic
‘should’ can be objective.
First, an argument that is provided in favour of the truth norm proceeds from
the following claim:
Correct Belief A belief that P is correct iff P is true.
It is then argued that ‘correct’ is a normative term and that we can therefore
infer Truth from Correct Belief.16 Truth can only be true if the ‘should’ in its
formulation is objective. Thus, if the argument from Correct Belief to Truth
is sound, the doxastic ‘should’ has an objective sense.
Second, there is linguistic evidence suggesting that we at times employ an
objective ‘should’. Consider the following scenario:17
Police-CCTV-1. Detective Lester Freamon is pondering about who
killed Bob. He knows that it was either Omar or Marlo. Furthermore,
15For more on this see footnote 4 above.
16See Gibbard (2005) and Engel (2007).
17This case, and variants of it that I will discuss in this and following chapters, is structurally
analogous to the Miners case, which I introduced in subsection 2.5.1.
64
his reliable informant Bubbles told him that Marlo was at the other
end of town at the time of the murder. He therefore concludes that
it was Omar. His colleague Kima Greggs, who is watching Lester via
CCTV, knows that Bubbles was mistaken this time and that Marlo in
fact killed Bob. She utters:
(4) Oh what a shame! Lester should believe that it was Marlo.
(4) rings true, and it is true if the ‘should’ occurring in it is objective. In light of
the fact that Marlo killed Bob, Lester should believe that Marlo killed Bob. (4)
can’t be true if the ‘should’ in it is subjective as Lester’s epistemic perspective
supports believing that it was Omar, not Marlo. Thus, (4) is a sentence in which
the objective doxastic ‘should’ occurs.
A potential objection to this line of reasoning is to argue that the ‘should’ is
neither subjective nor objective, but relativized to another information-state. In
particular, I propose myself in chapter 5 that we sometimes employ a collective
sense of the doxastic ‘should’, where the information-state is the joined evidence
of the speaker and the subject. On such a collective reading, (4) would be true
as well since in light of Lester’s and Kima’s joint evidence, Lester should believe
that it was Marlo.
I reply that the purpose for which we employ ‘should’ in (4) is different from
the use to which we put the collective doxastic ‘should’. As I explain in chapter
5, the collective doxastic ‘should’ is used when we give others advice on which
doxastic attitude to adopt. Kima can’t be said to give Lester advice as Lester
can’t hear what Kima is saying. Rather, what Kima is doing by uttering (4)
is assessing Lester’s belief in light of the standard of correctness for beliefs. A
correct belief is true, and that’s why she’s expressing (mild) frustration with the
fact that Lester believes something false (‘What a shame!’) and claims that he
would better believe that Omar killed Bob.
Further evidence that the sense of the doxastic ‘should’ that we employ when
we evaluate someone’s belief is not the same as the one we use for the purpose of
epistemic advice is the following variant of Police-CCTV-1:
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Police-CCTV-2. Lester is pondering about who killed Bob. He
knows that it was either Omar or Marlo. Furthermore, his reliable
informant Bubbles told him that Marlo was at the other end of town
at the time of the murder. He therefore concludes that it was Omar.
His colleague Kima Greggs, who is watching Lester via CCTV, knows
that Bubbles was mistaken this time and mistook someone else for
Marlo. Moreover, the equally reliable Johnny told Kima that he saw
Marlo shooting Bob. Kima says to Detective McNulty, who is watching
Lester via CCTV with her:
(4) Oh what a shame! Lester should believe that it was Marlo.
In fact, however, unbeknownst to Kima and McNulty, Johnny was
also wrong and mistook Omar for Marlo. Omar indeed killed Bob.
The next day, Detective McNulty finds out about this and confronts
Kima with the facts:
(5) Well, I guess you were wrong when you said that Lester should
believe that it was Marlo.
Kima admits that she was wrong when she uttered (4).
Kima seems right to admit that (4) was wrong. However, she can only be right if
the ‘should’ in (4) is objective. If it were collective, then she would rather respond
to McNulty:
(6) No, given what we all knew at the time, Lester should have
believed that it was Marlo!
To conclude, the fact that Kima is willing to retract (4), and does not refuse to,
is evidence that the ‘should’ in (4) is objective, and not collective.
A third argument in favour of the objective ‘should’ is that ‘S should do A’,
sometimes at least, means ‘It is best if S does A’.18 Take the example of the
sentence ‘There should be world peace’. It arguably means that it would be best
if there was world peace and expresses a political ideal. It is natural to describe
18See Sloman (1970). For more on the relation between ‘best’ and ‘should’, see section 2.4.
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an epistemically ideal world as one in which we believe every true proposition
and no false proposition (Gibbard 2005). This is connected to the point that the
standard of correctness for belief is truth. In such an ideal world, we hold all the
correct beliefs we could possibly hold. In other words, what is best, epistemically
speaking, is to believe all and only true propositions. Thus, where ‘should’ means
‘best’, ‘One should believe P iff P ’ is true. Since this sentence can only be true if
the ‘should’ occurring in it is objective, it follows that the doxastic ‘should’ has
an objective sense. When speakers like Kima use the objective doxastic ‘should’,
they describe what would be best in light of the epistemic ideal of truth. You do
not necessarily have to believe that truth is the only epistemic ideal in order to
be convinced by this third argument. You can believe that it’s just one epistemic
ideal next to others such as knowledge, understanding, justification, or reliability,
and that it is one of the epistemic ideals in light of which we evaluate doxastic
attitudes. 19
Fourth, as I have pointed out in section 3.2 above, it is widely agreed that the
practical ‘should’ has an objective sense. Even though you are not aware that the
hotel is on fire, you should, in some sense at least, jump out of the window. Now,
in chapter 2, I explained that the doxastic and the practical ‘should’ are both
instances of the deontic modal ‘should’. Whether this ‘should’ expresses epistemic
or practical norms depends on whether the contextually salient ordering source
reflects epistemic or practical norms. That practical and doxastic ‘should’ are the
same except with respect to the kind of normativity they reflect makes it plausible
that they also share the characteristic that they can have an objective sense.
Fifth, Schroeder (2015) suggests a subjective/objective distinction analogous
to the one I am discussing here, but with respect to reasons. On his view, reasons
are propositions. An objective reason is a true proposition. For example, the
fact that Renaud is smiling is a reason for believing that Renaud is happy. A
subjective reason is a proposition that the agent who has the reason has a certain
access to, e.g., a proposition that is part of the agent’s evidence. For example, if
I know that Renaud is smiling, I have a subjective reason to believe that he is
happy. Now, the following principle is plausible:
19Alston (2005) proposes such a view.
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Reasons-Should If there is conclusive reason for S to believe P , S should
believe P .
Now, let’s assume that P is true. Then, there is an objective reason to believe
P for any person S: P itself. This might sound odd, but P clearly counts in
favour of P . In fact, P seems to be a conclusive objective reason to believe P
since there is no other fact, i.e., objective reason, that could outweigh it. Thus,
we can infer from Reasons-Should that for any proposition P , if P is true, one
should believe P . This conclusion can only be true if the ‘should’ occurring in it
is objective. Since the derivation is sound, the conclusion is true and the doxastic
‘should’ must thus have an objective sense.
I have to concede that this argument is probably the weakest of the five.
It rests on the assumption that there are objective reasons. If you need to be
convinced that there is such a thing as an objective doxastic ‘should’, wheeling in
objective reasons might feel close to begging the question.
3.4 Subjective Epistemic Norms and the Truth Norm
I will present the main thesis of this chapter in this section. Subjective epistemic
norms (which I will introduce in subsection 3.4.1) and the truth norm (3.4.2) seem
to be in conflict (3.4.3). I argue that this conflict is only apparent as formulations
of the truth norm and those of subjective norms use different senses of the doxastic
‘should’, namely, the objective and subjective sense, respectively (section 3.4.4).
As these senses result from the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’,
one implication of this semantic feature for normative epistemology is that it
resolves the apparent conflict between subjective and objective epistemic norms.
3.4.1 Subjective Epistemic Norms
There are a number of epistemic norms discussed in the literature that I would
describe as subjective. What they all share is that they make what a subject should
believe partly dependent on the subject’s epistemic perspective. In section 3.2
above, I’ve already mentioned Evidentialism as an example. Another example
is the knowledge norm, according to which one should, roughly, believe something
only if one knows it. In his (2013: 14), Gibbons describes the knowledge norm as
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“objective”. The reason is that due to the factivity of knowledge, the knowledge
norm makes whether one should believe P dependent on an aspect of the external
world: on whether P is true. Thus, for Gibbons (2013), a norm is subjective
only if what one should believe is entirely dependent on the subject’s epistemic
perspective, as for example with Evidentialism. For me, however, a norm is
subjective if what one should believe is to some extent dependent on the subject’s
epistemic perspective. Gibbons and I don’t have a substantive agreement; we’re
just carving up logical space in different ways.
In this subsection, I want to show that due to its flexibility, Subjective
Doxastic Should, and hence Doxastic Should, can accommodate subjective
epistemic norms. This means, Subjective Doxastic Should can be precisified
in a way that allows interpreting these subjective epistemic norms as using the
subjective doxastic ‘should’ in their formulation. As a reminder, here is the
account of the subjective doxastic ‘should’ I offered in section 3.2:
Subjective Doxastic Should S should subjectively adopt doxastic attitude
D to P iff having D to P reflects accurately how much S’s information-state
supports P .
I already explained there how Evidentialism can be accommodated by Subjec-
tive Doxastic Should. The norm can be seen as an instance of the justification
norm:
Justification S should have doxastic attitude D to P iff S is propositionally
justified in adopting D to P .
Gibbons (2013: 5) explicitly proposes this norm. What it exactly amounts
to depends on the notion of justification that the respective proponent has
in mind. On Feldman’s evidentialist account of (propositional) justification
Justification becomes Evidentialism.20 Gibbons (2013: 39) propagates a
more externalist account of justification according to which, roughly, one has
propositional justification to believe something iff one’s available evidence supports
it, where one’s available evidence is not just the evidence one already possesses, but
20Hume also seems to support something along these lines, when he states: “A wise man [...]
proportions his belief to the evidence” (Hume 1748/2007: sec. 10).
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also evidence one can very easily collect, for example by looking around the room
one is in. His version of Justification can be accommodated by Subjective
Doxastic Should, too, if we take the subject’s information-state to be their
available evidence.
Another, very prominent account of justification is reliabilism.21 Unlike eviden-
tialism, it is an account of doxastic justification. Roughly, one has propositional
justification to have believe P iff one has sufficient reason to believe P . One has
doxastic justification to believe P if one, furthermore, also actually believes P and
does so for the right reasons (Kvanvig and Menzel 1990). A somewhat altered
version of Justification, according to which one should believe a proposition iff
one is doxastically justified in doing so, could look like this:
Reliabilism S should believe P iff believing P is the result of a reliable belief-
forming process.
Kornblith (2002: 158) seems to defend such an account, when he proposes that
epistemic norms require us to adopt cognitive systems that are truth-conducive.
Precisifying Subjective Doxastic Should such that it makes Reliabilism true
is a bit trickier, but possible. We can stipulate that the contextually provided
information-state i is the proposition describing how reliable the process that
produced S’s belief that P is. This might stretch the notion of ‘information-state’
a bit, but since it is a technical term, it need not refer to anything that looks like
evidence. Furthermore, we stipulate that believing P reflects most accurately how
much i supports P iff according to i the process that produced S’s belief that P
is more than (let’s say) 70% reliable. This would make sense since the probability
of P on i, i.e., the probability of P given that the process that produced belief
that P is more than 70% reliable, is more than 70%. Thus, P has an evidential
probability of more than 70% on i, and this support relation seems to be most
accurately reflected by believing P , rather than by suspending judgement on
whether P or disbelieving P . (Of course, 70% is randomly chosen, and one can
set the threshold required for licensing belief higher or lower.)
Admittedly, at this point one might wonder whether it is still accurate to speak
of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ if the thing the doxastic
21See, for example, Goldman (1979).
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‘should’ is sensitive to doesn’t have much to do with what we intuitively describe
as information. This is not too worrisome for two reasons. First, it is far from clear
that our intuitive understanding of technical terms like ‘information-state’ should
bear on how we use them in our formal theories. Second, what is essential about
the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ is that it allows us to evaluate
doxastic attitudes from different epistemic perspectives. One of these perspective
is the perspective of the relevant subject, and this is the perspective we’re taking
when we employ the subjective doxastic ‘should’. Now, an obvious candidate
for characterizing a subject’s epistemic perspective is their (available) evidence.
However, the reliability of the process that brought about a certain belief is also
an aspect of the person’s epistemic perspective. Imagine that we both believe
that Germany won the Football World Cup in 2014, but that you do so because
you read it in the newspaper and I because of wishful thinking. The different
ways in which our beliefs were formed puts us in different epistemic positions with
respect to the proposition that Germany won the Football World Cup in 2014. To
conclude, the proposition that describes how reliable the process is that formed a
subject’s belief that P represents the subject’s epistemic perspective on P and
can therefore be called the subject’s information-state (with respect to P ).
Another, quite popular subjective norm is the knowledge norm. If we were to
simply model it on Justification, it would read as follows:22
Knowledge-Simple S should believe P iff S knows that P .
Knowledge-Simple has the problem that since knowledge entails belief, it follows
from it that if one should believe P , one believes P . This is obviously wrong
because we’re not epistemically perfect and can fail to believe what we should
(Whitcomb 2014: 93).23 To avoid this, one could weaken Knowledge-Simple as
follows:
22The following remarks on the knowledge norm owe much to the excellent discussion in
Whitcomb (2014).
23Notice that Reliabilism faces the same problem since it entails that we should believe P if
we are doxastically justified to believe P , from which follows that we should believe P only if we
believe P . Defenders of Reliabilism could react to this by modifying their position such that
one should believe P iff if one came to believe P , one’s belief that P would be the product of
a reliable belief-forming process. This position avoids the problem of epistemic perfection for
similar reasons as Knowledge-Counterfactual, which I discuss below.
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Knowledge-Material S should believe P only if S knows that P .24
Knowledge-Material replaces the biconditional in Knowledge-Simple with
a material implication. As a result, Knowledge-Material does not entail that
we’re epistemically perfect. However, in turn this norm never tells us when we
should believe P or should not believe P . It only tells us when it is not the case
that one should believe P : when we don’t know that P . Notice, <it is not the
case that S should believe P> is not the same as <S should not believe P>.25
The former can be true and the latter false if, for example, S should either believe
P or suspend judgement on P , but both options are permissible.
The most common version of the knowledge norm is even weaker than
Knowledge-Material:
Knowledge-Wide S should: believe P only if S knows that P .26
To understand the distinction between the two, it helps to look at their logical form,
which is respectively LF-Knowledge-Material and LF-Knowledge-Wide:
LF-Knowledge-Material Should: (S believes P ) only if S knows P .
LF-Knowledge-Wide Should: (S believes P only if S knows P ).
‘Should’ has narrow scope in Knowledge-Material, while it has wide scope in
Knowledge-Wide. In the former, it binds the expression ‘S believes P ’, in the
latter the whole expression ‘S believes P only if S knows P ’. As Whitcomb (2014:
94) points out, such a wide-scope formulation of the knowledge norm is even
more uninformative about what we should believe than Knowledge-Material.
It only tells us that we should not be in a state where we believe P , but do not
know P . This norm can be satisfied in two ways: either by not knowing and not
believing P or by knowing P and believing P .27 Knowledge-Wide is thus not
only incapable of telling us whether we should or should not believe a proposition,
24This norm is discussed, but not endorsed, by Littlejohn (2012: 233).
25In terms of modal logic, this is the difference between ¬ and ¬.
26See Williamson (2000: 11), Sutton (2007: 44), and Bird (2007: 95).
27The third option would be knowing and not believing P , but since knowledge entails belief,
this is a logical impossibility.
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but also of telling us whether it is not the case that one should (or not) believe a
proposition.28
To sum up, Knowledge-Material and Knowledge-Wide are strangely
‘hands-off’ for a norm of belief. Another way to circumvent the difficulty with
Knowledge-Simple is to go counterfactual:
Knowledge-Counterfactual S should believe P iff if S came to believe P , S
would know P .29
This does not entail that if one should believe P , one believes P , since according
to it one should believe P if one does not believe P , but would know it if one
came to believe it. Furthermore, it clearly tells us under which conditions we
should (not) believe a proposition. Whitcomb (2014) points out that Knowledge-
Counterfactual faces some counterexamples due to the conditional fallacy (Shope
1978) and considers different possible moves to fix this problem. I don’t want
to go into this here; I merely wanted to lay out that there is a version of the
knowledge norm that neither entails that we’re epistemically perfect nor is too
hands-off. In the following, if not otherwise indicated, I will orientate myself on
Knowledge-Counterfactual when discussing the knowledge norm.
Subjective Doxastic Should can accommodate Knowledge-Counter-
factual as follows. First, we need to assume that information-states are not
sets of worlds, but sets of propositions. Furthermore, a subject S’s information-
state is the set of the propositions that S would come to know if S believed
them. Let’s call this set of propositions S’s counterfactual knowledge. That S’s
counterfactual knowledge is S’s information-state is somewhat intuitive. On the
Williamsonian assumption that E = K, i could then be described as S’s available
evidence, since it is the knowledge, i.e., the evidence, that S either already pos-
sesses or can gather. Finally, we stipulate that a belief that P accurately reflects
how much i supports P iff i fully supports P . ‘Full support’ is a technical notion
such that an information-state i fully supports P iff P is a member of i. It makes
intuitive sense to see this as the strongest possible evidential support relation
28Whitcomb’s argument is inspired by Broome’s (1999) argument that principles of rationality
are not normative since they are only wide-scope obligations.
29This is akin to another natural formulation of the knowledge norm according to which one
should believe P iff one is in a position to know P . Smithies (2012) puts this norm forward.
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between a proposition and an information-state; the proposition is not just very
likely on the information-state, it is actually contained by it. If we stipulate
that belief accurately reflects only such full support and that i in Subjective
Doxastic Should is S’s counterfactual knowledge, then S should subjectively
believe P iff if S came to believe P , S would know P .
The justification and knowledge norm are not the only subjective norms
one can hold. For one, one can defend Evidentialism or Reliabilism without
accepting evidentialist or reliabilist accounts of justification. In this case, one
would be non-committal with respect to Justification, but such epistemic norms
would of course still be subjective. Furthermore, the principle of conditionalization
championed by Bayesian epistemology is equally subjective as it tells you how
to revise your credences in the light of new evidence you have gathered. This
can easily be accommodated by Subjective Doxastic Should if we precisify it
such that (i) i is the subject’s total evidence and that (ii) a credence of x in P
accurately reflects i’s support for P iff x is the conditional probability of P on i.
To sum up, it holds for all of the subjective epistemic norms discussed here,
that Subjective Doxastic Should is flexible enough to be precisified in such a
way that it makes them true in the subjective sense of the doxastic ‘should’. Before
I move on to the objective norm, it is worth noting that the different subjective
norms are also in conflict with each other. For example, one can justifiably
believe, but not be in a position to know P . In this case one should believe
P according to the justification norm, but not the knowledge norm. One can
approach the conflict between the subjective norms by claiming that only one of
them is correct and that the precisification of Subjective Doxastic Should that
accommodates this one norm gives us the one correct meaning of the subjective
doxastic ‘should’. Alternatively, one could argue that all (or at least some) of
the subjective norms are true in some sense of the subjective ‘should’. On this
picture, the information-state that the subjective ‘should’ is relativized to is, for
example, on some occasions the subject’s evidence and on other occasions it is the
subject’s counterfactual knowledge. In effect, this would mean that the doxastic
‘should’ has several subjective senses. My goal here is not to resolve the conflict
between subjective epistemic norms and to decide whether there is one subjective
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sense of the doxastic ‘should’ or in fact several.30 I am only concerned with the
(apparent) conflict between subjective and objective norms. When I speak of the
subjective doxastic ‘should’ in the following, this is therefore not supposed to
mean that I side with the view that there is only one subjective sense, but is just
shorthand.
3.4.2 The Truth Norm
Let’s turn to the truth norm. In this subsection, I will quickly present the different
versions of the truth norm that can be found in the literature, what motivates
some of them, and how they can be accommodated by Objective Doxastic
Should. The default formulation of the truth norm is the one I used above:
Truth For any proposition P and subject S, S should believe P iff P is true.31
Gibbard (2005), Shah and Velleman (2005), and Engel (2007) are among the propo-
nents of Truth. As I have already shown in section 3.2, it can be accommodated
by
Objective Doxastic Should For any proposition P and subject S, S should
objectively believe P iff P is true.
However, Truth is not the only formulation of the truth norm on offer. Wedgwood
(2002: 273) proposes the following:
Truth-Considered For any subject S and any proposition P that S considers,
S should believe P iff P is true.
Whereas Truth implicitly quantifies over all propositions, Truth-Considered
only quantifies over those propositions that the subject considers. This is to avoid
the objection to Truth that it would make more sense to suspend judgement on
trivial propositions, such as those concerning the number of grains of sand on
30However, in chapter 4 I propose that we should distinguish between two senses, one that is
relativized to the subject’s first-order evidence and one that is relativized to their higher-order
evidence.
31In the following, I will make the quantification over propositions and subjects explicit again,
since they are important for our discussion.
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a beach, rather than to believe them since believing them would be a waste of
one’s valuable cognitive resources. Since on Truth-Considered the principle
only applies to propositions one considers anyway and thus already spent cognitive
resources on, Truth-Considered is not subject to this objection.
The ‘should’ in Truth-Considered cannot be objective given Objective
Doxastic Should since according to the latter, ‘S should believe P ’ is true even
if P is not considered by S as long as P is true. A possible response to this would
be to modify Objective Doxastic Should as follows:
Objective Doxastic Should-Considered For any subject S and any propo-
sition P , S should objectively believe P iff P is true and S considers P .
This refined account of the meaning of ‘S should believe P ’ where the ‘should’ in
it is the objective doxastic ‘should’ quantifies over all subjects and propositions,
unlike Truth-Considered. This is necessary because otherwise it wouldn’t give
us an account of the meaning of all sentences of the form ‘S should (objectively)
believe P ’. Despite this difference, Objective Doxastic Should-Considered
entails Truth-Considered and hence makes it true. Objective Doxastic
Should-Considered can be integrated into Doxastic Should by stipulating
that where the doxastic ‘should’ takes on an objective sense the contextually
provided information-state is the intersection of all those true propositions which
are such that the subject S considers them. I take it that if one considers
a proposition P one thereby automatically also considers its negation. Thus,
if someone wonders ‘Is P true?’ and P is false, then ¬P is among the true
propositions considered by this person. This information-state will have a strong
support relation with the true propositions S considers since it entails them, and
will neither support nor speak against those propositions S does not consider.
Thus, it will license believing P iff P is true and considered by S.
Another concern with Truth is raised by Boghossian (2003). He argues that
it cannot hold that for every true proposition, we should believe it. This would
violate the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ since it is impossible for someone to
believe everything that is true—this would be a cognitive overload. He therefore
retreats to the following, weaker formulation:
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Truth-Necessity For any proposition P and subject S, S should believe P
only if P is true.32
A problem with this account, just like with Knowledge-Wide, is that it does not
tell us when one should believe a proposition (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007: 280).
If P is true, nothing follows about what S should believe from Truth-Necessity
since it only gives us a necessary condition. If P is false, it only follows that it is
not the case that S should believe P , but not that S should not believe P . For
this reason, I will mostly ignore it in the following and hence don’t need to discuss
whether it can be accommodated by Objective Doxastic Should.
Notice that Truth-Considered is not subject to the point that ‘ought’ implies
‘can’ (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007: ibid). It is within our cognitive capacity
to believe all true propositions that we consider. Wedgwood’s (2002) account of
Truth is at the same time logically strong enough to make predictions about
what one should believe. I will discuss whether Truth or Truth-Considered
is to be preferred in section 3.5. For now, what matters is that they can be
accommodated by either Objective Doxastic Should or Objective Doxastic
Should-Considered, which can both be integrated into Doxastic Should.
3.4.3 The Conflict
Subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm seem to conflict with each other.
More precisely, they appear to be inconsistent. Truth and Justification can
clash in two ways. First, on almost any conception of justification, there are
justified false beliefs.33 Thus, there can be a situation where the following is true:
(7) S is propositionally justified to believe P and P is false.
From (7) and Justification, we can infer:
(8) S should believe P .
From (7) and Truth, we can infer:
(9) It is not the case that S should believe P .
32Shah (2003: 469f.) also chooses this formulation of the truth norm.
33Littlejohn (2012) opposes this traditional view.
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Notice that (9) can also be inferred from (7) and Truth-Considered, given that
S considers P . (8) and (9) are inconsistent. Thus, Justification and Truth (and
its variants) clash if (7) holds.
Second, there are cases where (10) holds:
(10) S is not propositionally justified to believe P and P is true.
Justification and (10) entail:
(11) It is not the case that S should believe P .
Truth and (10) entails:
(12) S should believe P .
(11) and (12) are inconsistent, so Justification and Truth clash where (10) holds.
The same is true for Justification and Truth-Considered if S considers P . It
will be easy to see that these two kinds of conflict can also occur between the
truth norm and all the other subjective epistemic norms I discussed above, except
for the knowledge norm. For example, it is possible that one’s evidence supports
believing P and P is false or that one’s evidence supports not believing P and P
is true. In those cases, Evidentialism and Truth clash.
Variations of the knowledge norm and the truth norm can come in conflict,
too. We can ignore Knowledge-Narrow since it is extremely implausible and
probably no one holds it anyway. However, Knowledge-Counterfactual and
Truth clash when (13) holds:
(13) If S came to believe P , S wouldn’t know P , and P is true.
On an analysis of knowledge as un-Gettierized justified true belief, (13) holds
when S is not propositionally justified to believe P or S’s belief that P would be
Gettierized.
(13) and Truth entail:
(14) S should believe P .
(13) and Knowledge-Counterfactual entail
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(15) It is not the case that S should believe P .
Thus, when (13) holds, Knowledge-Counterfactual and Truth, as well as
Truth-Considered where S considers P , clash.
What about other instances of the truth norm and the knowledge norm? Since
Knowledge-Wide does not entail anything about whether it is (not) the case
that one should (not) believe a proposition, it cannot be in conflict with Truth
or any variation of it. Truth-Necessity only tells us something about whether a
subject S should believe a proposition P when P is false, in which case it says
that it is not the case that one should believe P . However, the knowledge norm
tells us in none of its variations that one should believe P when P is false, so
Truth-Necessity and the knowledge norm can never conflict.
To sum up, subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm seem to be
inconsistent, except if we choose Knowledge-Wide as our subjective norm or
we choose any instance of the knowledge norm as our subjective norm and Truth-
Necessity as our preferred formulation of the truth norm. As I have mentioned,
both Knowledge-Wide and Truth-Necessity have been criticized for being
too weak since they don’t tell us what we should believe, which one would guess is
the precise job of an epistemic norm. Accordingly, I will put Knowledge-Wide
and Truth-Necessity aside in the remainder of this chapter. Assuming that we
want stronger epistemic norms, we seem to face a puzzle. As Gibbons (2013: 6)
points out, subjective norms and the truth norm both seem to have something
going for them, but if they are inconsistent, we can’t accept both.
3.4.4 Resolving the Conflict
The distinction between the subjective and the objective doxastic ‘should’ provides
a straightforward solution to the conflict between the two kinds of norms. Any of
the apparently inconsistent pairs of sentences that we derived from variants of the
truth norm and the subjective norms are not actually inconsistent. For example,
(8) and (9) explicitly mean:
(8*) S should subjectively believe P .
(9*) It is not the case that S should objectively believe P .
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(8*) and (9*) are not inconsistent, just as the sentences ‘This is a bank’ and ‘It is
not the case that this is a bank’ are not inconsistent if ‘bank’ in the first sentence
refers to a river bank and ‘bank’ in the second to a financial institution.
3.5 Four Objections
While probably everybody who believes that there are epistemic norms would
agree that at least some subjective norm holds, the truth norm is significantly less
popular. An alternative solution to the conflict between subjective norms and the
truth norm is therefore to simply give up the latter. Furthermore, claiming that
the truth norm is not correct is claiming that there is no objective doxastic ‘should’
as the correctness of the truth norm entails that there is an objective doxastic
‘should’. In the following, I will first discuss three objections to the truth norm,
which if successful, would accordingly undermine my solution. Subsequently, I
will reply to a fourth objection by Gibbons (2013) that directly attacks the idea
that there is a subjective and an objective sense of the doxastic ‘should’.
First, as I already mentioned in section 3.4, one of the major worries with the
truth norm is that following it will either lead to cognitive overload or at least to
an inefficient use of our cognitive capacities.34
A first reply to this worry is that the truth norm describes an epistemic
ideal. As mentioned in section 3.3, the objective doxastic ‘should’ can be seen as
describing what is epistemically best. When we think about ideal situations, we
abstract away from real-world constraints. For example, given the current political
situation or maybe even given the human condition, it might be impossible to
achieve world peace. ‘There should be world peace’ could nonetheless be true
since it would be best if there was world peace. Analogously, when describing
what would be epistemically best we presumably ignore constraints such as our
cognitive capacities, too (see Engel 2013: 209). Thus, ‘One should believe all
and only all true propositions’ can be true even if fulfilling this is psychologically
impossible. As Gibbard (2005) nicely points out, this abstraction away from
real-life constraints also applies to subjective norms like the normative constraints
of probabilism. The latter require that we get rid of all probabilistic incoherencies
in our credences, like assigning a proposition and its negation a total credence
34See Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), and Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007).
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of less or more than 1. However, Gibbard is certainly right when he writes that
“[o]n many matters [...] ironing out incoherencies would be more trouble than it’s
worth” (ibid.: 339-40).
A second, alternative reply to this worry about cognitive overload and waste
is Wedgwood’s (2002) suggestion to restrict the truth norm to propositions one
has considered. As explained above, I can accommodate this move by proposing
Objective Doxastic Should-Considered as the definition of the objective
doxastic ‘should’.
I am not sure which of these two general strategies are to be preferred. I won’t
settle this issue here and will remain neutral with respect to the question whether
the objective doxastic ‘should’ is better characterized by Objective Doxastic
Should or Objective Doxastic Should-Considered.
Second, Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007: 281) argue that the truth norm faces
difficulties because of so-called blindspot propositions like the following one:
(16) It is raining and nobody believes it is raining.
If (16) is true, you should believe it according to Truth, but then (16) becomes
false because now someone believes that it’s raining: you. The problem is not
that you cannot believe (16) if you should believe it. Even though it is irrational,
it seems psychologically possible to form the belief that it is raining and that
nobody believes that it is raining. It is just that as soon as you try to satisfy the
truth norm and form the belief that (16), it’s no longer the case that you should
believe it as it has become false. Truth hence violates the plausible principle
that if one should do A, one can do A while it is the case that one should do A.
Notice that the same problem applies to Truth-Considered since we can easily
imagine that you’re considering (16).
As Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007: 282) themselves point out, one way to
address this problem is to restrict Truth to propositions unlike (16) that can be
believed truly, so that Truth doesn’t entail that we should believe (16):
Truth-Believable For any subject S and any proposition P that is truly be-
lievable for S, S should believe P iff P is true.
In this case, we could modify Objective Doxastic Should as follows in order
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for it to fit Truth-Believable:
Objective Doxastic Should-Believable For any subject S and proposition
P , S should objectively believe P iff P is true and P is truly believable for S.
Like Objective Doxastic Should-Considered, Objective Doxastic
Should-Believable quantifies over all subjects and propositions, so that it can
provide the truth-conditions for every sentence of the form ‘S should (objectively)
believe P ’. It entails Truth-Believable and thus makes it true.
Modifying Objective Doxastic Should in this manner is not ad hoc. If we
assume that the objective doxastic ‘should’ describes the epistemic ideal of a world
where we hold every correct belief we can possibly hold, it makes sense to exclude
propositions from the range of the truth norm that are such that it’s impossible
to believe them correctly. Notice that ‘impossible’ here means logically impossible
(ibid.: 281). I’ve argued above that it need not be a problem if the truth norm
describes an ideal that is humanly impossible to achieve as it would lead to a
cognitive overload. Ideals don’t have to be achievable. This is not incoherent with
the claim that the truth norm shouldn’t apply to propositions that aren’t truly
believable. While ideals might ignore human capacities, they can’t ignore what’s
logically possible.
Doxastic Should can accommodate Objective Doxastic Should-
Believable. However, this is a bit more complicated. We need to assume
that the objective doxastic ‘should’ is relativized to an information-state i rep-
resenting true propositions that can be believed truly by S. Let’s call this the
truly believable realistic information-state, or itbr. One important point is that
in order for Doxastic Should to accommodate Objective Doxastic Should-
Believable, itbr must not be modelled as the intersection of all these propositions,
where the propositions are again modelled as sets of worlds. Otherwise, we end
up with itbr being a set of worlds such that in all of them (16) holds true, given
that the conjuncts of (16) are true and truly believable. Because a set that is an
intersection of these two conjuncts and other propositions will only contain worlds
in which both conjuncts are true, such a set will only contain worlds in which (16)
is true. If itbr was modelled in this fashion, it would provide strong evidential
support for (16) and hence license believing (16). In this case, Doxastic Should
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would predict that ‘You should believe (16)’ is true on an objective reading of
‘should’.
To avoid this, we can model itbr as a set of propositions, and not intersections
of them. Furthermore, we need to stipulate that believing P accurately reflects
the support relation between itbr and P iff itbr fully supports P . I have defined
the notion of ‘full support’ in subsection 3.4.1 such that an information-state i
fully supports a proposition P iff i is a member of P . This way, one should believe
P in light of itbr, i.e., objectively, iff P is true and can be truly believed. The
same solution applies mutatis mutandis to Truth-Considered and Objective
Doxastic Should-Considered.35
Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007: 282) object that formulations of the truth
norm along the line of Truth-Believable are too weak since they do not tell us
what to do if we’re faced with blindspot propositions. Wedgwood (2013: 128),
who defends Truth-Considered, agrees with this. For him, the truth norm is
the foundational epistemic norm (Wedgwood 2002) that all other epistemic norms
derive from. Hence, the truth norm needs to cover every proposition. This is not
really a problem for my view. All I claim is that the truth norm holds since the
‘should’ in its formulation is the objective doxastic ‘should’. I do not make any
claims about the position of the truth norm in the hierarchy of epistemic norms.
I do not need it to cover every proposition.
Admittedly though, ‘One should not believe (16)’ has a true ring to it. However,
35One might worry whether it’s still possible for Doxastic Should to account for both the
subjective and the objective doxastic ‘should’ if the notion of ‘accurately reflecting a support
relation’ is defined in such a peculiar manner. If believing P accurately reflects the support
relationship between an information-state i and P only if P is a member of i, how can Doxastic
Should explain that ‘S should (subjectively) believe P ’ is true where S’s evidence abductively
supports P , but P is not among the propositions constituting S’s evidence? Given our definition
of ‘accurately reflecting’, S’s evidence would not license believing that P .
This problem reveals a limitation of Doxastic Should that arises from its simplified nature.
As I made clear in section 2.7, Doxastic Should is a simplified version of those semantic theories
of the deontic ‘should’ that make use of information-sensitive ordering sources. While Doxastic
Should struggles with the just described problem, these more sophisticated models can resolve
it. We only need to design our information-sensitive doxastic ordering source g in the following
manner: where g is relativized to the truly believable realistic information-state itbr, it ranks
a world at which the subject holds a belief that P best iff itbr fully supports P , i.e., iff P is a
true proposition that is truly believable. However, where g is relativized to a subject’s body of
evidence E, g ranks in a more ‘relaxed manner’; it ranks a world where the subject holds a belief
that P best also if E supports P less than fully, for example where E makes P only probable.
To conclude, Doxastic Should runs into difficulties accommodating both Subjective Dox-
astic Should and Objective Doxastic Should-Believable, but this is only so because it’s a
simplified semantic account. This is not a problem for Doxastic Contextualism in itself.
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I can make it turn out true by the following further development of the assumption
that the doxastic ‘should’ is objective where it is relativized to the truly believable
realistic information-state, itbr. I can stipulate that itbr does not fully support
a proposition P , suspending judgement accurately reflects the support relation
between itbr and P . We then end up with the view that for all true propositions
P , if they are truly believable, you should objectively believe them, and if they
aren’t truly believable, you should objectively suspend judgement about them.
This seems plausible. If P is true, disbelieving it seems wrong in light of the
ideal of truth, but if it can’t be truly believed, believing it seems wrong, too.
Suspending judgement appears to be the best way out.
To conclude, we can defend the truth norm against the worry about blindspot
propositions by restricting it to Truth-Believable and Doxastic Should can
be specified such that it makes Truth-Believable true.
A third major objection to the truth norm is that it cannot be guiding and
thus cannot really be a norm. Glu¨er and Wikforss (2009, 2010, 2015) argue that in
order to follow the truth norm, we need to figure out first whether the proposition
P we are considering is true or not. In other words, in order to follow it, we
first need to form a belief about whether P holds, which is “the very belief the
formation of which [the truth norm] was supposed to guide” (Glu¨er and Wikforss
2010: 752). The truth norm’s guidance therefore “necessarily comes too late”
(ibid.: 751).36 Notice that the argument is not that the truth norm cannot be
guiding since one is not always in a position to tell whether the condition for
its application is satisfied or not. This is a popular internalist-spirited criticism
of any norm whose satisfaction conditions are such that we are not always in a
position to know whether they apply. However, as Boghossian (2003) remarks,
among such norms is not only the truth norm, but many other norms, such as
‘Buy low, sell high’. Furthermore, Williamson (2000: 192) has argued that since
no interesting condition is luminous, i.e., such that we are always in a position to
know whether it obtains or not, actually no norm can be such that we are always
in a position to know what we need to do in order to conform with it.
This does not undermine the defence of the truth norm that I’ve been offering
here. I am arguing that there is a reading of the truth norm on which it is
true—i.e., when the doxastic ‘should’ in its formulation is objective. I’m not
36Sosa (2001: 54) makes the same argument.
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claiming that this ‘should’ is guiding. As McHugh (2012) has argued, we do not
need to interpret the truth norm as being prescriptive, i.e., as being “apt to guide
an agent in doxastic deliberation” (ibid.: 18). He proposes to understand the
truth norm instead as evaluative and therefore best formulated in terms of ‘good’,
not ‘should’. More precisely, he formulates the truth norm as follows (ibid.: 19):
Truth-Good For any subject S and proposition P , if S believes P , then that
belief is good if P is true and bad if P is false.
My proposal differs in a number of ways. First, I think the truth norm can be
formulated in terms of ‘should’. This is arguably only a difference in terminology
since on my proposal the objective doxastic ‘should’ means something similar to
‘good’, namely ‘best’, and is not prescriptive. Second, similar to Wedgwood (2002),
McHugh (2012: 21) claims that the truth norm needs to explain other epistemic
norms. As I have pointed out, I am not committed to this view. Finally, on
McHugh’s account the truth norm only evaluates propositions a subject believes,
whereas on my picture it applies to all propositions that they can truly believe (or
at least all propositions that they consider and can truly believe). McHugh’s main
reason for rejecting more inclusive formulations like Truth-Believable seems to
be that he believes that even if the truth norm does not guide our belief-forming
processes directly, it nonetheless plays a motivating role in these processes. For
example, he suggests that our acceptance of the truth norm should explain why
we avoid believing propositions for which we lack evidence (ibid.: 19). The trouble
with Truth-Believable is that it is too complicated to play such a role (ibid.:
15). Again, I do not ascribe to any particular view on how the truth norm is
connected to other epistemic norms or our cognitive processes. On the picture I
suggested in section 3.3, we use the objective doxastic ‘should’ to describe which
beliefs others persons should adopt in light of the epistemic ideal of truth.37 While
Truth-Believable might be too complicated to play a role in the deep-seated
psychological processes of belief-formation, it does not seem to be too complex
to be employed for the more conscious practice of evaluating other people. If it
were, then many analyses of knowledge that go beyond the simple JTB-analysis
37Sometimes this third ‘person’ and the evaluated subject are the same, but at different points
in time.
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would disqualify just on basis of being too complicated to explain our practice
of ascribing knowledge to each other. However, despite all these differences, I
agree with McHugh’s (2012) central point: the truth norm needs not to be read
as prescriptive. Therefore, the point that the truth norm cannot guide does not
show that the norm can’t be true.
A fourth complaint with resolving the conflict between the two kinds of norms
by arguing that they use different senses of the doxastic ‘should’ comes from
Gibbons (2013). He acknowledges that ‘should’ might be ambiguous or context-
sensitive in the way I have described it, but then adds that he does not think that
this can “really solve the problem” (ibid.: 19). For Gibbons, the question remains
which of the two expresses a “genuine requirement” (ibid.: 21) or the “regular
ought” (ibid.: 65). This is in and of itself not much of an argument. It is as if
you pointed out that my question ‘Are banks close to water?’ is ambiguous, and I
replied by saying ‘OK. But are genuine banks close to water?’.
Gibbons has more to say in favour of his point. He remarks that practical
deliberation has the aim of making up one’s mind, of coming to a practical
conclusion by forming an intention (ibid.: 62). In practical deliberation, we are
guided by the question ‘what should I do?’, and this question must be unambiguous,
otherwise it couldn’t lead us to a specific practical conclusion. Applying this to
doxastic deliberation, Gibbons argues that the core issue is whether the subjective
or the objective doxastic ‘should’ figures in the question ‘What should I believe?’
that leads us in doxastic deliberation. Only one of the senses of the doxastic
‘should’ can be the one that guides deliberation, otherwise doxastic deliberation
would be paralysed. Gibbons is not the only one to hold this position. In his
review of Gibbons (2013), Lord (2014) agrees that the ambiguity theory can for
this reason not solve the conflict between subjective norms and the truth norm.
In other words, Gibbons claims that there can only be one norm that is guiding
us and thus either the truth norm or a subjective norm is correct, but not both.
As the reader will have guessed, my reply to this is that I happily grant that it is
one of the subjective norms that is guiding, but that the truth norm is nonetheless
correct as its purpose is not to guide, but to describe an epistemic ideal. One might
have quarrels with calling the truth norm a norm or the objective doxastic ‘should’
normative if they are not involved in guiding doxastic deliberation. However, as
McHugh (2012: 26, n. 12) notes, this terminological difference is irrelevant as
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long as it is made clear that we’re using the term ‘norm’ as an umbrella term,
covering both guiding (or prescriptive) and evaluative norms.
3.6 Conclusion
The distinction between the subjective and the objective ‘should’ is familiar in
ethics and has recently received more attention in epistemology. It can be seen
as an instance of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ and is easy
to integrate into the model of the latter that I have introduced in chapter 2.
While the claim that there is an objective sense of the doxastic ‘should’ might
be met with criticism, I have given five arguments in support of it, in particular
instances of our use of it in natural language, where we employ it to assess beliefs
in light of their standard of correctness. The pay-off of this distinction between
the subjective and the objective doxastic ‘should’ for epistemology is that it solves
the apparent conflict between the truth norm and subjective epistemic norms.
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Chapter 4
Higher-Order Evidence
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of work in epistemology on
higher-order evidence (HOE) and how an agent should react to such evidence. This
question is particularly pressing in cases where the gathered HOE is misleading.
For example, HOE might indicate that the proper functioning of an agent’s
cognitive faculties was interfered with when forming their belief that P on the
basis of their first-order evidence (FOE), even though they actually inferred
correctly from their FOE. One kind of HOE that can put us in such a scenario is
peer disagreement,1 which has received even more attention, compared to HOE
in general, over the last 10 years or so.
Weatherson (ms) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) defend the view that one should
stick with one’s FOE in light of misleading HOE in general, and Van Inwagen
(1996) and Kelly (2005) defend this view only for the particular case of peer
disagreement. Borrowing a term used in the peer disagreement debate, let’s call
views according to which one should follow one’s FOE rather than one’s HOE
Steadfastness.2.
On the other side, Christensen (2010), Feldman (2009), and Schoenfield (ms)
argue that our HOE puts rational pressure on us to sway away from our FOE.
1See Feldman (2009), Christensen (2010), Kelly (2010), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), and Schoen-
field (2015).
2One could potentially add Lackey (2010) to this list. She defends the weaker claim that at
least in some cases one should maintain one’s FOE-supported belief, namely those where this
evidence gives one a high degree of justification.
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Elga (2007) makes this claim with respect to peer disagreement. Let’s call this
family of views Conciliationism.
When there is disagreement about which of two apparently conflicting positions
is correct, there is a third position we can take. We can claim that actually both
of the positions are correct: there is an appearance of conflict without a genuine
conflict. I defend this option with respect to the HOE debate between Steadfastness
and Conciliationism. In particular, I will argue in this chapter that an agent
should both follow her FOE and follow her HOE, but just in different senses of
the term ‘should’. The choice between Conciliationism and Steadfastness is a false
dichotomy.
Following up on the distinction between the subjective and the objective
doxastic ‘should’ in the previous chapter, I suggest that the subjective doxastic
‘should’ can be divided further. We don’t only distinguish in English between what
an agent should believe in light of their evidence and in light of the relevant facts,
but we can also make a more fine-grained distinction concerning the subjective
‘should’: between what an agent should believe in light of their FOE and in light
of their HOE. In the following, I refer to these respective uses of ‘should’ as
‘shouldFOE ’ and ‘shouldHOE ’.
In line with this distinction, my thesis in this chapter is that there is no such
thing as what an agent faced with misleading HOE should believe simpliciter.
Rather, we have to distinguish between what one shouldFOE and what one
shouldHOE believe. Consequently, we do not have to be either Conciliationists
or proponents of Steadfastness—we can have our cake and eat it, too. I call this
position the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory.
Section 4.2 introduces the notion of higher-order evidence and section 4.3
some arguments in support of Steadfastness and Conciliationism. In section 4.4, I
make the distinction between what one shouldFOE and shouldHOE believe more
precise by integrating it into the information-sensitive contextualist semantics for
the doxastic ‘should’ I have presented in chapter 2. Accordingly, I take the HOE
debate to be a further case where Doxastic Contextualism helps to solve a tricky
problem in epistemology.
Section 4.5 describes a potential worry with the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory:
agents who are deliberating theoretically ask themselves the question of what
they should believe. But it does not seem as though the Evidence-Ambiguity
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Theory tells us what the answer to their question is since the question appears to
be ambiguous on the view. In section 4.6, I deal with this objection by explaining
how, on my account, the context of a deliberating agent provides a particular
information-state and thus determines a particular meaning for the deliberating
agent’s question. Finally, in section 4.7, I distinguish the Evidence-Ambiguity
Theory from the similar looking, but distinct position that misleading HOE puts
us in a rational dilemma.
4.2 What Is Higher-Order Evidence?
Higher-order evidence (HOE) is, roughly, evidence about evidence. In particular,
nth-order evidence is evidence about (n-1)th-order evidence. In this chapter, we
will focus on “second-order evidence” (Feldman 2005: 100), i.e., HOE about
first-order evidence. First-order evidence (FOE) bears directly on the proposition
the agent is wondering about (Kelly 2014: sec. 2). I will call this the ‘target
proposition’.
Evidence can be about FOE in different ways. It can be about what FOE
other people possess or is available to you, but which you yourself don’t possess
(Feldman 2009: 304). This is not what I take to be HOE in this chapter. Rather,
an agent’s HOE, as understood here, bears on which proposition is supported by
this agent’s FOE. It can do this in different ways. First, it can be directly about
the evidential relation that holds between the agent’s FOE and a proposition P ,
for example when someone tells the agent that their FOE supports that Obama
is the President of the US. Second, it can concern the reliability of the agent’s
cognitive faculties (Feldman 2005: 96; Kelly 2010: 139; Kelly 2014: sec. 2).
Evidence of the latter kind in combination with what judgement one has formed
on the basis of one’s FOE is evidence to the effect of what one’s FOE supports.
Third, it can concern what FOE one has (Worsnip 2015b: 17).
Misleading HOE is similar to the phenomenon of ordinary undercutting defeat,
however many, nonetheless, consider the two to be distinct (Feldman 2005: 113;
Christensen 2010: 195; Lasonen-Aarnio 2014: 317). I agree that there is a
distinction here. What I say in this chapter about how people should react to
misleading HOE does therefore not extend to undercutting defeat. A classic
example of ordinary undercutting defeat comes from Pollock and Cruz (1999: 86).
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Suppose you look at an object that seems red to you. You are then justified to
believe it is red. Then you learn that the room is bathed in red light and you know
that under such circumstances objects that are actually white can seem red. You
thereby lose justification for believing that the object is red. Your evidence that
the room is bathed in red light is an undercutting defeater for your (propositional)
justification for believing that the object is red.
It might appear as though this is simply an instance of HOE as I have
characterized it. After all, it seems to suggest that your FOE does not support
that the object is red. But I think this is false. True, your original FOE in
combination with the evidence that the room is bathed in red lightning does not
support that the object is red (or at least less so). But the undercutting defeater
does not suggest that the original evidence itself does not support that the object
is red. That something seems red makes it plausible that it is red. On the other
hand, when I get evidence that an epistemic peer of mine inferred ¬P from the
same batch of evidence from which I inferred P , this is evidence that my original
FOE supports something other than what I assumed it did.
My account of the distinction is similar to the accounts of other authors.
Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 317) captures the distinction by saying that HOE is
evidence that the belief one formed on the basis of one’s original FOE was
irrational, whereas ordinary undercutting defeaters are not evidence to this effect.
This matches my way of putting it since I characterize HOE as evidence that
can show that one’s belief was not supported by one’s original FOE, or, in other
words, that one’s belief was irrational. Ordinary undercutting defeaters, on the
other hand, only have the effect of changing what one’s new body of evidence
supports, and thus don’t imply anything about the reasonableness of forming the
relevant belief from one’s original FOE. Furthermore, Christensen (2010: 195)
suggests that what is characteristic of HOE is that a rational response to it is
to “bracket” one’s FOE. That is, in order to rationally account for HOE, one
needs to ignore one’s FOE and revise one’s doxastic attitudes on the basis of this.
Ordinary undercutting defeat, however, does not demand that one bracket one’s
original evidence. Rather, if you want to rationally react to it, you need to add
it to your original FOE and revise you belief in light of this new, enlarged body
of evidence. This is consistent with my account. If, as I suggest, undercutting
defeat does not have an effect on what is rational for you to believe by indicating
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what your original FOE supports, then it must do so by changing what the body
of your FOE supports.3
4.3 Motivating Steadfastness and Conciliationism
In this section, I want to present some of the respective considerations in favour of
Conciliationism and Steadfastness. For this purpose, let us look at some examples
of misleading HOE. Proponents of Conciliationism often rely on cases like the
following to motivate their position.
Logical Reasoning. I’ve been presented with the following facts:
∀x(Fx→ Gx) and ¬(Fa∧Ga). I infer ¬Fa. I then get evidence that
I’ve been slipped a drug which distorts deductive reasoning and makes
people in 50% of all cases come to the wrong conclusions.4
The relevant bodies of evidence and the target proposition are:
• FOELR: ∀x(Fx→ Gx) and ¬(Fa ∧Ga)
• HOELR: I’ve been slipped a drug that makes my deductive reasoning 50%
reliable
• Target proposition: <¬Fa>
Many have the intuition that a rational reaction to receiving HOELR is to change
my belief that ¬Fa to suspension of judgement on whether ¬Fa.
There are other kinds of HOE that apparently undermine deductive reasoning.
I have already mentioned peer disagreement:
Peer Disagreement. My friend and I have often amused ourselves by
solving little math problems in our heads, and comparing our answers.
We have strikingly similar track records: we are both very reliable
at doing mental maths, and neither is more reliable than the other.
3Feldman (2005: 113) suggests an alternative approach for telling the two apart. I reject this
approach for the reasons given by Christensen (2010: 194).
4This case is Weatherson’s (ms: sec. 1.5) variant of a case described by Christensen (2010:
187). I prefer Weatherson’s version since here it’s clearer that we have a body of FOE that
entails the target proposition, which will be of importance later.
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We now engage in this pastime, and I come up with an answer to a
problem, 457. I then learn that my friend came up with a different
answer, 459.5
We’re assuming that I am right and that the answer is 457. The relevant bodies
of evidence and the target proposition are:
• FOEPD: Details of the mathematical problem
• HOEPD: My peer disagrees with me
• Target proposition: <The answer is 457>, short 457
Again, it’s a widespread intuition that in light of my friend disagreeing with
me, I should suspend on 457. There are also cases in which HOE seems to have
an impact on doxastic attitudes that are based on non-deductive reasoning like
abductive or inductive reasoning:
Abductive Reasoning. I’m a medical resident. I correctly recognize
a patient’s symptoms X and come to the conclusion that he has
arthritis. Furthermore, that the patient has arthritis is in fact the best
explanation for the patient having symptoms X—that is, my diagnosis
was not a lucky guess. However, a nurse comes up to tell me that I’ve
been up for 36 hours, and I know that the diagnoses of sleep-deprived
doctors can be right just as well as wrong.6
The relevant bodies of evidence and the target proposition in this case are:
• FOEAR: Patient has symptoms X
• HOEAR: I have been up for 36 hours and the diagnoses of sleep-deprived
doctors can be right just as well as wrong
• Target proposition: <The patient has arthritis>, short Arthritis
5This is taken verbatim from Lasonen-Aarnio (2014: 315).
6This is a variant of a case described by Christensen (2010: 186), too. Horowitz (2014: 719)
and Coates (2012: 114) discuss similar cases.
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The reasoning process here is inference to the best explanation, i.e., non-deductive.
To many it seems that I should give up my belief that Arthritis, and suspend
judgement on the proposition.
Our intuitions about these cases (or at least the intuitions of many) provide
support for Conciliationism. Perhaps the main theoretical consideration Con-
ciliationism draws on is the idea that in order to assess how likely it is that
my judgement on the issue in question is correct, e.g., that the answer is 457
or that the patient has Arthritis, I have to reason about this independently of
my judgement on the issue. It would be question-begging to reason that since
the FOE in fact supports 457, my judgement is very likely correct (Christensen
2011: 1; Elga 2007: 490). In other words, in order to assess the probability of
my judgement being correct, I can only rely on my HOE. In the case of peer
disagreement, my HOE is that you and I have come to inconsistent conclusions
on the issue. Since, per stipulation, I assume that we’re equally reliable, I have
to think it is 50% likely that I’m correct. But if I think it’s just as likely as not
that I’m right, then I better suspend judgement. Similar reasoning applies for
other kinds of HOE. If I assign, on the basis of my HOE and independent of my
first-order reasoning about whether my evidence in Logical Reasoning entails
¬Fa, a probability of 50% to my belief that ¬Fa is correct, I should come to
suspend judgement on this issue (Christensen 2010: 195-197).
Against this, defenders of steadfast views have presented different arguments.
First, Kelly (2005, 2010) accuses conciliatory views of “throwing away evidence”,
to put it in Christensen’s (2011: 2) terms. Consider Peer Disagreement. I
have my FOE, which, as stipulated, supports 457. It supports it in the strongest
possible sense: it entails it. I now learn that my peer disagrees with me. Kelly
argues that when we want to know how we should react to HOE, we should
consider what we should believe in light of the total evidence we possess after
having gathered the HOE. In Kelly (2005), he claims that besides the HOE that
my peer believes that the answer is 459, there is also the HOE that I believe that
it is 457. Given that we’re equally reliable, I should give equal weight to these
bodies of evidence, such that they cancel each other out. If we add to this that
my total body of evidence further contains my FOE, which strongly supports 457,
it follows that my total body of evidence remains supporting 457. Consequently,
I should believe 457.
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Weatherson (ms: sec. 2) makes the same argument. He adds that defenders
of Conciliationism must therefore reason as follows: if, for example, I judge that
457 in Peer Disagreement, this judgement ‘screens off’ my original evidence
for 457 and becomes my only evidence in favour of 457. Since my only remaining
evidence concerning whether 457 is your judgement that the answer is 459, my
evidence overall accordingly supports withholding on whether 457. Weatherson
(ms: sec. 4) then goes on to argue against this that the assumption that one’s
judgement on a proposition P screens off one’s original evidence on P is false. If
it were true, one’s second-order judgement that one has judged P should then
also screen off one’s first-order judgement, and one’s third-order judgement that
one has judged that one judged P should screen off that second-order judgement,
etc. We then end up with an infinite regress to the effect that we don’t have any
evidence at all.
Finally, Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) chooses a somewhat different strategy. She
claims that in cases where our HOE falsely indicates that we made a mistake in
our reasoning, our belief is actually the result of a correct epistemic rule. Take
the example of the rule that if one knows P and knows <If P , then Q>, one
should infer Q. Assume that I am in a situation where I know P and <If P , then
Q>, and accordingly come to believe Q. I now gather HOE that modus ponens is
incorrect. If HOE stirs us away from what would be the outcome of following a
correct epistemic rule, we should rather stick with our belief that Q. One might
say that the rule is not correct since precisely because HOE that modus ponens is
invalid can undermine an inference from P and <If P , then Q> to Q, we shouldn’t
always make this inference. Rather our rule should include a proviso like ‘...and
we don’t have evidence that modus ponens is invalid’. To this, Lasonen-Aarnio
(2014: 323) replies that there could also be HOE that undermines beliefs based
on such a rule, for example disagreement with a peer over whether there is any
evidence against the validity of modus ponens. Of course, one could integrate a
further proviso into our rule to deal with such cases, but this would just lead us
into an infinite regress.
The literature on HOE, and in particular peer disagreement, is vast, and there
are many more arguments brought forward on each side. I won’t discuss them
here. The point of this section was just to motivate the two views and give a
rough account of what’s respectively appealing about them. They both have
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something going for them. So it would be nice if we could reconcile them. In the
remainder of this chapter, I show how to do this.
4.4 The Evidence-Ambiguity Theory
4.4.1 The Semantics of the Doxastic ‘Should’
In this section, I give a more precise account of the meaning of ‘shouldFOE ’ and
‘shouldHOE ’ and show how they fit into the simplified account of the semantics of
the doxastic ‘should’ that I introduced in chapter 2:
Doxastic Should For any context of utterance c that provides a doxastic
ordering source, ‘S should have doxastic attitude D to P ’ is true at c iff having D
to P reflects accurately how much i supports P , where i is the information-state
provided by c.
For the following discussion, it is quite relevant what it means for an information-
state i to support a target proposition P and how we measure the strength of
this relation. As I have explained in chapter 2, I think of this support relation as
what we ordinarily understand as evidential support. A strong inferential relation
between i and P , be it deductive or abductive, or a high evidential probability of
P on i will often instantiate a strong support relation between i and P . I have
also pointed out that evidential support is neither reducible to or co-extensive
with any one of these inferential or probabilistic relations or their disjunction, as
we otherwise end up with the counter-intuitive result that every body of evidence
supports every logical truth. Since I cannot solve the question of what the nature
of evidential support is, we will have to rely on an intuitive understanding of
what the evidential relations are between the information-states and the target
propositions that we will consider in the following.
In the remainder of this section, I explore how to fit the distinction between
shouldFOE and shouldHOE into Doxastic Should by discussing two different
approaches. I will reject the first and accept the second one.
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4.4.2 Approach 1
A first natural thought is that shouldFOE is relativized to FOE, while shouldHOE
is relativized to both the FOE and the HOE, meaning that, if we model bodies of
evidence as sets of possible worlds, it’s relativized to FOE ∩ HOE, the intersection
of the two. This fits how Feldman (2005) thinks about how one should react to
HOE: it is just more evidence, which is added to the evidence one already possesses
(one’s FOE). What one shouldHOE—or for Feldman, simply should—believe is
what one should believe in light of this more informed body of evidence.
A problem with this approach, however, is that the support relation between
FOE and P will, at least in some cases, also hold between FOE ∩ HOE and P .
This is problematic where the relevant HOE is meant to undermine FOE. In such
scenarios, the same doxastic attitude to P will be licensed (i) by the support
relation between FOE and P and (ii) the support relation between FOE ∩ HOE
and P , where we actually want different doxastic attitudes to be licensed by these
relations.
This is most obviously the case where one’s FOE entails the target proposition,
as in Logical Reasoning. FOELR ∩ HOELR also entails ¬Fa. So if it is the
entailment relation between FOELR and ¬Fa that makes it the case that I
shouldFOE believe ¬Fa, then it seems that in light of FOELR ∩ HOELR, I should
also believe ¬Fa.
The problem is not limited to deductive support relations. Christensen (2010:
197) claims that if there exist explanatory connections between FOE and a target
proposition P , “[t]hese connections [...] do not depend on any claims about me,
and the new information I learn about myself [i.e., the HOE] does not break these
connections”. Christensen does not provide any arguments for his claim, so let’s
consider Abductive Reasoning to have a closer look at it.
The relevant bodies of evidence and the target proposition in the case are:
• FOEAR: Patient has symptoms X
• HOEAR: I have been up for 36 hours and the diagnoses of sleep-deprived
doctors can be right just as well as wrong
• Target proposition: Arthritis
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FOEAR supports Arthritis in virtue of the fact that Arthritis is the best expla-
nation for the patient having symptom X. Christensen is certainly right that
FOEAR has this support relation to Arthritis, irrespective of whether HOEAR
is true or not. The fact that I am sleep-deprived seems to be irrelevant to the
medical question of whether Arthritis is the best explanation for the patient
having symptoms X.
However, it is not clear that just because HOEAR does not bear on the
abductive support relation between FOEAR and Arthritis, it is guaranteed that
the same support relation holds between FOEAR ∩ HOEAR and Arthritis. Take
a case where you have FOE that all of the 100 swans you have observed so far
have been white. This body of FOE gives strong enumerative inductive support to
the proposition <All swans are white> (or at least the proposition <most swans
are white>). Then you gather more FOE, which consists of an observation of
100 black swans. While the fact that you’ve observed 100 black swans doesn’t
make a difference to the support-relation between your previous body of FOE
and the proposition that all swans are white, the intersection of this new FOE
and your previous FOE does obviously not have the same support relation to the
proposition <All swans are white>.
Thus, even if we pool a body of FOE with another body of evidence that does
not bear on the evidential relation the original FOE has to the target proposition
P , their intersection might have a different support relation to P . To check which
support relation holds between Arthritis and FOEAR ∩ HOEAR, let’s examine
whether Arthritis is the best explanation for FOEAR ∩ HOEAR. Whether it
is depends on the alternative possible explanations. For the sake of simplicity,
let’s assume there is only one other possible disease—lupus—which could have
caused symptoms X, but that the symptoms are more typical for arthritis than
lupus. Therefore, Arthritis is a better explanation for symptoms X than the
proposition that the patient has lupus (Lupus). Now, if we add evidence that
I was sleep-deprived when concluding Arthritis (HOEAR) to my evidence that
patient has symptoms X (FOEAR), is this joint body of evidence (FOEAR ∩
HOEAR) better explained by Arthritis or Lupus? I suggest we answer this by
reasoning in the following piecemeal fashion:
First, neither Arthritis nor Lupus is a better explanation of HOEAR, i.e., the
proposition that I made my diagnosis while I was sleep-deprived and that such
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diagnoses can just as well be wrong as right. If anything, neither of them explains
this. Second, Arthritis explains the FOEAR-part of the joined body of evidence
better than Lupus does. Combining these two factors, we can conclude that
Arthritis explains the joint body of evidence better than Lupus does. Hence, this
joint body of FOE and HOE licenses believing Arthritis, rather than suspending
judgement on it, just as the original FOE did.
I conclude that in all the three cases described above, the joint body of evidence
resulting from adding the HOE to the FOE has the same support relation with
the target proposition as the FOE alone has. So, Approach 1 fails.
4.4.3 Approach 2
Approach 2 says that where ‘should’ means shouldFOE , the information-parameter
is filled with the subject’s FOE; and where it means shouldHOE , the information-
parameter is filled with the subject’s HOE. This idea reflects Christensen’s sugges-
tion that in order to respect HOE, we have to bracket our FOE. I think Approach
2 is the way to go for the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory.
Approach 2 gets the cases discussed in section 4.3 right. That I have been
slipped a drug that makes my deductive reasoning 50% reliable makes it as likely
as not that my belief that ¬Fa is true. Therefore, HOELR neither supports ¬Fa
nor its negation, and I accordingly should suspend judgement on ¬Fa in light of
my HOE in Logical Reasoning. Similarly, the fact that my friend believes that
the answer is 459 and I believe that it is 457 makes it as probable as not that
the answer is 457. Thus, in light of my HOE in Peer Disagreement, I should
suspend judgement on whether the answer is 457 or 459. Finally, in Abductive
Reasoning I come to know that I made my diagnosis while I was sleep-deprived
and that my diagnosis could hence be right just as well as wrong. My HOE in
Abductive Reasoning accordingly neither favours Arthritis nor its negation,
and I shouldHOE suspend judgement on Arthritis.
A first objection to Approach 2 might be that it overgeneralizes. Consider
Logical Reasoning. The relevant bodies of evidence and the target proposition
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were:
• FOELR: ∀x(Fx→ Gx) and ¬(Fa ∧Ga)
• HOELR: I’ve been slipped a drug that makes my deductive reasoning 50%
reliable
• Target proposition: <¬Fa>
I have claimed that there is no support relation between HOELR and ¬Fa. HOELR
neither supports ¬Fa nor its negation, Fa. It follows from Doxastic Should
that I shouldHOE suspend judgement: suspending judgement is the doxastic
attitude to ¬Fa that best reflects how much HOELR supports ¬Fa.
Yet something about this explanation seems off. For any information-state i
and target proposition P such that i neither supports P nor its negation, it is true
that the doxastic attitude that most appropriately reflects this support relation is
suspending judgement on P . Doxastic Should would therefore predict that for
any piece of HOE that has no support relation with a target proposition P , S
should (in the sense of shouldHOE) suspend judgement on P . But is this right?
Imagine the following case:
Tree. Hannes sees a tree in front of him and comes to believe that there
is a tree in front of him. Now he gathers HOE that his mathematical
reasoning is distorted. This is the only HOE he possesses.
Hannes’ HOE, HOETree, has no support relation with the target proposition
<There is a tree in front of me>, short Tree. If we assume that a lack of
support is appropriately reflected by suspending judgement, it follows that Hannes
shouldHOE suspend judgement on whether there is a tree in front of him. This is
odd. It seems that he should not, in any sense, suspend judgement on whether
there is a tree in front of him. He has clear perceptual evidence supporting that
there is a tree in front of him and the HOE has no undermining effect on this.
I bite the bullet and maintain that Hannes shouldHOE suspend judgement
on whether there is a tree in front of him. If some evidence supports neither
P nor its negation, one should, in light of this evidence, support judgement on
whether P . I agree, however, that there is something odd about saying that
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Hannes should suspend judgement on whether there is a tree in front of him. The
reason for this oddness is purely pragmatic: there is no natural context in which
one would discuss whether Hannes should believe that there is a tree in front
of him and in which this HOE would be the information-state provided by this
context. Thus, there is no natural conversation where one is talking about what
Hannes should believe in Tree and ‘should’ is relativized to the HOE Hannes has
in Tree. As I will explain in section 4.6, a context’s information-state shifts from
a subject’s FOE to their HOE if the HOE undermines or ‘brackets’, to put it as
Christensen (2010), their FOE. Since HOETree does not undermine Hannes’ FOE
supporting Tree, this HOE does not become the information-state provided by
a normal context in which it is discussed what Hannes should believe. True, I
can force ‘should’ to have the relevant sense by saying ‘in light of Hannes’ HOE
that his mathematical reasoning is distorted, he should...’, but a context wouldn’t
naturally give ‘should’ this sense.
Note that from the truth of ‘Hannes should suspend judgement on Tree
in light of HOETree’ it does not follow that Hannes has a reason to suspend
judgement on Tree, which would be absurd. It is the FOE-undermining power of
HOE that makes it provide reasons. When I gather HOELR, this undermines my
FOE concerning ¬Fa, which gives me reason to suspend judgement on whether
¬Fa. HOETree, in contrast, does not undermine Hannes’ perceptual evidence
concerning Tree and hence does not give him reason to suspend judgement on
whether Tree is true. That HOETree can’t undermine Hannes’ perceptual evidence,
whereas HOELR can undermine my FOE concerning ¬Fa, is obviously so because
HOETree is not HOE with respect to Tree, but HOELR is HOE with respect
to ¬Fa. Whether my deductive reasoning was distorted when I concluded that
¬Fa has something to do with whether ¬Fa is true, whereas whether Hannes’
mathematical reasoning was distorted when he perceived the tree does not seem
to have any bearing on whether there is a tree in front of him. For a piece of HOE
to be HOE with respect to a target proposition P , it needs to be evidence about
FOE with respect to P . Given the account of HOE I presented in section 4.2, this
means that a body of evidence is HOE with respect to P iff it is evidence about
either (i) what FOE one possesses with respect to P , (ii) what the evidential
relation between one’s FOE and P is, or (iii) the reliability of one’s cognitive
faculties responsible for processing FOE on P . HOETree is accordingly not HOE
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with respect to Tree since it ticks none of these boxes in relation to Tree.
A second objection likely to be made against Approach 2 is that it ignores the
norm that one should form one’s beliefs based on one’s total evidence. Both what
one shouldFOE and what one shouldHOE believe is relativized only to a part of
one’s total evidence, namely one’s FOE and one’s HOE. However, it seems to be
a platitude that when forming one’s beliefs one should take all of one’s evidence
into account. Let’s call this position following Carnap (1950) the requirement of
total evidence.7
For a start, I should point out that a lot of the statements I defend in this
thesis are, at first sight, at odds with the requirement of total evidence. For
example, in the previous chapter, I have defended the view that one should, in
the objective sense of ‘should’, believe and only believe what is true. This is often
not what one’s total evidence supports. Furthermore, we sometimes talk about
what someone should believe in light of the evidence they had at some point in
the past, which is different from their current total evidence.8 Finally, in the next
chapter I will propose that when you give epistemic advice you talk about what
your advisee should believe in light of the collective evidence, i.e., the combined
evidence of the two of you, which often goes beyond your advisee’s total evidence.
This is not to say that I necessarily reject the requirement of total evidence.
Rather, I believe that there are a number of senses of the doxastic ‘should’ and that
the requirement of total evidence does not apply to all of them, as for example
the collective or the objective one. Yes, it might be true that in some sense
of ‘should’, one should believe what is supported by one’s total evidence, but
certainly not in every sense of ‘should’. I would argue that shouldHOE is another
sense of the doxastic ‘should’ that is not tied to the requirement of total evidence.
Christensen’s (2010) view that HOE brackets one’s FOE provides support for this
idea. He believes that in response to gathering HOE, one should ignore one’s
FOE, rather than take it into account.
Kelly (2005, 2010) has criticised Christensen’s view precisely because he thinks
that it violates the requirement of total evidence. Unlike Christensen, I have the
resources to respond to this worry by claiming that I don’t disagree with Kelly
7The requirement is also endorsed, among others, by Adler (1989), Williamson (2000: 189),
and Kelly (2008: 938).
8See the case Nostalgia in subsection 2.6.2.
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that in some sense the requirement of total evidence has to be respected. The
sense I have in mind is ‘shouldFOE ’. As already mentioned in section 4.3, Kelly
(2005) himself suggests that in Peer Disagreement the total evidence supports
what the FOE supports since the HOE, i.e., that I believe that the answer is
457 and my peer believes that it is 459, outweighs each other.9 Furthermore, I
have argued in the previous subsection, when discussing Approach 1, that all the
bodies of FOE in the cases in section 4.2 do not change the support relations with
their target proposition even if the respective bodies of HOE are added to them.
In short, if the arguments in the previous subsection are sound, then what one
shouldFOE believe and what one should believe in light of one’s total evidence is
co-extensive in the cases discussed.
One might protest that even if following the requirement of total evidence
and believing what one shouldFOE each leads to the same doxastic attitudes, the
latter is still a violation of the former since it only requires one to believe what
is supported by one’s FOE, not one’s total evidence. The worry seems overly
pedantic. If the effects of following two different norms is the same, why would it
matter which norm one follows?
In any case, there is a way to fully reconcile Approach 2 with the requirement of
total evidence. If one’s FOE and HOE combined have the same support relations
with every target proposition as FOE alone has, then we could stipulate that it is
not our FOE that the doxastic ‘should’ is sometimes relativised to, but rather
our total evidence. That is, I can propose that defenders of Steadfastness are not
talking about what one shouldFOE believe, but about what one should believe in
light of one’s total evidence, or short, what one shouldTE believe. On this version
of the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory, Steadfastness and Conciliationism are not in
conflict because defenders of the former are talking about what one shouldTE
believe, whereas defenders of the latter are talking about what one shouldHOE
believe.
9Kelly (2010: 143) weakens this claim. He reasons that since the total body of evidence
now contains two pieces of HOE that cancel each other out and thus together neither support
that the answer is 457 nor 459, the whole body now supports 457 to a lesser degree than it did
before. For this reason, one should lower one’s confidence in 457 somewhat, even though by
far not so much that one comes to suspend judgement. Matheson (2009: 274) shows that this
argument is flawed. By this reasoning, adding any kind of evidence that doesn’t bear on our
target proposition P and thus neither supports P nor ¬P to our total body of evidence should
push us towards suspending on P . This is obviously absurd.
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One might attack the idea that one’s FOE and one’s total evidence always
have the same support relations with any target proposition by pointing out that
HOE can also work as FOE. If I get HOE that my FOE supports P isn’t this also
evidence for P? As Worsnip (2015b: 23) puts it, the effects of HOE sometimes
“trickle down” to FOE. Thus, if HOE sometimes has FOE-like effects, then, in
some cases, one’s total evidence should have different support relations with some
target propositions compared to FOE on it’s own. I reply to this that if a body of
evidence E, which is HOE with respect to P , is also FOE with respect to P , then
E is not only part of our HOE, but also of our FOE. Thus, combining FOE and
HOE and thus ‘adding’ E to FOE does not make a difference in such cases since
E would be part of one’s FOE already anyway.
To conclude, the requirement of total evidence is already respected by the
Evidence-Ambiguity Theory in that what one shouldFOE believe is co-extensive
with what one shouldTE believe in the cases discussed in section 4.3. If this
does not suffice for a proponent of the requirement of total evidence, I could
adjust the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory such that defenders of Steadfastness are
talking about what one shouldTE believe, not what one shouldFOE believe. In
the following, however, I will put this issue aside and return to speaking of what
one shouldFOE believe.
4.5 So What Should I Believe?
I have shown that the distinction between shouldFOE and shouldHOE can be
integrated into my information-sensitive contextualist semantics for the doxastic
‘should’. Now, a main concern with contextualist theories about ‘should’ is that
they seem to dodge the relevant question. After all, we got into the debate about
peer disagreement, or HOE in general, hoping to find an answer to the question
of what one should believe in such scenarios. The Evidence-Ambiguity Theory
doesn’t answer this question, but rejects it as ambiguous: is the question what
one should believe in light of one’s FOE or is it what one should believe in light of
one’s HOE? To this it can be objected that there seems to be a clear, unambiguous
question. In this and the next section, I try to resolve this apparent problem for
the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory.
First of all, that modals like ‘should’ are context-sensitive in some way is
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widely accepted among semanticists, and it is thus pretty much uncontroversial
that the question is ambiguous to some degree if taken out of context. Since
‘should’ can be epistemic or deontic, ‘What should I believe?’ can either mean
‘Which belief do I probably have?’ or ‘Which belief is required by the norms?’
Furthermore, as ‘should’ can express different norms, the latter question can, for
example, be specified as either ‘Which belief is required by the practical norms?’
or ‘Which belief is required by the epistemic norms?’10
Of course, the opponent of the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory might say that
this is all good and well, but that the question we have in mind with respect to
HOE is ‘What should I believe in the doxastic sense?’ and that this question is
unambiguous. Against this, I would point to the distinction between the subjective
and the objective doxastic ‘should’ that I defended in chapter 3. If we accept
that ‘What should I believe?’ can be relativized to different information-states,
i.e., sometimes to the facts, sometimes to the subject’s evidence, it is not that
much of a step further to posit that it can be relativized to more fine-grained
information-states, such as the subject’s FOE and HOE. Certainly, it does not
follow from the subjective/objective distinction that there must be a distinction
between what one shouldFOE and shouldHOE believe, but it puts pressure on the
idea that we can, prima facie, expect the doxastic question to be unambiguous.
Gibbons (2013) rejects ambiguity theories in normative epistemology as missing
the point. As I have mentioned in chapter 3, he thinks that the respective
plausibility of the justification norm and the truth norm create a deep philosophical
puzzle. Because there are unjustified false beliefs, we can sometimes satisfy one
norm, but not the other. Now, what should we do in such a scenario? Are we
required to change our false belief or are we rather required to stick with it?
While he acknowledges that ‘should’ in English might be ambiguous between a
subjective and an objective sense, this does not really resolve the puzzle in his
eyes (Gibbons 2013: 21). The central question is whether the subjective or the
objective doxastic ‘should’ figures in the question ‘What should I believe?’ that
leads us in theoretical reasoning.11
A potential complaint with the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory could accordingly
be that it does not tell us whether the deliberating agent is concerned with what
10For more details on the general context-sensitivity of modals, see chapter 2.
11For more details on this, see section 3.5.
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she shouldFOE or with what she shouldHOE believe. I reply to this worry in the
next section by giving a contextualist model for theoretical deliberation.
4.6 A Contextualist Model for Theoretical Delibera-
tion
In general, the contextualist’s position on what the meaning of ‘What should I
believe?’ is, is obvious: it is whatever meaning this question has in the agent’s
context. A comparison: the meaning of the context-sensitive question ‘Who am
I?’ that a soul-searching agent is asking herself is determined by what ‘I’ refers to
in the context of the agent: herself. Similarly, the meaning of the agent’s question
‘What should I believe?’ is determined by the information-state salient in the
agent’s context of deliberation.
When an agent starts out to privately deliberate about whether P , they focus
on their FOE concerning P . Private deliberation means that they are deliberating
on their own, and not as a member of a group that is inquiring together.12 The
question they are asking themselves is ‘What should I believe in light of my FOE?’
and the information-state provided by this context is accordingly their FOE. In
some cases where an agent is in the process of answering this FOE-question by
weighing their FOE with respect to P , the agent gathers HOE that supports
another doxastic attitude to P than their FOE does. In this case, the agent is
not anymore in the position of answering the FOE-question. Therefore, the agent
turns to a question, getting the right answer to which is second-best to getting
the right answer to the FOE-question: the question of what they should believe
in light of their HOE (the HOE-question).13 Let me explain this in more detail.
Christensen’s (2010) talk of a bracketing of the FOE by HOE is a way to explain
why HOE sometimes puts agents in positions in which they can’t answer the FOE-
question anymore. If a deliberating agent becomes aware of HOE undermining
their FOE, the FOE gets ‘disqualified’ from being considered in their deliberation.
When I gather HOE in Logical Reasoning that I have been slipped a drug that
12I will cover the practice of collective deliberation in chapters 5 and 6.
13Sometimes, an agent might gather HOE with respect to P , before or at the same time,
rather than after, they gather the FOE with respect to P undermined by this HOE. In such
cases, they do not turn from the FOE-question to the HOE-question, but go straight for the
HOE-question.
107
distorts deductive reasoning, I am not competent anymore to answer, based on my
FOE, whether I should believe ¬Fa or not. That I am not competent to answer
this question might be due to the fact that I don’t know what my FOE supports
after I gathered the relevant HOE. Once I am in this position, the information-
state of the context shifts to the HOE. To some degree, this also makes sense if
we consider which metasemantic principle might be at work here. As explained in
chapter 2, speaker intentions are a very plausible candidate for determining the
contextual parameters of modals, such as the information-state. When I can’t
answer the FOE-question anymore, I intend to reason about what I should believe
about this in light of my newly gathered HOE instead, which is second-best to
believing what I shouldFOE believe. While context-sensitive semantics have been
developed mostly with the intention to model context-sensitive expressions in
language, their basic principles arguably also apply to context-sensitive thoughts.
When I think ‘I am hungry’ and you think ‘I am hungry’, too, we are thinking two
different propositions since ‘I’ in my thought refers to me and ‘I’ in your thought
refers to you. Similarly, it seems plausible that my deliberating question changes
from ‘What shouldFOE I believe?’ to ‘What shouldHOE I believe?’ when I realize
that I can’t answer the FOE-question anymore and therefore intend to deliberate
about what I should believe in light of my HOE.
The other two candidates for determining a contextually provided information-
state that I mentioned are the pragmatic purpose of an utterance and conversa-
tional salience. As just hinted at, private deliberation is done in thought and not
a communicative act. Therefore, we can presumably ignore these factors here.
However, if ‘thinker’ intentions are the only factor that could determine the sense
of ‘should’ in our thoughts, the following interesting question arises: what happens
when someone gathers HOE that undermines their FOE, but they nonetheless
intend to think about what they shouldFOE believe, or what happens when they
don’t gather such HOE, but intend to think about what they shouldHOE believe?
Contrary to what I have suggested in the previous paragraph, it seems at least
not implausible that in such scenarios the information-state does not shift in
accordance with whether the subject’s FOE is undermined or not, but with the
subject’s intentions. I can’t go into too much detail here and settle which of the
two options is correct. All that matters in order to avoid the worry that the
deliberating question can’t be guiding on a contextualist semantics is that there
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will be some kind of mechanism determining which sense the deliberating question
carries.
Why is correctly answering the HOE-question second-best to correctly answer-
ing the FOE-question? Motivation for this claim can be found in Lasonen-Aarnio
(ms, 2014) and Schoenfield (2012, ms). Even though they both think that the
rational thing to do in cases where one gathers misleading HOE is to be steadfast,
they claim that it is reasonable to revise (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014: 343; Schoenfield
2012: 209). They think it is reasonable—even though not epistemically rational—
since it is what someone should do who has the aim of conforming to the norm of
believing what one’s FOE supports (Lasonen-Aarnio ms). In other words, they
say that following one’s HOE is a means to conform with what one shouldFOE
believe.
While I think they are on the right track, this can’t be quite right. If on the
basis of my HOE, I know that my FOE either supports P or ¬P , but I have no
idea which, and therefore suspend judgement on P , this is neither a means to
conform with what I shouldFOE believe nor the result of planning to do so. After
all, I know that suspending judgement on P is not what is supported by my FOE.
If I perform action A and I know that doing A can’t make me achieve my goal z,
doing A is neither a means to nor the result of planning to achieve z.
I want to put the idea that believing what you shouldHOE believe is second-
best to believing what you shouldFOE believe in a somewhat different manner. It
is a common idea in epistemology that the truth norm for belief is fundamental
to other norms like the justification or rationality norm in that they are derived
from the truth norm.14 Accuracy-first approaches to epistemology15 give a good
account of this derivative relation. The truth norm implies a measurement of
credences in terms of their accuracy, that is, their closeness to truth. The higher
a credence in a true proposition, the more accurate it is. Now, answering the
FOE-question tells us which credence to P is the one with the highest expected
accuracy value. Very roughly, the higher the probability of P on my FOE, the
higher will be the credence to P with the maximal expected accuracy (Greaves
and Wallace 2006).
In an analogous fashion, we can construe believing what one shouldHOE believe
14See Joyce (1998) and Wedgwood (2002).
15I take this label from Schoenfield (ms).
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as second-best to believing what one shouldFOE believe because it maximizes
the expected value of what the norm articulating what one shouldFOE believe
promotes: expected accuracy. Let’s call this maximized value your expected
expected accuracy.
It’s beyond the scope of this thesis to go far into the details, but I hope the
following example can illustrate what I have in mind. Imagine that on my HOE,
there is a 50% chance that my FOE fully supports P and a 50% chance that
it fully supports ¬P . Intuitively, I should suspend judgement on P (in some
sense). In fact, my FOE fully supports P and the expected accuracy on my
FOE of believing P is 1, and the expected accuracy of believing ¬P is 0. If my
evidence fully supported ¬P , the expected accuracy on it of believing P would be
0, and the expected accuracy of believing ¬P would be 1. The expected expected
accuracy of a doxastic attitude D relative to a body of FOE F and a body of
HOE H is calculated as follows:
Expected Expected Accuracy EEAF,H(D) =
∑
k
(PrH(k) × EAk (D)),
where k ∈ K and K is a partition of ways F could be like, PrH(k) is the
probability of k obtaining on H, and EAk(D) the expected accuracy of D on k.
In the given example, there are two members of k:
• k1: Your FOE fully supports P
• k2: Your FOE fully supports ¬P
The expected expected accuracy of believing P is the average of the expected
accuracy (EA) of believing P given the different ways my FOE could be, weighted
by the probability on my HOE of my FOE being the respective ways. Given that
there is a 50% probability for k1 and k2 respectively, EEA(Believing P ) = 0.5
and EEA(Believing ¬P ) = 0.5. Now, where believing P and believing ¬P are
‘equally good’ from an epistemic perspective—in our case in terms of expected
expected value—suspending judgement is the best option. Thus, suspension of
judgement will be the (coarse-grained) doxastic attitude maximizing the expected
expected value.
It is not important that this particular way of cashing out the idea that
believing what one shouldHOE is second-best to believing what one shouldFOE
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works. Maybe Lasonen-Aarnio’s (2014), Schoenfield’s (2012), or another account
that I have not considered is better for this. All that matters is that there is
some account of the idea that works. Given that the idea is quite intuitive, I am
hopeful that there is some such account.
In the remainder of this section, I will address a number of objections to my
contextualist model of doxastic deliberation.
A possible objection to my story about the context-shift from the FOE-question
to the HOE-question is that it is controversial to assume that epistemic norms are
in a hierarchy relative to the epistemic goal of having true beliefs. For example,
when we discussed blindspot propositions in chapter 3.5, we saw that it is at least
tricky to formulate the truth norm in a general enough manner so that other
norms can be derived from it.16 Furthermore, one might reject the idea that
truth is the epistemic summum bonum, and claim that rather knowledge17 or
understanding18 is. To both these points I could reply that for my purposes it is
sufficient if maximizing expected expected accuracy is second-best to maximizing
expected accuracy. This can be the case irrespective of whether the importance
of maximizing expected accuracy is again derived from the truth norm, i.e., the
value of accuracy. Third, however, one might dislike the idea that norms stand
in derivative relations to each other altogether, maybe because the proximity of
this idea to epistemic instrumentalism. It is important to notice therefore that
the claim that we move from the FOE-question to the HOE-question when facing
undermining HOE does not rest on the assumption that there is a truth-orientated
hierarchy among epistemic norms. This is only the most plausible explanation I
could think of for this shift. All this claim requires is that there is some reason
why privately deliberating agents turn to their HOE if their FOE has become
‘bracketed’ or ‘undermined’. Another explanation could be that such agents simply
need to orientate themselves by something in their belief-forming business and
that their HOE is just the only plausible candidate left after their FOE has been
undermined. This story would need to work out what makes HOE the only
plausible option. In any case, the general point is that if the truth-hierarchical
story won’t work, I am confident there will be another one that can convincingly
16Wedgwood (2013) proposes a solution to this problem.
17See, for example, Bird (2007), Sutton (2007) and Williamson (forthcoming).
18See, for example, Kvanvig (2003).
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explain why when their FOE gets discredited, privately deliberating agents turn
to their HOE.
This last point shows that a lot in my story hinges on Christensen’s (2010)
idea that misleading HOE brackets FOE. As already mentioned in section 4.3
above, Weatherson (ms: sec. 1.5) claims that this idea relies on the mistaken
assumption that judgements screen evidence. According to Weatherson, we cannot
say that misleading HOE undermines or brackets an agent’s original evidence
concerning a target proposition P , i.e., their FOE concerning P . At best, we can
say that it brackets the judgement the relevant agent formed on the basis of this
FOE. Christensen therefore has to assume that the evidence that gets bracketed
by HOE in Logical Reasoning is my belief that ¬Fa, and not FOELR, or so
Weatherson argues. He thinks Christensen must make this assumption since the
misleading HOE, HOELR, indicates that my belief that ¬Fa is unreliable, and
not that the evidence FOELR from which I’ve formed it is unreliable. But if one’s
evidence in such cases is one’s first-order judgement, and not the evidence it was
based on, we get into the infinite regress described in section 4.3.
I maintain that the HOE in the cases we have discussed brackets the respective
bodies of FOE themselves, and not the judgements formed from them. On my
interpretation, that one’s HOE brackets one’s FOE does not mean that one’s
HOE shows that one’s FOE is unreliable. Rather, when a deliberator’s HOE
brackets their FOE, this means that, from the perspective of this deliberator,
their HOE has made their FOE ‘unusable’. A deliberator who has gathered
misleading HOE with respect to a target proposition P cannot reasonably—to
use Lasonen-Aarnio’s (ms, 2014) and Schoenfield’s (2012, ms) terminology—form
judgements about P on the basis of their FOE pertaining to P . It might not be
reasonable because ignoring HOE makes one, on average, worse-off truth-wise.
For readers who don’t like such a truth-orientated picture of reasonableness, I
have to posit that it is a brute fact that ignoring HOE is unreasonable; a fact
that we pick up on in our intuitive reactions to cases like Logical Reasoning.
One might think that this amounts to begging the question against defenders of
Steadfastness like Weatherson (ms). However, since I do not deny Steadfastness,
but agree that it accurately captures how one shouldFOE react to misleading
HOE, I can’t be guilty of begging the question against Steadfastness.
This leads me to a final potential worry. One might wonder whether my
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account still leaves room for the idea that Steadfastness is right in some way,
given that I’ve argued that any agent who is presented with misleading HOE
should turn away from the question of what they shouldFOE believe. However,
this doesn’t imply in any way that it’s incorrect for a third person to state that
such an agent should remain steadfast. What brings it about that deliberating
agents should turn away from this question is that they have misleading HOE.
A third person judging this agent, however, can ignore this HOE if they know it
to be misleading and talk about what this agent shouldFOE believe. Schoenfield
(2012: 209) suggests that in ordinary discourse discussing whether another agent
is believing what their FOE supports can be important for us in order to evaluate
whether this agent is someone we can defer to. The reason is that we want to
defer to agents who believe what they shouldFOE rather than to those who believe
what they shouldHOE since the former agents’ ratio of true beliefs will, on average,
be higher (Schoenfield 2012: 215). Pointing out that someone is not believing
what they shouldFOE could hence be used to mark individuals whom one should
not defer to.
It is this external perspective we take when we state, in line with Steadfast-
ness, that agents in cases like Deductive Reasoning, Peer Disagreement,
or Abductive Reasoning should maintain their beliefs. And it is the internal
perspective of these agents we take when we state, in line with Conciliationism,
that they should suspend judgement.
4.7 Dilemma or Ambiguity?
I have argued that the distinction between shouldFOE and shouldHOE can be
accommodated by Doxastic Contextualism. The upshot was that we don’t have
to choose between Conciliationism and Steadfastness. Since both views have
something going for them, my ‘third way’ seems therefore preferable to choosing
between them. Of course, there might be a significant disadvantage to the
Evidence-Ambiguity Theory that outweighs the advantage of having one’s cake
and eating it, too. I have tried to diffuse worries about one potential disadvantage
in sections 4.5 and 4.6.
There is a ‘fourth way’ that I have not mentioned yet. Instead of claiming that
Steadfastness and Conciliationism are both correct and don’t conflict, one can
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also suggest the view that they are both correct, but actually do conflict. Worsnip
(2015b: 33) thinks that Christensen (2007, 2010, 2013) should be interpreted in
this way. Exegesis of Christensen is not too important here, as the view itself
certainly merits to be taken serious.
Worsnip (2015b) uses the example of moral and prudential reasons to illustrate
the view. What we morally and what we prudentially should do can come apart.
One can interpret this in two ways. On one view, the two kinds of reasons
are commensurable and can be weighed against each other such that there is
something one should do all-things-considered. For example, one could think
that the moral always trumps the prudential. Worsnip (2015b) likens this to
(putatively) Christensen’s view that there is both a demand on us to follow our
FOE and to follow our HOE. On this picture, our FOE and our HOE pull us in
opposite directions. There is something we should believe all-things-considered,
but it is unfortunate that we can’t accommodate the demands put on us both by
our FOE and our HOE, just as it is unfortunate when we cannot be both prudent
and moral. In other words, misleading HOE places us in a dilemma. Let’s call
this the commensurability position.
The Evidence-Ambiguity Theory is rather like the position that moral and
prudential reasons are incommensurable and from completely different normative
domains, which do not compete with each other.19 What we shouldFOE believe
and what we shouldHOE believe does not compete with each other; they just
constitute two different perspectives. Accordingly, there is no dilemma when one
cannot both believe what one shouldFOE and what one shouldHOE . Let’s call
this the incommensurability position.
Worsnip (2015b) himself defends a version of the incommensurability position.
He rightfully points out that its advantage is that it avoids dilemmas (ibid.: 35),
which leaves us with the uncomfortable situation that whatever we do, we’re
violating one of the demands placed on us. Furthermore, it is conservative with
respect to the axioms of standard deontic logic. According to the latter, if we
should do A and we should do ¬A, we should do A and ¬A, which is impossible.
The incommensurability position resolves this by making clear that we should do
A in some sense of ‘should’ and should do ¬A in some other sense, which does
not entail that we should (in one sense) A and ¬A (ibid.: 36).
19This position is often attributed to Sidgwick, Henry (1874).
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I agree with Worsnip (2015b) on this and gladly take his points on for the
purpose of defending the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory against the commensura-
bility position. However, we disagree on what the different kinds of normative
domains are that are at work in cases where there is misleading HOE. First of
all, he is only concerned with cases where one’s FOE supports having a doxastic
attitude D to a proposition P and one’s HOE supports believing that one’s FOE
does not support having D to P (ibid.: 5). He argues that in such scenarios, we
have epistemic reasons to have D to P and at the same time epistemic reasons to
believe that our evidence does not support having D to P , but that rationality
requires us not to have this combination of attitudes as they are incoherent. This
conflict between what our epistemic reasons demand and what rationality requires
is, according to him, only apparent since reasons and rationality are different
kinds of normative things that do not actually compete with each other (ibid.:
34).
On the Evidence-Ambiguity Theory, on the other hand, the two domains are
(i) what one should believe in light of one’s FOE and (ii) what one should believe
in light of one’s HOE. One might think that what one shouldFOE believe is what
one has epistemic reasons to believe and what one shouldHOE believe is what
rationality requires, and that Worsnip’s and my theory are therefore actually
identical. However, they differ in two important aspects. First, as mentioned,
Wornsip’s theory is only limited to cases where one’s FOE supports having a
doxastic attitude D to a proposition P and one’s HOE supports believing that
one’s FOE actually does not support this attitude. This already excludes Logical
Reasoning from the list of cases his theory can be applied to. Remember that in
Logical Reasoning my FOE supports believing ¬Fa. However, my HOE does
not support believing that my FOE supports not believing ¬Fa, as there is a 50%
chance on my HOE that my belief that ¬Fa is entailed by my FOE and a 50%
that it is not. My HOE in Logical Reasoning does therefore support suspending
judgement on what my FOE supports. It follows that Logical Reasoning is not
the kind of case Worsnip’s theory covers, which makes the Evidence-Ambiguity
Theory more widely applicable. Second, Worsnip concurs with Broome (1999)
that rationality requirements are wide scope such that they only demand of us
that we don’t have certain combinations of attitudes, but not how to resolve
them. The Evidence-Ambiguity Theory, on the contrary, allows that HOE requires
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specific doxastic attitudes, namely what we shouldHOE believe, rather than just
forbids combinations of attitudes. This seems to be exactly what is needed given
the intuitions we have about the three cases I mentioned in section 4.3, in each of
which HOE appeared to demand suspending judgement.
4.8 Conclusion
We can have our cake and eat it, too, in the higher-order debate: we don’t have
to chose between Conciliationism and Steadfastness. Both views are right in
some way. Conciliationism is right about what we should believe in light of our
HOE, while Steadfastness is right about what we should believe in light of our
FOE. I have defended this Evidence-Ambiguity Theory against the worry that it
cannot provide us with an answer to the question of agents deliberating about
what to believe. Depending on the respective context of the deliberating agent, a
specific information-state is provided by the context, determining which particular
meaning the agent’s question ‘What should I believe?’ carries. Finally, I have
argued with the help of Worsnip (2015b) that my Evidence-Ambiguity Theory is
to be preferred to views according to which we are in a rational dilemma when
FOE and HOE conflict. In conclusion, I hope to have presented a further case
where highlighting the information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ can help us
resolve a debate in epistemology.
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Chapter 5
The Collective ‘Should’ and
Epistemic Advice
5.1 Introduction
In chapters 3 and 4, I have provided evidence for Doxastic Contextualism. I have
argued that the doxastic ‘should’ has a objective and a subjective sense, and that
it can be further relativised to the subject’s first-order evidence and the subject’s
higher-order evidence. In this chapter, I will propose that the doxastic ‘should’
can be relativized to another information-state: the collective evidence, that is,
the joint evidence of the speaker and their addressee.
My thesis is that the doxastic ‘should’ carries this collective sense in sentences
that are uttered for the purpose of giving epistemic advice (epistemic-advice
sentences). While there is no account of epistemic advice in the literature,
practical advice has received quite a bit of attention, for example from Hobbes
(1651/2009) and Searle (1969). Based on their and others’ work, I provide a
characterisation of the practice of giving epistemic advice. I suggest that giving
epistemic advice is the attempt to help someone who is deliberating about whether
a proposition P holds with their epistemic goal of adopting the best-informed
doxastic attitude to P possible.
Not only have philosophers written about the nature of practical advice, there
is also some recent research on the truth-conditions of sentences uttered for the
purpose of giving practical advice (Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay 2010; Kolodny and
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MacFarlane 2010; Dowell 2013). Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), at least, think
that their account also applies to epistemic-advice sentences.1 However, neither
they nor anyone else in the literature has discussed the specific issues relevant for
epistemic advice. The present chapter therefore fills a gap in the literature.
After clarifying what I take epistemic advice to be in section 5.2, I go through
several candidates for the truth-conditions of epistemic-advice sentences, that is,
through different proposals concerning what the sense of the doxastic ‘should’
in epistemic-advice sentences is. In chapter 3, we have looked at the objective
and subjective doxastic ‘should’. I argue that epistemic-advice sentences employ
neither of these two (sections 5.3 and 5.4). However, there are further information-
states, other than the facts and the subject’s evidence, that theorists could propose
as the information-state that the doxastic ‘should’ is relativized to when occurring
in epistemic-advice sentences. Other possible candidates are the subject’s—i.e.,
the advisee’s—available evidence and the speaker’s—i.e.the advisor’s—evidence.
I will reject these proposals, too (sections 5.5 and 5.6). Instead, I put forward
Collectivism. According to this view, epistemic-advice sentences like ‘You should
have D to P ’ are true iff D to P is supported by the collective evidence, the
combined evidence of the advisor and the advisee (section 5.7).
Figuring out under which conditions epistemic advice is correct helps us to
better understand the practice of epistemic advice. Besides this more general
theoretical benefit of giving an account of the truth-conditions of epistemic-advice
sentences, Collectivism also has a more specific advantage: it solves a problem
in normative epistemology. Turri (2012) presents a puzzle about withholding. He
considers various solutions to it, but in the end rejects all of them and concludes
that the puzzle seems to be unsolvable. In section 5.8, I show how Collectivism
can solve it.
5.2 What Is Epistemic Advice?
To state the obvious first: epistemic advice is a kind of advice. Advice can come
in different linguistic forms. One can explicitly say ‘I advise you to exercise more’
(Hinchman 2005: 359). Furthermore, one can use the imperatival form, as in
‘Exercise more!’ (Hobbes 1651/2009: Ch. xxv, 3); the subjunctive form, as in ‘If
1Personal conversation with Steve Finlay.
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I were you, I’d exercise more’; or weak deontic necessity modals like ‘should’ or
‘ought’, as in ‘You should exercise more’.2
My focus here is on this last form. I am looking for the truth-conditions
of sentences of the form ‘You should have doxastic attitude D to proposition
P ’ that are used for the purpose of epistemic advice, i.e., of epistemic-advice
sentences. However, these truth-conditions will arguably give the conditions for
when it is correct to give the same advice in one of the other three forms I’ve
described. That is, I suggest that it is correct for me to utter ‘Believe P !’ as a
piece of advice (instead of, say, a command) if and only if it is true for me to
utter ‘You should believe P ’ as a piece of advice. This does not mean that the
truth-conditions of ‘You should believe P ’ are the truth-conditions of the other
forms of giving the same advice. For example, imperatives like ‘Believe P !’ are
usually taken to have no truth-conditions at all. Furthermore, since I’m fallible
with respect to whether I’m giving advice, the self-report ‘I advise you to believe
P ’ has different truth-conditions than ‘You should believe P ’. In conclusion,
detecting the truth-conditions of epistemic advice of the form ‘You should believe
P ’ is interesting beyond merely finding out these truth-conditions, since it also
provides us with the conditions for correctness (but not truth) for the same advice
in a different form.
Epistemic advice needs to be distinguished from practical advice. As a first
approximation, practical advice is advice on what one should do, whereas epistemic
advice concerns which doxastic attitude one should adopt. Many acknowledge,
however, that there are practical reasons for belief .3 The distinction between
epistemic and practical advice can therefore not be drawn simply in virtue of the
kind of thing—an action or a doxastic attitude—that the advisor recommends to
do or to adopt.
What clearly separates the two kinds of advice is that they concern different
sorts of normativity. Practical advice is advice on what one should do (or believe)
according to practical norms. Epistemic advice, on the other hand, is about
what one should believe (or do) according to epistemic norms. According to my
characterization of epistemic norms in chapter 1, they concern which doxastic
2This list is not intended to be exhaustive; there might be other linguistic forms. There
certainly are furthermore non-linguistic ways of giving advice, as when I am pointing in a certain
direction after you’ve asked me where to go.
3See, for example, Foley (1987: 210) and Papineau (2013: 68).
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attitude one should adopt in light of considerations such as truth, evidence,
knowledge, or cognitive reliability. Epistemic advice is formulated with the help of
the doxastic ‘should’, which expresses epistemic norms, whereas practical advice
is formulated with the help of the practical ‘should’, which expresses practical
norms.
There are a number of philosophical accounts of advice. They all focus on
practical advice, but I think they point out features that epistemic advice shares,
too. The locus classicus on advice is Hobbes (1651/2009: ch. xxv). He singles
out a property of advice that many have agreed on: advising is done with the
intention of benefiting the advisee. Similarly, Searle (1969: 67) writes that an
essential feature of advice is that it is “an undertaking to the effect that” what the
advisee is advised to do is in the advisee’s “best interest”. Furthermore, Hinchman
(2005: 359) describes prudential advice as being given from the perspective of the
advisee’s self-interest.
Wiland (2000: 5) expresses doubts about this, arguing that advice is not only
given in order to promote the advisee’s self-interest, but also in order to promote
other ends the advisee has. Now, we can incorporate this into Hobbes’ view that
advice aims to benefit the advisee by using a wider reading of ‘benefit’, according
to which anything that promotes one of my aims, be that a self-interested aim
(in the narrow sense of ‘self-interested’) or an altruistic aim, counts as benefiting
me. Maybe this fix can’t embrace all kinds of advice. Intuitively, there is such a
thing as moral advice, but plausibly what one morally should do sometimes does
not promote any of one’s goals. This is most clearly the case when we’re giving
moral advice to a sociopath. On the other hand, precisely because a sociopath
doesn’t share the goal of doing what’s moral, we might hesitate to call it ‘moral
advice’ when we tell a sociopath that he shouldn’t murder innocent people. In
any case, I think we can at least say that advice aims at promoting some kind of
goal, whether or not that goal is one the advisee actually has or not.
A further important aspect of advice is that it is second-personal. That is, it is
about a person or group other than the speaker. I can’t advise myself (at least not
the same time-slice of myself). The standard way to give epistemic advice is thus
by uttering sentences of the form ‘You should adopt doxastic attitude D to P ’.
But I don’t need to use the second-person pronoun. If a philosophy major asks
me for advice whether she should take the intro to logic course or the aesthetics
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course, and I say ‘Every philosophy major should take at least one logic course’,
I have advised her without using the term ‘you’. Furthermore, advice-sentences
cannot just be about any other person than the speaker, they must be about the
person (or persons) who is the addressee of the utterance. In the literature on
deontic modals, eavesdropping cases are discussed, that is, cases where a subject
can’t hear the speaker and the speaker talks about what the subject should do in
light of her, the speaker’s evidence.4 Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 22) describe
such utterances as “simulated advice”. This aptly implies that they are not actual
advice, precisely because the speaker isn’t addressing the subject. I won’t be
concerned with such utterances here.
Let’s take stock. Epistemic advice is given in terms of sentences that express
epistemic normativity, it is about the person(s) who is (are) the utterance’s
addressee(s), and has the purpose of helping the advisee(s) with respect to an
epistemic goal. The satisfaction of all these conditions is still not sufficient for
epistemic advice. Remember the following case from section 2.6.2:
Nostalgia. Renaud looks back at a situation at time t, when his
evidence clearly supported disbelieving Q. We both know now that
this evidence was misleading, and that Q is true. I say to Renaud:
(1) Don’t beat yourself up. Disbelieving Q is what you should have
done at the time.
(1) expresses epistemic normativity and is about Renaud, the addressee of the
utterance. One could also say that it’s done for the purpose of helping Renaud
with respect to an epistemic goal. As I suggested in chapter 4, we sometimes
judge whether someone believes what they should in light of their evidence to
evaluate their epistemic reasonableness. Telling you that you believed what you
should have believed in light of your evidence at t can be seen as an effort to
stabilize a disposition in you to believe in accordance with your evidence, that is,
a disposition to be epistemically reasonable.5 In other words, uttering (1) is a tiny
contribution towards you achieving an epistemic goal, that is, being epistemically
reasonable, in the future.
4See Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 18), Dowell (2013: 150).
5For a paper-length defence of the idea that epistemic-normative talk is used to promote
certain belief-forming processes in the members of our community, see Dogramaci (2012).
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Admittedly, someone who is giving epistemic advice seems to try to help their
addressee to achieve an epistemic goal in a somewhat more straightforward way
than I do when uttering (1) in your presence. Being at a loss to single out in which
way it is more direct, I’d like to suggest a different way to distinguish between
evaluating someone’s epistemic reasonableness and giving epistemic advice.
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010) and Dowell (2013) put forward the idea that
practical advice aims to help practically deliberating agents. Analogously, it seems
right to say that epistemic advice tries to help agents who are engaged in doxastic
deliberation about whether P . Now, in chapters 3 and 4, I have claimed that
doxastic deliberators are contemplating about what they should believe in light of
their evidence, i.e., in the subjective sense of ‘should’, sometimes contemplating
what they should believe in light of their first-order evidence, sometimes what
they should believe in light of their higher-order evidence. This would suggest that
the epistemic goal that advisors are trying to assist with is the advisees’ epistemic
goal to believe about P what’s supported by their—the advisees’—evidence.
However, on reflection this turns out to be wrong. If I am advising you on
what you should believe about whether P and I have better evidence concerning
whether P than you have, then I wouldn’t help you if I told you what you should
believe in light of your evidence. Rather, you would be interested in what my
evidence says. Thus, the epistemic goal that epistemic advisors help you with
cannot be to believe what’s supported by your evidence, otherwise a typical
advisor would ignore their own evidence.
There are two ways to interpret this. First, one could conclude that I was
wrong in chapters 3 and 4 that doxastic deliberators are wondering about what’s
supported by their evidence. There is some support for this if we think of
deliberation not just as interpreting one’s evidence, but also as gathering new
evidence. When you’re inquiring about when the train to Stirling leaves, you’ll
not only rely on what your evidence, e.g., your memory, tells you about this, but
also look for new evidence, e.g., the train schedule. But we need to distinguish
between two different goals of deliberating agents. The goal of inquiry is arguably
something like believing what’s supported by the best available evidence. We
need to distinguish this from the aim of believing what’s supported by my current
evidence. Feldman (2000) discusses the case of someone who has modest evidence
that ginkgo supplements improve one’s memory and then sees the cover of a
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scientific magazine with the headline ‘The health effects of ginkgo’. She doesn’t
know that the article inside says that ginkgo doesn’t have a positive effect on
one’s memory. The aim of her inquiry into the effectiveness of ginkgo is to believe
what the best evidence on ginkgo supports. Does this mean that right now,
before having read the article, she should believe that ginkgo doesn’t boost one’s
memory? Feldman (2000: 688) writes: “Until [she’s] read the article, it would be
bizarre for [her] to stop believing what’s supported by [her] old evidence”. He
seems right. In at least some sense of ‘should’, she shouldn’t stop believing that
ginkgo helps one’s memory before she’s read the article. Let’s call this process
of forming one’s beliefs in response to the evidence you’ve got private doxastic
deliberation.
Thus, the view that private doxastic deliberators are guided by the question
of what they subjectively should believe is not mistaken. This leaves us with
the second option, which is to assume that advisors assist their advisees with
another epistemic goal than the one they have as private doxastic deliberators.
As the consideration that advisors go beyond their advisees’ evidence suggests,
receiving advice is about tapping into the knowledge and experience of others.
Corresponding to this, giving advice is ‘presumptuous’ (Hinchman 2005: 358). If I
tell you what you should do, I seem to think that I know better or at least as well
as you what needs to be done. For this reason, the epistemic goal of advisees is not
to have the doxastic attitude licensed by an information-state that is limited to
their own evidence. They want to profit from their advisor’s evidence. An intuitive
way to put this is that advisees want to get the best-informed doxastic attitude
possible, and not one which is merely supported by their own evidence. The
activity that consists in pursuing this goal is also a form of doxastic deliberation.
After all, it is about forming a doxastic attitude. I suggest that we call this kind
of doxastic deliberation public doxastic deliberation, in contrast to private doxastic
deliberation, which is concerned with believing what’s supported by one’s own
evidence. It is public in the sense that it goes beyond the realm of the agent’s
‘private’ evidence.
The phrase ‘best-informed doxastic attitude possible’ is vague. In its strictest
sense, the most-informed doxastic attitude is one that is supported by the facts,
i.e., belief that P where P is true and disbelief that P where P is false. On
this picture, advisees pursue the goal of believing what they objectively should
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believe P . We find support for this idea in the literature on advice. Judith Jarvis
Thomson (1986: 178) writes about moral advice:
“On those rare occasions on which someone conceives the idea of
asking for my advice on a moral matter, I do not take my field work
to be limited to a study of what he believes is the case: I take it to be
incumbent on me to find out what is the case.”
However, as I will argue in section 5.3, this understanding of the epistemic goal
of public deliberators doesn’t fit seemingly good practice of epistemic advice.
We will discuss a number of cases of epistemic advice in sections 5.4 to 5.7,
which will narrow down what exactly it means that public deliberators want the
best-informed doxastic attitude possible.
For now, we can give the following account of epistemic advice: Epistemic
advisors try to help publicly deliberating agents in their goal to adopt the best-
informed doxastic attitude possible, which means, in some cases at least, that this
doxastic attitude isn’t supported by the agent’s—i.e., the advisee’s—but by the
advisor’s richer evidence.
This definition of epistemic advice seems to be blind to the following kind
of case. Imagine you are training to become a statistician and wonder which
credence in P is supported by the evidence you have. Even if I know that the
evidence you have is actually misleading, I could be said to be helping you when I
tell you that you should have credence x to P in light of the evidence you possess.
You wanted to know which credence is licensed by the evidence you have since
you’re trying to learn how to statistically interpret evidence.6
Admittedly, this is a form of epistemic advice, at least in some sense of the
term. But it’s not the sense I’m concerned with here. My ‘advice’ in this case is
for the sake of helping you to learn how to be epistemically reasonable. This is
the same kind of ‘advice’ as (1) is, and I set such cases aside in this paper.
There is one final feature of advice I’d like to point out, which will be relevant
in section 5.4. When we give advice to someone in order to benefit them, we do
this in a certain way. We tell them that they should do A, so that they follow
our advice and do A, which is supposed to be to their advantage. But there are
6Thanks to Ralph Wedgwood for making me aware of this kind of case.
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other ways to bring someone to do A. As Hinchman (2005: 355) points out, we
could use fear or flattery to make them do A. If I tell you that you should do A,
while raising my fist in an aggressive way, I’m hardly advising you to do A, even
if doing A would be to your benefit. No, when I give you advice, I rather try to
make you do what will benefit you by trying to give you a reason to do A. I can
do this by explicitly pointing out a reason for you to do A. Imagine I’m a doctor
and I know that your blood pressure is high, but you don’t know this. I tell you:
(2) Your blood pressure is too high. You should exercise.
By telling you that you have high blood pressure, I am pointing out a reason for
you to exercise. Furthermore, we can also use should-sentences on their own to
give someone a reason. Imagine the same scenario, but I just say:
(3) You should exercise.
Here, I don’t explicitly refer to a reason, as I do in (2). However, the act of me
uttering (3) seems to be a reason on its own for you to exercise. Hinchman (2005)
describes this reason as resulting from the fact that advising is presumptuous. In
advising others, we signal that we know better (or at least as well) what needs to
be done. Advising is therefore, or so (Hinchman, 2005: 259) argues, an invitation
to trust the advisor’s judgement on what needs to be done. If I present myself as
a trustworthy source on whether to exercise, I give you a reason to exercise by
uttering (3).
To conclude, epistemic advice is the attempt to help someone who is delib-
erating about whether a proposition P holds by trying to give them a reason
to do what helps them achieve the epistemic goal of adopting the best-informed
doxastic attitude to P possible.
5.3 Objectivism
With a characterization of epistemic advice on the table, I will in the next sections
go through different possible accounts of the truth-conditions of epistemic-advice
sentences. For this purpose, I will again use the semantic model of the information-
sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ introduced in chapter 2:
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Doxastic Should For any context of utterance c that provides a doxastic
ordering source, ‘S should have doxastic attitude D to P ’ is true at c iff having D
to P reflects accurately how much i supports P , where i is the information-state
provided by c.
The question of what the truth-conditions of epistemic-advice sentences are can be
re-described as follows: what kind of information-state is provided by contexts in
which doxastic-should sentences are uttered for the purpose of advice? I will call
this information-state the advisory information-state. In order to figure out what
the advisory information-state is, I will again rely on the methodology used in
previous chapters, i.e., I will both consult linguistic intuitions and metasemantic
considerations.
In chapter 3, I have discussed the objective and the subjective senses of the
doxastic ‘should’. In this section, I show that the advisory information-state
cannot be the fully realistic information-state, and in the next section 5.4 that
it cannot be the subject’s information-state. In sections 5.5 and 5.6, I consider
two other information-states, which we have so far not (properly) discussed, and
will explain why they aren’t the advisory information-state either. I present my
preferred account in section 5.7.
According to the first proposal I want to consider, Objectivism, the advisory
information-state is the fully realistic information-state:
Objectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D to P ’
is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much the fully realistic
information-state supports P .
A context of epistemic advice is a context in which a doxastic-should sentence is
uttered for the purpose of epistemic advice. As the reader will remember, the fully
realistic information-state is the information-state that, if the doxastic ‘should’ is
relativized to it, makes the doxastic ‘should’ carry its objective sense. According
to Objectivism, advice of the form ‘You should have D to P ’ is thus true iff one
objectively should have D to P .7
7As we have seen in sections 3.4.2 and 3.5, it is probably not the fully realistic information-
state, but a slightly different one—such as the truly believable realistic information-state—that
the objective doxastic ‘should’ is relativized to. I will ignore this subtlety here.
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In order to test Objectivism and other accounts of the advisory information-
state, I will partly rely on intuitions on variations of the following case. Police-
CCTV-1, which I introduced in chapter 3, is a slightly altered version of it:
Police. Detective Lester Freamon is pondering about who killed Bob.
His evidence is conflicting: it might either have been Omar or Marlo,
but it must have been one of them. He looks at his colleague Kima
Greggs, who has just entered the room. Unbeknownst to Lester, Kima
has solid evidence that it was Omar: her reliable informant Bubbles
told her that Marlo was at the other end of town at the time of the
murder.
(4) Lester: I really don’t know what I should believe anymore.
(5) Kima: You should believe that it was Omar.
Our intuition is that (5) rings true. It is unclear whether Objectivism predicts
that (5) is true. While the case is set up such that on basis of Kima’s evidence
it is very likely that it was Omar, it is not stipulated that this is true. After all,
even though her informant Bubbles is generally very reliable, he could be wrong
in this particular case and actually not have seen Marlo at the other end of town.
I think it is telling that we seem to get the intuition that (5) is true, even though
the case description leaves it open whether the condition for (5) being true in the
objective sense is satisfied. This is a first point telling against Objectivism.
A second problem with Objectivism is that it seems perfectly fine on some
occasions to give advice to suspend judgement or to adopt a credence that neither
constitutes belief nor disbelief. This can’t be true if the advisory information-state
is the fully realistic one. If P is true, one objectively should believe P . If P is
false, one objectively should disbelieve P . Since P is either true or false, one
always objectively should believe or disbelieve P , but never suspend judgement or
adopt a credence that does not constitute belief or disbelief (McHugh 2012: 15).
Consequently, on Objectivism it is never correct to advise someone to adopt
doxastic attitudes other than belief or disbelief.
Third, if the advisory information-state were the fully realistic one, it would
be trivial to advise someone not to suspend judgement or not to adopt a credence
that doesn’t constitute belief or disbelief. According to Objectivism, advice of
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the form ‘You should not suspend judgement on P ’ or ‘You should not have a
credence in P that is not equivalent to believing or disbelieving P ’ would always
be true and thus uninteresting. Contrary to this, it does not always seem to be
trivial. Take the following case introduced by Turri (2012):
Withholding mathematicians (WM). One hundred eminent math-
ematicians discuss, outside of your earshot, whether a certain axiom
entails a certain claim. Let’s call the proposition that the axiom
entails the claim ‘M ’. After their discussion, they all tell you that you
shouldn’t withhold on M . You have no other evidence regarding M .8
When the mathematicians tell you that you should not suspend judgement on M ,
this carries interesting information. It implies that the mathematicians think that
they have evidence that supports believing or disbelieving M . If they didn’t think
so, they would tell you to suspend judgement on M . However, if the ‘should’ were
objective, it wouldn’t carry this implication. On this reading, anyone, independent
of what they believe about their evidence, is in a position to know and therefore
in a position to reasonably assert what the mathematicians are asserting.
Fourth, metasemantic considerations also speak against Objectivism. As I
pointed out in chapter 2, which information-state is provided by the context in
which a should-sentence is uttered is either determined by the speaker’s intentions,
the utterance’s pragmatic purpose, or by what’s conversationally salient. At first,
it seems to be that the pragmatic purpose of epistemic advice speaks in favour of
Objectivism. As I mentioned above, on a prima facie plausible interpretation,
‘the best-informed doxastic attitude possible’ is the doxastic attitude that is
supported by the fully realistic information-state. This is the doxastic attitude
an omniscient agent has and one couldn’t be better informed than someone who
is omniscient. On this reading, the epistemic goal of advisees is to believe all
truths, or at least hold true beliefs about whether P for every proposition P they
are considering. Since advisors want to help their advisees with their epistemic
goals, this would thus imply that advisors are talking about what advisees should
objectively believe.
8This is, almost verbatim, Comesan˜a’s (2013) description of the case. I have only changed
the propositional letter. I will discuss this case in more detail in section 5.8.
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However, this view of the goal of epistemic advisees must be wrong. Otherwise,
it would never be considered helpful when one is advised to adopt another doxastic
attitude than belief or disbelief, and this is clearly absurd. Therefore, the goal of
the advisee must be to have a doxastic attitude which is licensed by an information-
state that is different from the fully realistic one and that can license doxastic
attitudes other than belief. If the pragmatic purpose of epistemic advisors in such
contexts is not to help advisees believe all truths, reasonable advisors are also not
intending to speak relative to the fully realistic information-states in such contexts.
These two contextual features suggest that Objectivism is false. Finally, I
don’t see a reason why we should assume that the fully realistic information-
state is contextually salient; if anything, the other two features make another
information-state salient.
For these four reasons, I reject Objectivism. Before moving on to the next
proposal, I would like to address an issue about the nature of the advisory
information-state. I have just argued that if the pragmatic purpose of advice
cannot be to adopt a doxastic attitude licensed by the fully realistic information-
state, then a reasonable advisor won’t intend to speak relative to it. This raises
the questions what happens when an unreasonable advisor intends to speak to it or
another information-state that does not suit the pragmatic purpose of advice. If it
is speaker intentions that determine the information-state, then in such situations
the ‘advisor’ would say something that is true, but not something that would
serve the purpose of their utterance qua epistemic advice.
In order to avoid going into unnecessary details, I won’t settle here whether it
is speaker intentions or pragmatic purpose that determine the information-state.
Rather, I make the following conditional claim: if the intentions-based account
is correct, then what I am interested in in this chapter is actually not which
information-state is provided by contexts of epistemic advice, but rather which
is provided by contexts of good epistemic advice, where the advisor’s intentions
are reasonable with respect to the pragmatic purpose of their utterance. In other
words, what I am looking for is not which information-state all epistemic advisors
are always talking to, but which they should be talking to as epistemic advisors.
The reason is that if the intention-based account is right, then there won’t be
anything like a uniform advisory information-state and a uniform semantics for
epistemic-advise sentences, since which information-state is provided by a context
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of epistemic advice would simply be whatever information-state the respective
advisor intends to talk to, which could be any. I won’t make this conditional claim
explicit again in the remainder of the chapter, but readers should keep it in mind.
For this reason, I will also only consider reasonable, but not unreasonable, speaker
intentions as a metasemantic factor determining the advisory information-state.
5.4 Subjectivism
According to the subjectivist, the advisory information-state is the subject’s body
of evidence:
Subjectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D to P ’
is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much S’s information-state
supports P .
In other words, according to Subjectivism advice of the form ‘S should have D
to P ’ is true iff S should subjectively have D to P . As I explained in chapter 3,
the subjective ‘should’ can be characterized in different ways, depending on what
we take to be S’s information-state. It can be such that one should subjectively
believe P iff one is justified to believe P , iff one’s evidence supports believing P ,
iff one’s belief that P is the product of a reliable process, or iff one would know P
if one came to believe P . I think that on none of these readings of the subjective
doxastic ‘should’ Subjectivism turns out right.
To see this, let’s think about Police again. Is (5) true according to Subjec-
tivism? If we specify the case such that Lester neither would come to know nor
is justified to believe that it was Omar, it predicts that (5) is false:
Police-New. Everything is as in Police. Furthermore, Lester is new
in the police department and one of his colleagues has just told him,
wrongly, that Kima is often wrong in judging who committed a crime.
(5) Kima: You should believe that it was Omar.9
I submit that (5) appears to be as true in Police-New as in Police, but that
Subjectivism predicts that it is false. Lester’s relevant evidence in Police-New
9Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 119) discuss an analogous variation of Miners.
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is that Kima told him that it was Omar and that another colleague told him that
Kima is not reliable when judging who committed a crime. This evidence hardly
supports believing that it was Omar. Furthermore, that Lester has information
that Kima is not to be trusted when it comes to judging who killed Bob works
in general as a defeater on Lester being justified to believe that it was Omar.
This should be so on any plausible account of justification, including sufficiently
sophisticated reliabilist ones. For example, on Goldman’s (1986: 111) reliabilism,
it is a necessary condition for a belief to be justified that the subject does not
believe that the process that produced his or her belief is unreliable. Finally, since
justification is necessary for knowledge, Lester would also not come to know that
it was Omar if he believed it. To conclude, under no reasonable reading of the
subjective ‘should’ comes (5) out true.10
Notice that Lester’s information is incorrect though. Kima usually interprets
the evidence correctly and, in this case as well, has come to the conclusion
supported by her evidence. It doesn’t seem as if adding the detail that Lester
has received the mistaken information about her reliability makes (5) false. You
might not share this intuition because you might think that the (misleading)
evidence that Kima is unreliable works as a defeater for it to be the case that
Lester should believe that it was Omar. If this is so, you’re stuck with thinking
about what Lester should subjectively believe. The WM case I described in the
previous section might be better suited than Police-New to convince you that
advisors are not talking about what their advisees subjectively should believe.
It is structurally alike to Police-New in that the mathematicians apparently
correctly recommend a doxastic attitude to you, the advisee, that is not supported
by your evidence.
In any case, I think we can further back up the case against Subjectivism
with metasemantic considerations. If the purpose of uttering (5) is to epistemically
advise Lester, the goal of this speech act is that Lester adopts the best-informed
doxastic attitude to <Omar killed Bob> possible. If the advisor’s evidence is
more informative than the advisee’s, then the epistemic goal of the advisee cannot
be to adopt a doxastic attitude supported by their own, but not the advisor’s
10This is premature. As I have pointed out in section 2.7, on one possible reading of the
subjective ‘should’, it is relativized to the available evidence. I will address this possible reading
separately in the next section 5.5.
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evidence, since this doxastic attitude wouldn’t be the best-informed possible. In
order to serve the pragmatic purpose of her utterance, which is to help Lester with
his epistemic goal, Kima should thus not speak relative to Lester’s information-
state. If Kima is reasonable, she’s thus not intending to speak relative to Lester’s
evidence when uttering (5). Finally, given that both the pragmatic purpose of
Kima’s utterance and her speaker-intention are not linked to Lester’s information-
state, there is no reason to assume that the latter is conversationally salient. To
conclude, Subjectivism is also wrong in light of metasemantic considerations.
There is an oddity of Police-New, which might undermine it as a counterex-
ample to Subjectivism. As mentioned in section 5.2, advisors want to benefit
their advisees by trying to give them reasons. Can we see Kima as trying to give a
reason to Lester? As the case is set up, Lester does not have all-things-considered
reasons to believe that it was Omar after hearing (5). So, it seems like Kima has
failed to give him a reason.
However, it is important that we distinguish between all-things-considered and
pro tanto reasons here. Hinchman (2005) himself, from whom I have taken this
condition on advice, writes that one advises to do A only if one “intends that [the
advisee] gain[s] access to a pro tanto reason to” do A (ibid.: 361). Now, Kima
telling Lester that he should believe that it was Omar is arguably giving Lester a
pro tanto reason to believe that it was Omar, but a reason that is outweighed, or
rather defeated by, the misleading information Lester has about Kima.
Could one argue for a stronger condition on (epistemic) advice, according
to which in order to give advice to do A to an advisee, one needs to intend
to give them an all-things-considered reason to do A? I think this condition
is unreasonably strong. I admit though that what seems plausible about this
suggestion is the following consideration: if the goal of advice is to benefit one’s
advisee by making them do what one advises them to do, then it seems insufficient
to intend to give them just a pro tanto reason. If advisees are reasonable, they
won’t do what one advises them to do as long as they don’t have an all-things-
considered reason to do it. Now, this consideration, however, only supports the
weaker condition that advising to do A requires intending to give the advisee a
reason such that in combination with their other reasons, the advisee ends up
with an all-things-considered reason to do A. If this last condition is satisfied,
even giving a reason to do A that falls short of being an all-things-considered
132
reason to do A can achieve the goal of advice to make a (reasonable) advisee do
A. Let’s call this the ATC condition and look at it in more detail.
First, notice that the ATC condition only disqualifies one version of Police-
New from being epistemic advice. We have to distinguish between a version in
which Kima knows that Lester was misinformed about how reliable she is and
a version where she doesn’t know this. In the first version, she can’t reasonably
utter (5) with the intention that Lester ends up with an all-things-considered
reason to believe that it was Omar. Kima knows that Lester has other reasons,
which in combination with the reason she’s giving him won’t make him have an
all-things-considered reason to believe that it was Omar. However, in the second
version, where she’s ignorant about Lester’s misinformation, she can reasonably
utter (5) with this intention. She can reason that if an experienced colleague like
her tells Lester that he should believe a proposition P , then this makes him, ceteris
paribus, have an all-things-considered reason to believe P . Admittedly, Kima’s
intention won’t be realized; but the utterance of (5) will still be advice, since what
matters is the intention, not whether it is realized. Demanding that an utterance
actually has to bring it about that the advisee has an all-things-considered reason
to do A in order to be advice to do A is too much. Otherwise, a report like the
following one would be inconsistent:
(6) He advised me to try the peanut butter sandwich because it is
very tasty. But I’m allergic to peanuts, so I didn’t eat it.
If advice required succeeding in giving the advisee an all-things-considered reason,
then the first sentence and the second couldn’t possibly both be true. But they
seem to be both true.
Second, I think the ATC condition doesn’t apply to advice, at least to epistemic
advice. To see this, consider a case where I advise you to have a credence of x in
P . On the ATC condition, this can only be advice if I intend to thereby bring it
about that you have an all-things-considered reason to adopt credence x in P . I
contend that I will intend this only in very rare cases. I can only (reasonably)
intend this if I believe that you will then have an all-things considered reason
to have credence x in P . That is, I need to believe that the following rational
constraint holds on your probability function Cr:
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Full Trust Cr(P |I’ve advised you to adopt credence x to P ) = x.
A scenario where this is given is when you take me to be perfectly reliable. However,
usually you will assume that there is a chance that I’m wrong, however small that
might be. As a result, your conditional credence in P given that I’ve told you
that you should have credence x to P will in such cases usually be somewhere
between your unconditional credence in P and x. The more reliable you think I
am, the closer to x it will be. True, there are cases where Full Trust is satisfied
even though you don’t think I’m generally perfectly reliable, for example when
your unconditional probability to P happens to be x anyway. But in all other
cases where you don’t expect me to be generally perfectly reliable, you won’t
have all-things-considered reason to adopt credence x to P , but rather to adopt a
credence between x and your unconditional credence in P . The ATC condition
entails that in all such cases I can’t, reasonably, give you epistemic advice, since I
can’t, reasonably, intend to put you in a position to have an all-things-considered
reason to adopt credence x to P . I find it highly implausible that reasonable
epistemic advice to adopt a certain credence only exists in such rare cases.
I take it that we’ve established that Kima’s utterance of (5) is a form of
epistemic advice, at least in one of the two versions of Police-New, and very
likely in both. Given this, we can back up the intuitive case against Subjectivism
with the metasemantic considerations that I mentioned above, which derive from
the assumption that Kima is epistemically advising Lester.
5.5 Available Evidence
This position is a cousin of Subjectivism. It states:
Available Evidence. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D
to P ’ is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much the evidence
available to S supports P .
Dowell (2013: 160) supports the idea that, in contexts where an agent is in
practical deliberation about what they should do, this ‘should’ is relativized to
the evidence available to the agent, and not simply the evidence which is in their
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possession. If we assume that the subjective ‘should’ is relativized to the subject’s
available evidence—as when we join Justification with Gibbons’ (2013: 39) quite
externalist account of justification11— Available Evidenceis simply another
way to specify Subjectivism.
Available Evidence is attractive for our cases dealing with epistemic rather
than practical normativity since it predicts that (5) is true in at least some
specifications of Police-New. Under normal circumstances, the evidence available
to Lester includes Kima’s. He just needs to ask her why she thinks that he should
believe that it was Omar, in order to access the information that Bubbles told her
that Marlo was at the other end of town. The total relevant evidence available to
Lester under normal circumstances in Police-New is:
• E1: It was either Omar or Marlo.
• E2: Kima told him that he should believe that it was Omar.
• E3: His colleague told him that Kima is unreliable when it comes to judging
who committed a crime.
• E4: The generally very reliable informant Bubbles told Kima that Marlo
was at the other end of town at the time of the murder.
While E3 undermines E2, they are both irrelevant in light of E1 and E4. Here’s
one way to put this: the probability of Omar being the murder conditional on E1
and E4 is the same conditional on E1-E4. Since E1 and E4 strongly support that
it was Omar, the total evidence available to Lester thus supports it. Accordingly,
(5) is true on Available Evidence under normal circumstances in Police-New.
But circumstances aren’t always normal. One specification of Police-New
looks as follows:
Police-Disappears. Things are as in Police-New (p. 130). Fur-
thermore, Kima disappears right after uttering (5).
To my ears, (5) still rings true in Police-Disappears. However, (5) is not true
on Available Evidence, since the fact that Bubbles told Kima that it cannot
11For more on this, see subsection 3.4.1.
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have been Marlo is not evidence that is available to Lester. Kima disappears, so
there’s no way for him to access this evidence.
I’m not sure that everyone shares my intuition that (5) is true in Police-
Disappears. However, I think that the same metasemantic consideration that
counts against Subjectivism undermines Available Evidence. Doxastic delib-
erators want to tap into their advisors’ knowledge. In light of this, it would be
absurd if advisors, who tries to help their advisees with their deliberative goals,
would limit themselves to the evidence that is available to their advisees. By
drawing on those parts of their—the advisors’—evidence that aren’t available
to their advisees, advisors can recommend advisees a better informed doxastic
attitude. The pragmatic purpose of advice thus requires advisors to speak to
an information-state that is not limited to evidence available to the advisee.
Accordingly, reasonable advisors won’t be intending to speak relative to such an
information-state. As in previous cases, these two factors indicate that such an
information-state is also not conversationally salient.
5.6 Advisor’s Evidence
The discussion in the previous section suggests the following view:
Advisor’s Evidence. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D
to P ’ is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much the advisor’s
evidence supports P .
This gets us the right results for all the discussed cases so far since Kima’s
evidence supports believing that it was Omar, meaning that (5) turns out true
on Advisor’s Evidence. It also fits with the theoretical consideration that it is
absurd, given the aim of advice, for advisors not to look at their own evidence
when giving advice.12
12The idea that the practical ‘should’ is in some contexts sensitive to the speaker’s, i.e., the
advisor’s, evidence has been discussed in the literature. See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010),
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), Dowell (2012, 2013).
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However, Advisor’s Evidence faces a problem. Consider the following case:
Police-Reverse. Lester and Kima both know that it was either Omar
or Marlo who killed Bob. Kima was told by her generally very reliable
informant Bubbles that Marlo was at the other end of town at the
time of the murder. Lester knows that Bubbles told this to Kima, but
Lester also knows that Bubbles is mistaken to think that he has seen
Marlo at the other end of town. Lester has not shared this information
with Kima. Kima walks into the room, where Lester is pondering
about the case.
(5) Kima: You should believe that it was Omar.
(5) seems to be false here. One of the reasons is that following it would make
Lester adopt a belief that it is not supported by his own, better evidence. A
parallel example from practical advice should make this even clearer. Imagine
you want to go from St Andrews to Edinburgh by the cheapest mode of transport.
You know that this usually would be by bus, but that the bus company doubled
the price today because of the Edinburgh Festival. Not knowing about this, I tell
you: ‘You should take the bus’. If advice was correct if it was true in light of
the advisor’s evidence, my utterance would be true. Contrary to this, my advice
appears to be clearly false.
Furthermore, it’s certainly not the goal of advisees to have a doxastic attitude
that is supported by their advisor’s evidence, but not supported by their own
information-state, where this information-state is better. It follows that Kima’s
information-state in Police-Reverse is not the one Kima should be talking to
in order to serve the pragmatic purpose of her utterance. However, since she
is apparently not aware that Lester has better evidence than her, she seems
to reasonably intend to speak relative to her own evidence. Police-Reverse
could therefore be the first case we’re encountering in which the information-state
suggested by the pragmatic purpose and the one the advisor reasonably intends
to speak to come apart. If it is the speaker’s reasonable intention that determines
which is the contextually provided information-state and Kima really intends to
speak to her own information-state, then (5) in Police-Reverse is actually true.
I think we can save our intuition that (5) is false in Police-Reverse and avoid
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having to decide between reasonable speaker intentions and pragmatic purpose
as determining the information-state. As I argue in the next subsection, the
contextually provided information-state is the collective information-state, the
information-state that pools the advisor’s and the advisee’s evidence. On this
account, (5) is false in Police-Reverse. Moreover, the account is compatible
with Kima’s intention determining the context’s information-state since Kima
might just as well be intending to speak to this collective information-state when
uttering (5) in Police-Reverse. Since she falsely believes that Lester has no
further relevant evidence on whether it was Omar, she falsely thinks that the
collective information-state supports believing that it was Omar and therefore
utters (5).
Before turning to my preferred account, I’d like to discuss one possible modifica-
tion of Advisor’s Evidence. On this version of it, the advisory information-state
is the information-state of an advisor who is better informed than the advisee.
Kima’s information-state in Police-Reverse couldn’t be the information-state
that, according to this account, (5) in Police-Reverse is relativized to, since
Kima is not better informed than Lester. However, what would the advisory
information-state be instead? If there was none, (5) would have no content. But if
(5) is false, it must have content. In conclusion, the refined version of Advisor’s
Evidence must also tell us what the advisory information-state is where the
advisor is not better informed. Here is such an account:
Better-Informed Evidence. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should
have D to P ’ is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much i
supports P , where i is the information-state of the advisor if the advisor is better
informed and that of the advisee S if the advisee is better informed.
Better-Informed Evidence gives us the correct result for all the cases discussed
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so far. It is not without difficulties either, though. The following case shows this:
Police-Equals. Kima only knows that either Marlo or Omar killed
Bob. Lester only knows that either Omar or Avon Barksdale killed
Bob. Kima says to Lester:
(8) Kima: You should suspend judgement on whether it was Omar
who killed Bob.
The first problem is that Better-Informed Evidence does not determine an
advisory information-state for (8). Kima’s and Lester’s evidence are equally
good, so neither information-state is better than the other. We could fix Better-
Informed Evidence by stipulating that in cases of ties either the advisor’s or
the advisee’s information-state is the advising one. One problem with this is
that I’m a bit at loss to see which of the one to choose. Choosing either seems
arbitrary.
Second, if we chose either of them, (8) turns out true. Both information-
states support suspending judgement about whether it was Omar since on either
information-state it could as well have been someone else (Marlo or Avon Barks-
dale). However, there’s good reason to believe that (8) is false. It is bad advice.
Kima seems not to be interested in what Lester’s evidence concerning the case
is. To give advice to someone without first checking whether they might have
evidence that could put one in an epistemically better position to give advice is
arguably wrong.
Third, Better-Informed Evidence requires making precise what makes an
information-state ‘better’ than another one. In Police-Equals, it is easy to
measure the relative quality of the two information-states. Intuitively, they are
equally informative on the issue of who killed Bob. But the more complex, that is,
the more like in the real world, the involved information-states get, the harder it
will be to make comparisons. I’m not saying that this is impossible. But providing
this adds to the complexity of our account of correct epistemic advice. If we could
give a simpler model, this would be preferable.
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5.7 Collectivism
The following account can deal with all these three issues:
Collectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D to
P ’ is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much the collective
evidence supports P .13
The collective evidence is the result of pooling the advisor’s and the advisee’s
evidence. Pooling roughly means combining or putting together the advisor’s and
the advisee’s evidence. The effect is such that where one or both individuals have
evidence the other doesn’t possess, the collective evidence is better-informed than
their respective bodies of evidence. I will discuss different possible ways of pooling
evidence in the next chapter.
Collectivism is superior to Better-Informed Evidence. First, it avoids an
arbitrary choice of one of the information-states in cases where the two are equally
good. In every case, the account simply pools them. Second, on Collectivism,
(8) in Police-Equals is false. The doxastic attitude licensed by the intersection of
Kima’s and Lester’s evidence is believing that it was Omar since the intersection
of the proposition <It was either Omar or Marlo> and the proposition <It was
either Omar or Avon Barksdale> is the proposition <It was Omar>. The account
also makes sure that in order to give true epistemic advice, the advisor is urged to
look at the advisee’s information-state, and not only their own information-state,
before giving advice. This includes cases where the advisee’s information-state is
actually better than the advisor’s, but also cases such as Police-Equals where
the information-states are equally good. Third, it avoids the problem of how to
measure the quality of information-states, since it combines the two information-
states, rather than compares them.
Collectivism also has none of the problems any of the other mentioned
accounts have. Unlike Subjectivism and Available Evidence, it includes
the advisor’s evidence into the advisory information-state. Thus, (5) is true
13A related account is considered by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and supported by
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 13) for the truth-conditions of practical advice. While Bjrnsson and
Finlay only discuss examples of practical advice, Steve Finlay told me in personal communication
that they consider their view as applying to epistemic advice, too. The present paper can be
seen as taking up the task of defending their view as it applies to epistemic advice.
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in Police-New and Police-Disappears according to Collectivism, which is
what we want. Unlike Objectivism, it allows for the truth of epistemic-advice
sentences that recommend doxastic attitudes other than (dis)belief, since it does
not postulate that the advisory information-state is always the fully realistic
one. Finally, unlike Advisor’s Evidence, it doesn’t make an epistemic-advice
sentence true if it is true in light of the information-state of an advisor that is
less-informed than their advisee since Collectivism also includes the advisee’s
evidence into the advisory information-state.
Finally, Collectivism is supported by metasemantic considerations. The
epistemic goal of deliberating agents is to adopt the best-informed doxastic
attitude to P possible. As explained in section 5.3, this cannot be the goal of
believing all truths since otherwise advice to adopt doxastic attitudes other than
belief or disbelief could never be considered help with respect to deliberating
agents’ epistemic goals. Furthermore, because advisees want to tap into their
advisor’s evidence, it is their goal to adopt a doxastic attitude supported by
an information-state containing both the evidence that they possess and that
possessed by their advisor. Finally, in cases where the advisee’s information-
state contains further relevant evidence that the advisor’s does not, the doxastic
attitude supported by the advisor’s, but not the advisee’s, information-state can
hardly be called best-informed. Advisees want to tap into their advisor’s evidence,
but if they have further relevant evidence, they obviously don’t want to ignore
this when forming their doxastic attitude to P . We can respect all this if we
assume that the epistemic goal of deliberating agents is to adopt the doxastic
attitude that is supported by the collective information-state. The pragmatic
purpose of epistemic advice therefore requires advisors to speak relative to this
information-state, and they accordingly intend to speak to it if they are reasonable.
That these two contextual features suggest that the collective evidence is the
information-state provided by contexts of epistemic advice provides metasemantic
support for Collectivism.
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5.8 Resolving Turri’s Puzzle about Withholding
I have argued that the collective doxastic ‘should’ is the ‘should’ occurring in
epistemic advice.14 This is philosophically noteworthy because it fills a gap
in the literature concerning the truth-conditions of epistemic-advice sentences.
Furthermore, understanding what it means to give correct epistemic advice also
helps us to better understand the practice of giving epistemic advice, which has
so far been overlooked in the literature.
Apart from these rather big-picture considerations, I think that Collectivism
also has a more concrete philosophical cash value. It can solve a puzzle that John
Turri desribes in his paper ‘A Puzzle about Withholding’, surrounding the case
WM mentioned above. The puzzle arises from three assumptions, which he takes
to be common in epistemology:15
• Triad : For every proposition P that a subject S considers, S can adopt
three and only three doxastic attitudes towards P : believe it, disbelieve it,
or withhold.16
• Optimism: Given any proposition P and any body of evidence E, E will
justify at least one doxastic attitude towards P .
• Evidential Propriety17: The epistemic propriety of a subject’s doxastic
attitude is entirely a function of the subject’s evidence.
These three assumptions come into conflict in WM:
Withholding mathematicians (WM). One hundred eminent math-
ematicians discuss, outside of your earshot, whether a certain axiom
14A longer, self-standing version of the present section has been published under the title
‘Resolving Turri’s Puzzle about Withholding’ in dialectica (vol. 70, issue 2).
15In the following, I will refer to the set of these views as ‘the three assumptions’.
16One might object to this assumption that it ignores credences, i.e., more fine-grained doxastic
attitudes. If one thinks that not every credence is an instance of one of the coarse-grained
doxastic attitudes, belief, disbelief or withholding, one will deny Triad and claim that besides the
three coarse-grained doxastic attitudes, a subject could also adopt some credence to a proposition.
However, this objection does not undermine the following discussion. Turri’s puzzle arises in
a similar way if one reads the three assumptions only as claims about coarse-grained doxastic
attitudes, and not as claims about all doxastic attitudes in general.
17Turri (2012) actually calls this assumption Evidentialism. I have chosen another term to
avoid confusion with the different position Evidentialism, which I introduced in section 3.2.
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entails a certain claim. Let’s call the proposition that the axiom
entails the claim ‘M ’. After their discussion, they all tell you that you
shouldn’t withhold on M . You have no other evidence regarding M .
Turri (2012: 359) states that the following two claims seem true:
(9) You should not withhold on M in WM.
(10) You should neither believe nor disbelieve M in WM.
Turri’s argument for (9) is concise: “It stands to reason [...] that if all the
Mathematicians say that withholding is not the thing to do, then you shouldn’t
withhold” (ibid.). His argument for (10) rests on Evidential Propriety. Since your
evidence neither supports believing M nor disbelieving M , you should neither
believe nor disbelieve M .
Turri argues that WM creates a puzzle about withholding since it apparently
shows the possibility of an epistemic impasse. An epistemic impasse is a situation
in which one is not permitted to adopt any doxastic attitude to a proposition
P . According to (9), you should not withhold and according to (10), you should
neither believe nor disbelieve. From (9) and (10), Turri concludes that
(11) You are neither permitted to believe or disbelieve M nor permit-
ted to withhold on M in WM.18
Since according to Triad, you can only adopt belief, disbelief or withholding
towards M , you are thus not permitted to adopt any doxastic attitude to M . Thus,
WM is an epistemic impasse. This is incompatible with Optimism. According to
Optimism, given the proposition M and your evidence in WM, there is at least
one doxastic attitude you are justified to adopt to M .
Turri goes through several possibilities of resolving this puzzle by either giving
up Triad, Evidential Propriety or the intuitive verdict that (9) is true.19 He rejects
all of these options and concludes: “None of the proposed solutions to the puzzle
seems fully satisfactory. I, for one, am left puzzled” (ibid.).
I won’t discuss Turri’s arguments against the possible resolutions he considers.
My alternative way of resolving the puzzle should be clear: I claim that (9)
18(11) follows from (9) and (10) if one assumes, as Turri obviously does, that if one should
not do A, one is not permitted to do A. I will challenge this assumption further below.
19He does not consider rejecting Optimism.
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is true because the ‘should’ in it is collective. When the mathematicians are
giving epistemic advice, they talk about what you should believe in light of the
collective evidence. I refer to the proposition expressed by (9) when uttered by
the mathematicians as (9C):
(9C) In light of the collective evidence, you should not withhold on
M .
The ‘should’ in (10), on the other hand, is subjective. Since (9C) does not entail
that you are not permitted not to withhold, (9) and (10) together do not entail
(11).
The reason for this is as follows. That in light of your evidence you should not
do A entails that you are not permitted to do A.20 However, that you should not
do A in light of a body of evidence that contains evidence that you don’t possess
does not entail that you are not permitted to do A, as I will argue for shortly.
That is, the subjective ‘should’ is tied to permission, but the collective ‘should’
isn’t. In other words, (10) entails (11) in combination with (9S), but not (9C):
(9S) In light of your evidence, you should not withhold on M .
(9S) is false. As Turri remarks himself, your evidence neither supports believing
M nor ¬M . Consequently, you should withhold in light of it. You might think
that (9S) is actually true since after the mathematicians uttered (9), you gathered
new evidence supporting that you should not withhold: the experts told you not
to withhold. What speaks against this line of reasoning is that on the natural
picture I am assuming throughout this thesis, which doxastic attitude one should
have to a proposition P in light of a body of evidence E depends on the evidential
support relation between E and P . That the mathematicians uttered (9) is part
of your evidence, but this additional evidence neither supports nor speaks against
M , as can be seen by the fact that we are at a loss to say whether it supports M
20This needs qualification. As explained in chapter 2, ‘should’ is a weak deontic necessity
modals in comparison to the strong deontic modal ‘must’. It is agreed that <S must do A> (in
its subjective sense) entails <S is obliged to do A> and therefore, since obligation is the dual of
permission, that <S must not do A> entails <S is not permitted to do A>. However, ‘should’
is thought to be weaker and not to entail obligation, from which follows that <S should not do
A> might not entail <S is not permitted to do A>. (Harman 1993 is one among many to have
made this point.) I ignore this subtlety here. If ‘should’ is not the dual of ‘is permitted’, Turri
could simply restate the problem in terms of ‘must’.
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or speaks against it. Therefore, even once you have gathered the evidence that the
mathematicians uttered (9), you should withhold on M in light of your evidence.
Now, since (9) in WM is only true in the sense of (9C), but not (9S), WM
does not constitute an epistemic impasse because (9C) and (10) do not entail
(11). To see that such an entailment relation between the collective ‘should’ and
permission does not hold, imagine that you simply formed the belief that M (or
¬M ; which is irrelevant). It seems fairly clear to me that you are not permitted
to do this. You have no evidence supporting M , so you’re arbitrarily choosing a
belief on whether M holds. But arbitrarily choosing beliefs is hardly epistemically
permissible. If it were, it would be OK for you to simply form the belief that the
numbers of stars in the universe is even or that the fair coin you are about to flip
will land heads up. This is so, even if someone else happens to have excellent
evidence that the numbers of stars is in fact even or that the coin will land heads
up. Thus, whether you are permitted or not to adopt a doxastic attitude seems
to be merely a function of your own evidence, but not of that of others. We
have accordingly no reason to assume that the fact that you should not, in the
collective sense, withhold on M entails that you are not permitted to withhold on
M .
A worry one might have about my solution is whether (9) can really be called
advice and whether it is hence plausible to claim that the ‘should’ in it must
therefore be collective. As pointed out in section 5.2, it is widely assumed that
advice requires that advisors intend to give advisees a pro tanto reason to do
whatever they advise them to do. If the mathematicians utter (9), this doesn’t
seem to give you any kind of reason not to withhold on M . It’s not like the
utterance of (9) gives you a pro tanto reason not to withhold, which is then
overridden by another reason. Since it doesn’t change your evidence with respect
to M at all, it is hardly a reason for you to stop withholding on M at all.
These considerations do not only make it doubtful whether (9) is a form of
epistemic advice, but also raise the question of why the mathematicians utter it
in the first place. If they don’t want to advise you, what else are they trying to
achieve? Turri doesn’t tell us more about the case than what is said in WM, so
it is underspecified with respect to the advisors’ intentions. I see two possible
reasons for the mathematicians to utter (8) when it carries its collective meaning
(9C). First, as I explained in section 5.3, the mathematicians can use (9) to simply
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imply that they have evidence that determines whether M is true. Where making
this implication is their sole intention, they do not try to give you a pro tanto
reason not to withhold on M . Under this specification of WM, (9) would not be
epistemic advice, but nonetheless contain the collective doxastic ‘should’.
Second, things in WM could also be as follows. Imagine that what the
mathematicians are, and only are, discussing outside your earshot are the merits
of a recently suggested proof for M and that, so far, M has neither been proved
nor disproved. They can therefore only come to two possible conclusions after
discussing this proof: that you should (collectively) believe M or that you should
keep on withholding on M . They come to conclude that the proof works and that
you should believe M . The crucial point is that they reasonably, but mistakenly,
believe that you know that they have been discussing this proof. Furthermore,
they reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that you have been told by a rival, evil
mathematician that they cannot be trusted and that whatever they say, you should
maintain withholding on M . In such a situation, the (good) mathematicians can
reasonably intend to give you a pro tanto reason not to withhold on M by uttering
(9). They assume that on hearing (9) you get a reason to believe that the collective
evidence supports M because they think that you know that the only options are
that the evidence supports believing or withholding on M and that you therefore
will infer from (9) that they believe that the collective evidence supports M . They
don’t think that you have an all-things-considered reason not to withhold on M
after hearing (9), as they believe that you also have evidence from their rival, evil
mathematician that supports withholding on M and weighs against the reason
they have provided. To conclude, under this second specification of WM, the
good mathematicians can reasonably intend to give you a pro tanto reason not
to withhold on M by uttering (9), and (9) will therefore be reasonable epistemic
advice under these circumstances.21
It is important to notice that my view is compatible with Evidential Propriety.
21You might wonder why I have added an extra complication to this specification by stipulating
that you have been misinformed by a rival, evil mathematician. The reason is that otherwise the
good mathematicians are giving you an all-things-considered, not just a pro tanto, reason not to
withhold by uttering (9). An opponent of my solution to Turri’s puzzle could therefore claim
that the (9) in ‘should’ is in fact subjective, and not collective. Don’t get me wrong: I do believe
that in such a case the ‘should’ is also collective, since (9) is still advice, but I wanted to show
that there is a specification of WM where it is uncontroversial that (9) is both epistemic advice
and contains a collective ‘should’.
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While I claim that which doxastic attitude a subject should adopt, in the collective
sense, is partly a function of evidence that is not the subject’s, I do not deny that
the epistemic propriety of a subject’s doxastic attitude is entirely a function of the
subject’s evidence. I assume that by ‘epistemic propriety’ Turri means something
along the lines of ‘justification’; and whether you are justified in adopting a
doxastic attitude might very well be the same issue as whether you should adopt
it in light of your evidence. However, whether you should adopt it in the collective
sense is another issue and neither entails nor is entailed by whether you are
justified to adopt it. Since my view is furthermore compatible with Triad and
Optimism, it thus resolves the puzzle while accepting both (9) and the three
assumptions.
There are two more reasons why it matters that justification and epistemic
propriety come apart from what one should believe in light of the collective
evidence. First, it allows me to acknowledge the main point Comesan˜a (2013)
makes in his solution to Turri’s puzzle, while maintaining that my solution is
superior to his. Comesan˜a argues that (9) is false since you are not justified in
believing or disbelieving M . He concludes that you are and you are only justified
to withhold on M .
I agree with this last point, but it does not follow that (9) is false, at least if
it means (9C). It is tempting to derive from the fact that you are not justified
to believe or disbelieve M that you should not believe or disbelieve M . This is
indeed a plausible principle if ‘should’ is read subjectively, and we can correctly
derive from it that (9S) is false. However, this principle does not apply where
‘should’ is collective. Thus, Comesan˜a has only shown that (9S), but not that
(9C) is false.
The important difference between Comesan˜a’s view and mine is that Comesan˜a
claims that (9) is wrong. He does so because he only considers a subjective reading
of ‘should’, as his focus on whether you are justified to not withhold on M in
WM indicates. The advantage of my view over Comesan˜a’s is that I can explain
why we intuitively judge (9) to be true: we correctly read it as expressing (9C)
when the mathematicians utter it. On behalf of Comesan˜a, one could suggest the
following alternative, error-theoretic explanation of our judgement that (9) is true:
we read it as expressing (9S) and mistakenly judge it to be true since we wrongly
assume that once the advisors have told us not to withhold, we shouldn’t withhold
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relative to our evidence. My solution has the advantage that it does not have to
posit that we’re making such a relatively simple mistake and is thus more in line
with the assumption that speakers are competent. If this advantage came at the
cost of having to make implausible claims about the meaning of (9), the error
theory might be preferable. However, my arguments in support of Collectivism
have given us good reason to assume that the ‘should’ in (9) is collective.
Second, the distinction between epistemic propriety and the collective ‘should’
also prevents my solution from being subject to the following objection. One
might wonder whether the evidence-sensitivity of ‘should’ does not also imply
that ‘is permitted’ is evidence-sensitive. In this case, ‘is permitted’ can carry a
collective sense, too. This would allow us to infer (11) from (9C) and (10) if (11)
meant:
(11*) In light of the collective evidence, you are not permitted to with-
hold on M , and in light of your evidence, you are not permitted
to believe or disbelieve M .
Personally, I have difficulties hearing ‘is permitted’ as being relativizable to
collective evidence. As suggested above, if it were, someone who knows that a
coin about to be flipped will land heads up could correctly say about a person
who does not know this:
(12) She is permitted to believe that the coin will land heads up.
(12) sounds off to me. In any case, even if (11) could mean (11*), this wouldn’t
make WM an epistemic impasse. Remember that what is problematic about an
epistemic impasse is that it is a situation where there is no doxastic attitude to
a proposition P that would be epistemically proper for the subject. However,
the truth of (11*) does not entail that there is no epistemically proper doxastic
attitude for you in WM. Whether one is justified in adopting a doxastic attitude
might be identical with whether one should, in the subjective sense, adopt it, but
is distinct from whether one should, in the collective sense, adopt it. Analogously,
the fact that in light of some collective evidence, which contains evidence you do
not possess, you are not permitted to withhold on M does not mean that it is not
epistemically proper or justifiable for you to withhold on M .
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5.9 Conclusion
I have argued for Collectivism, the view that epistemic advice of the form ‘You
should adopt doxastic attitude D to proposition P ’ is true iff D to P reflects
how much the combined evidence of the advisor and the advisee supports P .
This reveals a further instance of the information-sensitivity of the doxastic
‘should’: its collective sense. Since no one has so far put forward an account of
the truth-conditions of epistemic-advice sentences, Collectivism fills a gap in
the literature. It also helps us to better understand the so far under-researched
practice of epistemic advice. On top of this, it can solve Turri’s (2012) puzzle
about withholding.
Collectivism can be precisfied in a number of ways. One issue, for example,
is what we understand as the collective evidence. In the next chapter, I will give
an account of how I think Collectivism should be specified.
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Chapter 6
Precisifying Collectivism
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I have proposed Collectivism, the view that when
we are giving epistemic advice, we talk about what our advisees should believe
in light of the collective evidence. Collectivism is a big tent and allows for
different precisifications. In this chapter, I discuss ways in which Collectivism
can be precisified. The purpose of this is to provide a more complete account
of Collectivism, and hence of correct epistemic advice, than I presented in the
previous chapter and to detect open questions that merit further research.
Section 6.2 examines how the advisor’s and the advisee’s evidence is pooled,
i.e., which parts of their evidence go into the collective evidence. Section 6.3
investigates whether (and mostly rejects that) the literature on group justification
can be of any help to precisify Collectivism. Finally, section 6.4 discusses
whether epistemic advice of the form ‘You should believe P ’ is true only if P
is true. I argue that there is no such factivity necessity condition on correct
epistemic advice and that our intuition supporting such a condition is mistaken.
This last insight does not only help us to get a better understanding of correct
epistemic advice, but also defends Collectivism because accepting said intuition
actually pushes us to a view that is incompatible with Collectivism.
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6.2 How to Pool Evidence
The first big question is what exactly the collective evidence is. The collective
evidence is the result of pooling the evidence of the advisor and the advisee. This
is a process that happens not only on the inter-subjective level, i.e., when two
individuals’ evidence is joined together, but also on the intra-subjective level.
When we gather new evidence, we add this new evidence to our old evidence.
Thus, the process of pooling the evidence of two distinct individuals should in
principle not be more mysterious than the process of an individual gathering new
evidence. However, evidence can be pooled in different ways. In this section, I
will discuss the main options, arguing against some of them, but won’t settle
which method of pooling evidence a defendant of Collectivism should go for. I
consider this a task for further research.
How we understand the process of pooling evidence depends on our account
of evidence. As mentioned in chapter 2, on one picture of information-states they
are sets of worlds. The result of pooling two such information-states would be
the intersection of these two sets. Where one agent has evidence the other agent
doesn’t possess, pooling accordingly results in an information-state containing less
worlds than the two agents’ information-states respectively contain. This reflects
that the collective evidence is more informative than the agents’ respective sets
of evidence: it has narrowed down the set of possible worlds that might be the
actual world.
This picture runs into problems in cases where a subject S’s evidence con-
tains a proposition Q and the other subject S∗’s contains its negation ¬Q. The
information-state representing S’s evidence contains only Q-worlds (worlds at
which Q is true) and S∗’s information-state only contains ¬Q-worlds. The inter-
section of these two sets is the empty set.
This problem is avoided on factive accounts of evidence, for example the view
that one’s evidence consists of all and only the propositions one knows.1 Two
bodies of evidence that only contain true propositions cannot contain inconsistent
propositions since the truth is not inconsistent.
However, this does not mean that Collectivism is committed to the factivity
1Tim Williamson (2000: Ch. 9) famously argues that E=K and hence that only true
propositions can be evidence. Littlejohn (2011) argues that evidence is factive, but denies E=K.
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of evidence. The issue of how to merge evidence has recently received attention
among those who apply formal methods to social epistemology, originating from the
literature on judgement aggregation (List and Pettit 2002, 2004). Jon Williamson
(2009, 2015) discusses how to merge evidence where a subject’s evidence is what
is rationally granted by the subject, which can include false propositions. He does
not propose a specific merging operator, but suggests certain constraints on such
an operator.
One operator meeting the suggested constraints adds all and only those
propositions to the collective evidence that are granted by all group members
(Williamson 2015: 57). This seems far too restrictive as it wouldn’t add to the
collective evidence evidence that, for example, a better-informed advisor has, but
a less-informed advisee lacks. This merging operator, therefore, does not represent
the pooling of evidence we’re interested in.
An alternatively proposed operator adds all and only those propositions to
the collective evidence that are not contentious and granted by at least some
members of the group (ibid.: 58). A proposition is contentious, roughly, if there is
disagreement within the group with respect to whether it is part of the evidence
or not. The collective evidence created by this operator includes therefore the
evidence that better-informed advisors possess, but excludes those propositions
Q such that the evidence of one member of the group contains Q, but that of
another member contains ¬Q. Let’s call this process neutral pooling.
I think that neutral pooling is not inclusive enough, and favour the view
that the collective evidence should include a true proposition that is part of one
group member’s evidence even if its negation is part of the other group member’s
evidence. On this view, collective evidence formed from two bodies of evidence E
and E∗ contains a proposition Q if and only if one of the following conditions are
satisfied:
• Q is part of E and E∗
• Q is only part of E (or E∗) and ¬Q is not part of E∗ (or E)
• Q is only part of E (or E∗) and ¬Q is part of E∗ (or E), but Q is true.
Let’s call this truth-sided pooling. To see the different predictions of neutral and
truth-sided pooling, let’s look at the following case.
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Misheard. Bob is about to undergo a very complicated surgery, which
often goes wrong. His doctor Dr Mayer has told him that she’s very
good at this surgery and that she’s unusually successful in performing
it, but Bob has heard from a colleague of Dr Mayer that she sometimes
exaggerates her medical track-record quite a bit. Furthermore, Bob
has overheard one nurse saying to another: ‘Out of 33 surgeries, Dr
Mayer was successful 13 times.’ However, Bob misheard. His partner
Ann, who also eavesdropped on the nurse, heard what he had actually
said: ‘Out of 33 surgeries, Dr Mayer was successful 30 times.’
When Ann visits Bob the next time, the issue of how risky the surgery
is comes up:
(1) Ann: But Dr Mayer said she is very good at this.
(2) Bob: Oh, I don’t know whether I should believe her.
(3) Ann: You should believe her.
Mistaken perception is a plausible candidate for false evidence, so on a non-factive
account of evidence the proposition <The nurse said that 13 of Dr Mayer’s 33
surgeries were successful> is probably part of Bob’s evidence. (Let’s call this
proposition 13/33 in the following). The proposition <The nurse said that 30 of
Dr Mayer’s 33 surgeries were successful> is part of Ann’s evidence. (Let’s call
this proposition 30/33 in the following).
If Ann’s and Bob’s collective evidence is the result of neutral pooling, then (3)
is accordingly false. Ann’s and Bob’s evidence concerning what the nurse said is
inconsistent and therefore both pieces of evidence are removed from the collective
evidence. The remaining evidence is that Dr Mayer said she’s very successful at
this surgery and that one of her colleagues said that she sometimes exaggerates
her medical track-record significantly. This collective evidence arguably does
not support believing that Dr Mayer is very good at this surgery, but rather to
suspend judgement about it. On the other hand, if the collective evidence is the
result of truth-sided pooling, (3) is true since the collective evidence then contains
the true proposition 30/33, but not the false proposition 13/33.
Do we judge (3) to be true in this scenario? What speaks for (3)’s falsehood is
that advisors should first check what their advisee’s evidence is before giving advice
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(with the exception of cases where they know that their evidence is conclusive). If
Ann had asked Bob and found out that he thinks that 13/33, Ann should have
investigated whether her or Bob’s evidence is accurate. Thus, it seems premature
of Ann to utter (3) if there is evidence that Bob possesses that contradicts her
own evidence.
However, it is consistent with Ann’s utterance of (3) being true that it is
premature or irresponsible. We can hit truth by luck. In fact, I tend to believe that
this is what’s going on here. Advisors want to help advisees in their goal of adopting
the best-informed doxastic attitude possible. Hence, Ann is certainly intending to
speak relative to her information that 30/33. Considerations concerning speaker
intentions therefore suggest that this proposition is part of the collective evidence
(and hence that 13/33 isn’t since a body of evidence can’t contain inconsistent
propositions). For the same reasons, the pragmatic purpose of her utterance to
advise Bob, i.e., to assist him with his goal of adopting the best-informed doxastic
attitude possible, is best served if the collective evidence contains this crucial
information. Thus, (3) is true. The reason that uttering (3) is premature is that
Ann didn’t check whether Bob doesn’t have any true evidence that contradicts
her own, which she needed to do in order to know that (3) is true.
Things get even more complicated if information-states are not sets of worlds,
but a probability distribution over a set of propositions.2 Now, for any proposition
that both parties’ information-states assign a probability, the question arises
which probability this proposition is assigned by the information-state representing
the collective evidence. For example, if S’s information-state determines that
PrS(P ) = 0.2 and S
∗’s information-state determines that PrS∗(P ) = 0.8, what
probability should the collective evidence represented by PrC assign to P?
One natural idea would be to split the difference between the two, such that
PrC(P ) = 0.5. However, similar reasoning applies here as when transforming
inconsistent evidence into a collective body of evidence. Ann’s information-state,
if modelled as a probability function, will assign a high probability to 30/33, while
Bob’s information-state will assign it a low probability. The idea that Ann intends
to speak relative to her (indeed) better evidence would have to be accounted
for by the collective evidence being represented by a probability function that
2For this suggestion, see Yalcin (2011: 299), Wedgwood (forthcoming: sec. 3), and Carr
(2015: 704).
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assigns the proposition in question a high probability. A pooling operator with
the following property would respect this: for any proposition P and two subjects
S and S∗, where PrS(P ) 6= PrS∗ , PrC(P ) equals that of the two probability
assignments PrS(P ) and PrS∗(P ) that is the result of a more veridical credence
revision.
What I mean by ‘veridical’ is best explained within the model of Bayesianism.
According to Bayesianism, credence revision consists in two steps: an initial
revision of one’s credence in a proposition E caused through some external stimulus,
e.g., perception, and then a revision of one’s credences in other propositions
through conditionalizing on E (Weisberg 2011: ch. 3.3). On Jeffrey Bayesianism,
the credence one assigns to E can be short of 1, as we are assuming if we
model bodies of evidence as probability distributions that assign probabilities to
propositions other than 1 or 0 (Jeffrey 1983: ch. 11).
Two factors determine how veridical a revision of one’s credence in P is. First,
it is the more veridical, the more the initial revision that triggered it was hooked
to reality. For example, increasing one’s credence in E on basis of having perceived
that E is more verdicial than doing so on basis of hallucinating that E. Second, it
is the more veridical, the more the conditional probability Pr(P |E) used for strict
conditionalization (or the corresponding formula for Jeffrey conditionalization)
represents something like the objective probability of P on E. For example, a
probability function that assigns a low probability to the conditional proposition
<I will win the lottery|I bought a lottery ticket> is more veridical than one that
assigns it a high probability.
These ideas for how to pool probabilistic information-states are only sketches
of a full account. Furthermore, the arguments I present in favour of truth-sided or
veridical pooling might turn out to fail and a more neutral approach that doesn’t
judge whose evidence is better might be the way to go for pooling evidence.
Working out a more definitive account of Collectivism is an interesting avenue
for further research.
6.3 Group Justification and Group Knowledge
As we have seen in the previous section, Collectivism leaves room for precisi-
fication since we can have different accounts of what the collective evidence is.
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Another way to precisify Collectivism is to approach the issue through the lense
of accounts of group knowledge or group justification. The key suggestion would
be the following one:
Group-Justification Collectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA,
‘S should have D to P ’ is true at cA iff the group is justified to have D to P .
A knowledge-version of this would state:
Group-Knowledge Collectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S
should believe P ’ is true at cA iff the group would come to know P if it believed
P .
The idea is to recruit the rich literature on group justification and knowledge to
give a more specific account of Collectivism. The suggestion is natural since
Collectivism states that advisees should believe what the collective evidence
supports and it is plausible to assume that this is what the group is justified
to believe or knows. In this section, I will argue that the current accounts of
knowledge and group justification are not very suitable candidates for this purpose.
However, I show that future research on Collectivism can nonetheless benefit
from the debate about group justification, in particular Lackey’s (ms) recent
contribution.
One decision point for someone who wants to make use of this literature for
our present purposes is to choose between Group-Justification and Group-
Knowledge Collectivism. In the next section, I argue against the idea that
‘You should believe P ’ as a piece of epistemic advice is true only if P is true.
This would obviously count against Group-Knowledge Collectivism since
knowledge is factive. For this reason, I will focus here on Group-Justification
Collectivism
Goldman and Blanchard (2015: sec. 4.3) notice that so far there aren’t many
detailed accounts of group justification in the social epistemology literature. In the
following, I distinguish three different proposals. First, there is what Lackey (ms)
calls Summativism. This is the view that group justification is solely determined
by the justified beliefs of its members. The most detailed instance of this view
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is, according to Lackey (ms), Goldman’s (2014) social-process reliabilism, which
states the following:
Social Process Reliabilism. “If a group belief in P is aggregated based on
a profile of member attitudes toward P , then (ceteris paribus) the greater the
proportion of members who justifiedly believe P and the smaller the proportion
of members who justifiedly reject P , the greater the group’s level, or grade, of
justifiedness in believing P” (Goldman 2014: 28).
One first issue with this is that it takes doxastic, rather than propositional,
justification of group members as input to calculate the group’s justification.3
This would make what an advisee should believe dependent on what they and the
advisor believe, and not just what the two are propositionally justified to believe.
This doesn’t fit with Collectivism as the latter refers to the group members’
evidence, so to what they are justified to believe, and not just what they justifiably
believe for the right reasons. The latter is a subset of the former, so a view that
makes what an advisee should collectively believe only dependent on the group
members’ doxastic justification leaves out important information, in the eyes of
Collectivism. Just think about a scenario in which evidence supporting P stares
the advisor in the face, i.e., they are propositionally justified to believe P , but
they don’t happen to actually believe P . If we plug Goldman’s definition of group
justification into Group-Justification Collectivism, we would end up with the
implausible claim that the advisor’s evidence for P is irrelevant to whether their
advisee should collectively believe P .
We could fix Social Process Reliabilism for our purposes by substituting
‘who have propositional justification to believe (reject) P ’ for ‘who justifiedly
believe (reject) P ’ in its formulation. However, this rephrasing is not capable of
alleviating the following problem: the principle is too ‘neutral’ in the sense that
it gives each member’s propositional justification equal weight. It would predict
that Ann’s utterance of (3) is false since it advocates that we have to aggregate
3One reason that this and other accounts of group justification focus on doxastic rather than
propositional justification might be that the social epistemology literature has in the past mostly
focused on providing an account of group belief (Goldman and Blanchard 2015: sec. 4.1-4.2).
From this point, asking what additional property such a belief needs in order to be justified
might be the more natural next step.
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Bob’s justification to reject 30/33 and Ann’s justification to believe 30/33. This
aggregation yields that the group consisting of Ann and Bob is neither justified
to believe nor justified to reject this proposition.
A way to respond to this is to point out that, since Goldman’s notion of
justification is reliabilist, Ann and Bob aren’t actually equally justified: Ann’s
belief is the product of perception, a reliable belief-forming process, whereas Bob’s
belief is the product of hallucination. Thus, Ann’s belief is more justified and the
group is therefore justified to believe the proposition in question. The problem is
that reliabilism is an account of doxastic, and not propositional justification, which
gets us back into the problem with Social Process Reliabilism we started with.
A second family of accounts of group justification falls under Lackey’s (ms)
label Non-Summativism. Such views see group justification as detached from
the justification of the group’s members. An example is Schmitt’s (1994: 265)
following view:
Joint Acceptance. “A group G is justified in believing [P ] just in case G has
good reason to believe, where G has reason [R] to believe [P ] just in case all
members of G would properly express openly a willingness to accept [R] jointly
as the group’s reason to believe [P ].”
Against this, Lackey (ms) argues that openly accepting reasons for believing P
cannot be a necessary condition on group justification for believing P . She gives
the example of the board members of Philip Morris who all have good evidence and
thus justification for believing that smoking is unhealthy, but who aren’t willing
to publicly accept the relevant evidence. Joint Acceptance predicts that Philip
Morris is therefore not justified in believing that smoking is unhealthy, which is
absurd. For the same reasons, Joint Acceptance is not a good candidate for
specifying Collectivism. Whether an advisor’s advice to believe a proposition is
true should not depend on non-epistemic issues like the group members’ practical
reasons for and against accepting certain evidence in public.
Finally, there is Lackey’s (ms) own account:
Group Epistemic Agent. A group, G, justifiedly believes that P iff
(i) a significant percentage of the operative members of G (a) justifiedly believe
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that P , and (b) are such that adding together the bases of their justified
beliefs that P yields a belief set that is coherent, and
(ii) full disclosure of the evidence relevant to the proposition that P , accompanied
by rational deliberation among the members of G in accordance with their
individual and group epistemic normative requirements, would not result in
further evidence that, when added to the bases of G’s members’ beliefs that
P , yields a total belief set that fails to make probable that P .4
The account has both summativist and non-summativist elements. Condition (i)
makes group justification dependent on its members’ justified beliefs, whereas
condition (ii) adds the non-summativist idea that a justified group belief that
P must survive a hypothetical deliberation of the group about its evidence on
P . The first thing to notice is that Lackey’s account, just like Social Process
Reliabilism, focuses on the group members’ doxastic, rather than propositional
group justification. This can be fixed by replacing ‘justifiedly believes’ with ‘has
propositional justification to believe’ Group Epistemic Agent. Second, the
thusly corrected account still has an issue since it is too neutral. It requires
that a significant percentage of the group members have justification to believe
P . In cases where an epistemic advisor correctly recommends believing P to
a less-informed advisee who isn’t justified to believe P , only 50% of the group
believes P , which would probably not be considered as ‘significant’. Even if it
was, in cases where we have not just one, but several advisees the percentage of
group members with justification to believe P will be much lower than 50%.
Despite these problems with using Group Epistemic Agent for the purpose
of precisifying Collectivism, it also provides some resources that can help with
this. Condition (ii) states that group justification for believing P requires that if
the members were to publicly share and discuss the evidence they all individually
got, they wouldn’t end up with a body of evidence that doesn’t license believing
P .5 Such a hypothetical public comparison of evidence could be a promising
model of how to pool information-states in a truth-sided or veridical manner since
it addresses the issues of how to handle inconsistent evidence. The proposal is
that if a group has an (ideal) public discussion about its members’ evidence, it
4This is, almost verbatim, Goldman’s (2015: sec. 4.3) statement of Lackey’s position.
5Hakli (2011) puts a similar constraint on group justification.
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weeds out inconsistency in the evidence in favour of the better (true) evidence.
To sum up, recruiting the accounts of group justification currently on the
market for the purpose of precisifying Collectivism proves difficult. One of
the main reasons for this is that some of these accounts start with the group
members’ doxastic justification, which leaves out important evidence which actually
determines what an advisee should collectively believe. However, Lackey’s (ms)
account might help with getting clearer on how to pool evidence. It is here where
further research on Collectivism could benefit most from the group justification
literature.
6.4 Is Epistemic Advice Factive?
6.4.1 The Factivity Necessity Condition
In this final section, I want to examine whether there is a factivity necessity
condition (FNC) on correct epistemic advice. What I mean by this is whether
‘You should believe P ’ is true at a context of epistemic advice only if P is true.
Note that this proposal is distinct from Objectivism, which I have rejected in
the previous chapter. First, on Objectivism, ‘You should believe P ’ is true at a
context of advice if (and only if) P is true. The proponent of an FNC, however,
claims that truth of P is only necessary, not that it is also sufficient for ‘You
should believe P ’ to be true. Second, the proposal that there is an FNC on correct
epistemic advice does not have the absurd consequence of Objectivism that
epistemic advice is only correct if the recommended doxastic attitude is belief
or disbelief. The proposal does not apply to advice to have a doxastic attitude
other than belief or disbelief since it only concerns sentences of the form ‘S should
believe P ’.
I will argue that there is no FNC on correct epistemic advice. This insight
is important for two reasons. First, it gives us more details on what a correct
account of the truth-conditions of epistemic-advice sentences looks like (or better:
does not look like). Second, as I explain in subsection 6.4.2, if one accepts an FNC,
one should also accept a factivity sufficiency condition on correct epistemic advice.
Since accepting such a condition and FNC would commit one to Objectivism,
it is thus important for defending Collectivism to show that no FNC applies to
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correct epistemic advice.
An FNC seems to be supported by intuition:
Police-False. Detective Lester Freamon is pondering about who
killed Bob. His evidence is conflicting: it might either have been Omar
or Marlo, but it must have been one of them. He looks at his colleague
Kima Greggs, who has just entered the room. Unbeknownst to Lester,
Kima has solid evidence that it was Omar: her reliable informant
Bubbles told her that Marlo was at the other end of town at the time
of the murder. However, Bubbles was mistaken, it wasn’t Marlo who
he saw at the other end of town. In fact, Marlo killed Bob.
(4) Kima: You should believe that it was Omar.
I believe many hear (4) as false because the belief that Kima recommends is false.
Lester should not believe that it was Omar simply because he would then believe
something false. Furthermore, if the aim of epistemic advice is to benefit the
advisee epistemically, (4) must be bad advice since, if followed, the advisee would
end up with something epistemically bad, i.e., a false belief. Assuming that bad
advice is false advice, we can conclude that (4) is false.
I doubt that (4) is false, and I will present reasons for this in subsections
6.4.3 and 6.4.4. Before turning to this, let me quickly point out that Collec-
tivism could account for an FNC. For example, we could specify it such that
it becomes equivalent to Group-Knowledge Collectivism, which I mentioned
in the previous section. This specification can be achieved by stipulating that
the collective evidence is the counterfactual knowledge of the group, i.e., what
the group would know if they believed it, and that believing a proposition P
only accurately reflects an information-state i if P is fully supported by i.6 Since
knowledge is factive, ‘You should believe P ’ is only true on this account if P is
true.
6I have used the same method in subsection 3.4.1 to show that the knowledge norm can be
integrated into Doxastic Should. There I also explain what I mean by ‘full support’.
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6.4.2 The Factivity Sufficiency Condition
As it turns out, our intuition does not only support that truth of P is necessary
for ‘S should believe P ’ to be true, but also that it is sufficient. Consider this
case:
Police-True. Everything is as in Police-False. However, Kima is
mischievous and wants to mislead Lester:
(5) Kima: You should believe that it was Marlo.
As we know, but Kima doesn’t, it was in fact Marlo. Just as (4) sounds false,
(5) rings somewhat true. Lester should believe that it was Marlo; after all, it’s
the truth. We can also give an argument for (5)’s truth that is analogous to
the one we have considered for (5)’s falsity. If the aim of epistemic advice is to
epistemically benefit the advisee, then uttering (5) is good epistemic advice since
following it makes Lester adopt a true belief. Furthermore, since good epistemic
advice is true, (5) is true.
Thus, there is not only intuitive support for an FNC, but also for a factivity
sufficiency condition (FSC) on correct epistemic advice, i.e., the condition that
‘You should believe P ’ is true at a context of epistemic advice if P is true. But if
there is both a factivity necessity and sufficiency condition on correct epistemic
advice, i.e., if truth of P is both sufficient and necessary for ‘S should believe P ’
to be true, we end up with the following claim:
Belief Objectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should believe
P ’ is true at cA iff P is true.
Note that this is different from Objectivism:
Objectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D to P ’
is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much the fully realistic
information-state supports P .
Objectivism entails that correct advice can only recommend belief or disbelief
since only these are doxastic attitudes that are licensed by the fully realistic
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information-state. Belief Objectivism, on the other hand, only applies to
sentences of the form ‘S should believe P ’ and does not give us the truth-conditions
for epistemic-advice sentences recommending doxastic attitudes other than belief
or disbelief.
Thus, someone can respect both intuitions supporting an FNC and an FSC
on correct epistemic advice, without buying into seriously flawed Objectivism.
However, Belief Objectivism is not sufficiently general because it does not
provide the truth-conditions for epistemic advice concerning doxastic attitudes
other than belief or disbelief. I think the best someone can do who accepts Belief
Objectivism is to combine it with Collectivism in the following gerrymandered
account:
Split. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D to P ’ is true at
cA iff (i) if D = belief or disbelief that P , then having D to P accurately reflects
how much the fully realistic information-state supports P , and (ii) if D 6= belief or
disbelief that P , then having D to P accurately reflects how much the collective
evidence supports P .
As the reader can see, Split is different from Collectivism in that on Col-
lectivism ‘S should believe P ’ is not true iff P , but depending on whether
the collective evidence licenses believing P . While Collectivism can be pre-
cisified such that the collective evidence can’t support a false proposition (see
Group-Knowledge Collectivism), it can’t be precisified such that the collec-
tive evidence always supports the target proposition P if it is true. Unfortunately,
we are often in situations where we lack evidence supporting what’s true.
Thus, if we want to respect the intuitions supporting an FNC and an FSC
on correct epistemic advice, we are committed to Belief Objectivism. The
best alternative to Objectivism if one wants one’s account to be consistent with
Belief Objectivism is Split. This is a problem for Collectivism because it is
incompatible with Split.
I see two main problems with Split. First, it breaks with any of the other
accounts suggested so far on a very important point. All of these accounts present
us with one advisory information-state, whereas Split states that there are two.
On Split, there is thus technically not one ‘should’ of epistemic advice, but rather
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two. One for epistemic advice to believe or disbelieve, relativized to the fully
realistic information-state; one for epistemic advice to suspend judgement or to
adopt a credence that doesn’t correspond to belief or disbelief, relativized to the
collective evidence.
What is unappealing about this is that it is at odds with the assumption
that the pragmatic purpose of an utterance determines the contextually provided
information-state. Split breaks with this since it entails that one kind of pragmatic
purpose, epistemic advice, can determine two different kinds of information-states.
Now, the defender of Split could say that there is not one pragmatic purpose
here, but two: that of epistemically advising to believe or disbelieve and that of
epistemically advising to suspend judgement or adopt a credence. However, I
think we are owed an explanation of why, first, in the case of epistemic advice
the pragmatic purpose is broken up into sub-categories, and why, second, it is
particularly broken up into belief/disbelief vs. suspending/credences. After all,
the usual classification of doxastic attitudes is into coarse-grained (belief, disbelief,
suspension) vs. fine-grained ones (credences).
Second, when constructing semantic theories, we often face a trade-off between
simplicity and capturing our intuitions. Weatherson (2003) has argued that such a
trade-off occurs between the JTB-analysis of ‘knowledge’ and an analysis that can
account for Gettier cases. While the latter would validate more of our intuitions
concerning knowledge-ascription, the JTB-analysis is simpler. He then draws on
David Lewis’ theory of meaning, according to which the meanings of terms must be
both natural, which includes being simple, and must fit our use of the term, which
is reflected in validating our intuitions. Weatherson argues that the JTB-analysis
strikes a better balance between naturalness and use, i.e., simplicity and intuitive
accuracy, than accounts sensitive to Gettier cases because the JTB-analysis is
much simpler. Similarly, we can argue that Split is more intuitively accurate,
but that Collectivism should, on balance, be preferred, since it is significantly
simpler.
To sum up, Split is quite unattractive. This leaves us with the conundrum
that our intuitions support Belief Objectivism but that there seems no plausible
account that it is compatible with it. As a way out of this, I argue in the next
subsection that these intuitions are mistaken and thereby defend Collectivism.
This argument should also satisfy those readers who might not have been very
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convinced by the Weatherson-style argument and think that Split is better than
Collectivism. If we have an account like Collectivism on the table, the only
reason for going for a gerrymandered account like Split would be that the latter
is more extensionally accurate since it predicts the truth-values of (4) and (5)
correctly. This reason will be refuted if I can show that the intuitions supporting
an FNC and FSC are mistaken.
6.4.3 Two Arguments against Factivity Intuitions
First, it would be ad hoc to postulate that ‘S should believe P ’ is true iff P when it
is used for epistemic advice, but that this isn’t the case when it is used for certain
other purposes, even though all these purposes are pursued in circumstances of
epistemic uncertainty. Take the following case of Skaiste, who is deliberating
about what to believe with respect to proposition P :
(6) Skaiste: While I can’t be certain that P , the best explanation for
phenomenon Y is P . Thus, I should believe P .
I want you to pay attention to the following things. First, (6) sounds absolutely
fine. Second, it is the result of doxastic deliberation. Third, the ‘should’ in it is
arguably subjective. Whether ‘I should believe P ’ is true in the context of (6)
depends on whether Skaiste’s information-state supports P since we assume that
there is no one she’s talking to, i.e., there is no collective evidence the ‘should’
in (6) could be relativized to. Finally, the sentence seems true despite the fact
that Skaiste’s information-state does not entail P , but only abductively supports
it.7 My point is that doxastic deliberation is done from a perspective of epistemic
uncertainty. It often involves deciding what to believe about whether P in light of
non-omniscient evidence, which allows both for P being true and false. In other
words, responsibly forming a belief does not require infallibility. The upshot is
that figuring out what one should believe about P in doxastic deliberation does
not require figuring out what is supported by the fully realistic information-state.
Now, when giving epistemic advice, advisors are facing the same problems sub-
jects who are doxastically deliberating face: epistemic uncertainty about whether
the respective proposition P holds. True, there is (according to Collectivism)
7We’re assuming that what Skaiste says about her epistemic situation is correct.
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a higher demand on them than on Skaiste: they need not just figure out what
their personal evidence supports, but what the combined evidence of them and
their advisee supports. However, such a joint body of evidence often leaves open
the possibility that the proposition it supports is false. A defender of Split needs
to explain why while both kind of agents, doxastic deliberators and epistemic
advisors, are faced with epistemic uncertainty, only epistemic advisors need to
know what’s supported by the fully realistic information-state.
Second, as I have already pointed out in the discussion of Objectivism in
the previous chapter, we seem to have intuitions about sentences of the form ‘S
should believe P ’ in contexts of epistemic advice even if we are not told whether
the relevant target proposition is true or not. Police is an example for this. Just
like Objectivism, Split has more difficulty explaining this than Collectivism
does.
So far, I have not engaged with the arguments that (5) is true because it is
good advice and (4) false because it is bad advice. In reply, I reject that (5) is
good advice and (4) bad advice. In general, the idea that telling someone that he
should believe P is good advice just as long as P is true and bad advice if P is
false is too simplistic. Take the following analogy from football: a shot can be
good, i.e., skilful, even if it does not achieve the ideal of football, that is, if the
player doesn’t score. Similarly, a shot can be bad or unskilful even if the player
scores. I think that the same is true of advice. Even if I tell you to do A and if
you did A, the aim of advice, that is, benefiting you, would be achieved, this can
still be bad advice. In a case where our evidence does not support doing A, but
doing A would actually benefit you, telling you to do A cannot be deemed good
advice since only by luck does following the advice benefit you. Rather, giving
you such advice is reckless of me. On the other hand, telling you to do A, when
doing A won’t benefit you, but our evidence clearly indicates that it will benefit
you, is good, sensible advice, which unfortunately, without any fault of mine, will
not benefit you.
6.4.4 Explaining Away Factivity Intuitions
While I might have shown that it’s not the case that (4) is false in Police-
False and (5) true in Police-True, I have not provided an explanation why our
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intuitions are wrong in these cases.
Explaining away these intuitions is just an instance of solving a general puzzle
that Doxastic Contextualism, but also contextualism about other terms such as
other deontic modals or predicates of taste, have to solve. Take the following
schematic case:8
Disagreement. Sam’s information-state supports doing A. Sam
utters:
(7) Sam: I should do A.
Unexpectedly, Nadia shows up. Her and Sam’s evidence combined
supports that Sam shouldn’t do A. She utters:
(8) Nadia: You should not do A.
Nadia and Sam seem to be in disagreement. This is hard to explain on an
information-sensitive contextualist semantics, at least given the traditional as-
sumption that two speakers are in disagreement only if the sentences they uttered
are inconsistent. According to contextualism, (7) and (8) are not inconsistent.
The ‘should’ in (7) expresses the subjective sense and the ‘should’ in (8) the
collective sense of ‘should’.
Our intuition that (4) in Police-False is false and (5) in Police-True is
true is just an instance of this general problem. To see this, consider that we
cannot only get disagreement between two speakers in an (imagined) case, but
also between a speaker in a case and a theorist evaluating the speaker’s utterance.
Consider again Police-False:
Police-False. Detective Lester Freamon is pondering about who
killed Bob. His evidence is conflicting: it might either have been Omar
or Marlo, but it must have been one of them. He looks at his colleague
Kima Greggs, who has just entered the room. Unbeknownst to Lester,
Kima has solid evidence that it was Omar: her reliable informant
Bubbles told her that Marlo was at the other end of town at the time
8This is an abstraction of Miners-unexpected, a variation of the Miners case, which is
described by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 123). I will discuss it in more detail in subsection
7.3.1.
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of the murder. However, Bubbles was mistaken, it wasn’t Marlo who
he saw at the other end of town. In fact, Marlo killed Bob.
(4) Kima: You should believe that it was Omar.
As mentioned, many would hear (4) as false. Imagine you belong to this group
and would react somewhere along the following lines:
(T-4) You: (4) is false. Lester should not believe that it was Omar.
After all, it was Marlo.
Kima uttering (4) and you (T-4) is a form of disagreement.
In the next chapter, I will address the problem that disagreement causes
for Doxastic Contextualism in more detail. I will argue, with Finlay (2014),
that there is actually no disagreement where speakers are talking relative to
different information-states and that they suffer from semantic blindness when
they think so. When evaluating should-sentences, we sometimes make the mistake
of evaluating the sentence not by evaluating the proposition actually expressed by
it, but the proposition the sentence would express in our context. In cases such as
Disagreement, a better-informed speaker like Nadia (sometimes) focuses on her
own epistemic perspective, which makes her overlook the relativization of Sam’s
utterance to Sam’s information-state. Focusing on what would be best for Sam,
Nadia suffers from a “benign kind of confusion” (Finlay 2014: 241) and wrongly
evaluates Sam’s sentence ‘I should do A’ in light of her, better information-state.
I argue that the same goes on when someone hears (4) as false in Police-False
and (5) as true in Police-True. Many, when presented with cases whose descrip-
tion include the truth-value of the target proposition, ‘overlook’ the relativization
of doxastic-should sentences for the purpose of advice to the collective evidence,
and go straight for an objective reading of (4) or (5). A reason for this could be
that those with such intuitions have Lester’s interest in true beliefs in mind, and
thus focus on what would be a correct belief for him to hold, i.e., on what he
should believe in the objective sense of ‘should’.
Explaining our factivity intuitions away as a form of semantic confusion is
therefore not ad hoc, but rather part and parcel of a comprehensive contextualist
account of dealing with disagreement. Just as ordinary speakers get confused by
the context-sensitivity of ‘should’, so do theorists like us.
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One could object that while it might be plausible that ordinary speakers suffer
from semantic confusion, theorists who are familiar with the context-sensitivity of
‘should’ should be educated enough to avoid this. I have two replies.
First, as Bealer (1998: 208) argues, one’s intuition that P can survive even if
one comes to believe on basis of rational arguments that ¬P . Even though we
know that the comprehension axiom of nave set theory is false, it still seems correct
to us. Similarly, it can be argued that the trained semanticist or philosopher
might still have the intuition that (4) is false in Police-False, even though she
has been convinced that it is in fact true.
Second, our intuitions concerning the truth-values of should-sentences are
actually quite sensitive to argumentation (Finlay 2014: 242). Take your statement
(T-4). It seems easy to get you to retract this claim and agree that (4) is in fact
true by confronting you with the following argument:
You’re right that it would have been best for Lester not to believe
that it was Omar. But given Kima’s (and Lester’s) evidence, believing
that it is Omar is certainly what they should do!
That the intuitions of some that (4) is false in Police-False and (5) true in
Police-True are that easy to manipulate is further evidence that they are a result
of semantic blindness.
6.5 Conclusion
In the previous chapter, I have argued for Collectivism, the view that epistemic
advice of the form ‘You should adopt doxastic attitude D to proposition P ’ is
true iff the combined evidence of the advisor and the advisee licenses D to P .
In this chapter, I have examined Collectivism and its possible precisfications
further. The first question I addressed is what we understand as the collective
evidence. I have argued for a view of collective evidence that is either factive
or at least truth-sided, i.e., that favours true evidence over false evidence (or
more veridical over less veridical probability distributions) when the advisor’s
and advisee’s evidence is pooled. Furthermore, I have expressed scepticism about
utilizing accounts of group justification and knowledge for the purpose of making
Collectivism more precise, with the exception of Lackey’s account of group
170
justification (ms). Finally, I have rejected the idea that epistemic advice of the
form ‘You should believe P ’ is true only if P is true. This was important in order
to defend Collectivism since respecting the intuition supporting such a factivity
necessity condition on correct epistemic advice would push us to a view that is
incompatible with Collectivism.
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Chapter 7
The Relativist Challenge
7.1 Introduction
In this final substantial chapter, I present answers to relativist challenges to
Doxastic Contextualism. These challenges are based on the kind of objections
relativists direct at contextualist semantics for the information-sensitivity of the
practical ‘should’ and of epistemic modals. As it is easier to understand their
objections if one understands what relativism is, I begin this chapter with an
explanation of the details of the view in section 7.2, focusing on MacFarlane’s
(2014) very well-developed version of it.
Section 7.3 discusses a first difficulty for Doxastic Contextualism: the doxastic
integration problem. It is analogous to the practical integration problem discussed
by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), and Dowell
(2013). The latter is a challenge to contextualist semantics for the information-
sensitivity of the practical ‘should’. According to the practical integration problem,
Practical Contextualism—as I call the view in short—struggles to explain how
someone who is giving practical advice is addressing the question the advisee is
deliberating about. The doxastic integration problem is the analogous problem
for Doxastic Contextualism. I show that Dowell’s (2013) solution of the practical
integration problem cannot be applied to Doxastic Contextualism. Instead, I
defend Doxastic Contextualism by arguing that an advisor can be addressing the
advisee’s question even if he is not answering a question with the same Kaplanian
content, as long as it has the same Kaplanian character.
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Section 7.4 moves on to the semantic assessment problem. It encompasses
three different problems that all pertain to how speakers assess and interpret
statements containing the doxastic ‘should’. First, the disagreement problem
concerns how Doxastic Contextualism struggles to account for the apparent
disagreement between speakers who both talk about what one of them should
believe, but who, according to Doxastic Contextualism, actually say compatible
things as they use different senses of ‘should’. I adapt Finlay’s (2014) solution
to the analogous problem for Practical Contextualism, which suggests, on the
one hand, that the disagreement actually does not lie in what is said, but rather
in the speakers’ preferences, and, on the other hand, that on some occasions
the speakers do not actually disagree, but merely suffer from semantic blindness
(section 7.4.1). The second problem, the reporting problem, consists in the fact
that we can accurately report statements about what someone should believe by
disquoting them. Standard context-sensitive terms like indexicals do not share
this feature of ‘disquotability’. However, as several authors have pointed out,
there are other context-sensitive term, like ‘local’, that can also be disquoted.
The disquotability of the doxastic ‘should’ therefore does not disqualify it from
being context-sensitive (section 7.4.2). Finally, the retraction problem refers to
cases where speakers retract their previous statements about what should be
believed since they gathered new evidence in the meantime. According to Doxastic
Contextualism, this would be inappropriate to do as the previous statements were
true at the contexts at they were uttered. My defence is that this prediction of
Doxastic Contextualism is, in fact, correct and that retracting those previous
statements would be unnatural (section 7.4.3).
Of course, you don’t have to be a relativist to level these objections against
Doxastic Contextualism, anybody can. The reason I am speaking of the ‘relativist
challenge’ is that, first, these challenges were brought forward by relativists and,
second, because relativists argue that the challenges speak in favour of their
position since relativism does not face them. Another semantic account of the
doxastic ‘should’ that does not face them is invariantism. This is the view that
the doxastic ‘should’ is not context-sensitive, but always carries the same sense,
for example, the objective or the subjective one, and that it is furthermore not
information-sensitive in the way relativists say it is. Invariantism doesn’t have
to deal with any of the mentioned problems since all of them stem from the fact
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that Doxastic Contextualism assumes that the doxastic ‘should’ can change it
senses in different contexts. Invariantism denies this. The reason I have chosen to
discuss the challenges against the backdrop of relativism rather than invariantism
is that chapters 3 to 5 were an all-round attack on invariantism. I have argued
that the doxastic ‘should’ does not have one, but four different senses. If I have
done my job, it should now be clear that invariantism is not a viable option. Only
relativism can benefit from these challenges to Doxastic Contextualism.
7.2 Relativism
Relativist semantic theories have been defended for a variety of terms, such
as epistemic modals like ‘might’ or ‘possible’1, for ‘knows’2, taste predicates3
and future contingents4. We can find rival contextualist proposals for epistemic
modals5, ‘knows’6, and taste predicates7. As this list illustrates, the conflict
between contextualism and relativism is not limited to the information-sensitivity
of the deontic ‘should’ (or ‘ought’, for that matter), but extends to many other
terms and has implications for the areas of philosophy that are concerned with
the respective terms, such as aesthetics, epistemology, or metaphysics. I am solely
concerned with the conflict between relativist and contextualist semantics for the
information-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’ and do not intend to make any
points about the other expressions.
The mentioned authors have somewhat different conceptions of what relativism
is. Of the accounts of relativism on offer, I have chosen to focus on John
MacFarlane’s. For one thing, his general theory of relativist semantics is extremely
well-worked out (see his 2014 book). Furthermore, unlike all of the other relativists,
he has provided a specific relativist semantics for the information-sensitivity of
the deontic ‘should’.
As the reader knows, contextualism accounts for the information-sensitivity
of the deontic ‘should’ by positing that ‘should’ has different semantic values
1See Egan et al. (2005), Egan (2007), or MacFarlane (2011).
2See Richard (2004) or MacFarlane (2005).
3See Ko¨lbel (2002), Lasersohn (2005), or MacFarlane (2014: Ch. 7).
4See MacFarlane (2003).
5See DeRose (1991), von Fintel and Gillies (2008), or Dowell (2011).
6See DeRose (1992) or Cohen (1998).
7See Glanzberg (2007).
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depending on which information-state is provided by the context in which the
sentence containing the term is uttered (the context of utterance). A sentence of
the form ‘S should do A’ can, in one context, mean ‘S should do A in light of S’s
information’, in another context mean ‘S should do A in light of the collective
evidence’, and in yet another context mean ‘S should do A in light of the facts’. In
other words, sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ express different propositions
in contexts that provide different information-states.
On MacFarlane’s (2014: 286) truth-relativism, ‘S should do A’ expresses
the same proposition at every context of use (provided, of course, that ‘S’ and
‘A’ have the same reference and ‘should’ has not changed its modal flavour).
Information-sensitivity is rather modelled by the assumption that ‘S should do A’
has different truth-values relative to different context of assessment. A context
of assessment is a possible situation in which someone can assess the truth of a
sentence. This can be the same as the context of utterance—in cases where the
speaker evaluates their own utterance—but often is not. An information-state
is one of the parameters that a context of assessment can provide. A sentence
of the form ‘S should do A’ is true at a context of assessment that provides the
information-state i only if ‘S should do A’ is true in light of i.
At first sight, this seems to be a radical proposal. The truth-predicate is here
not, as it is often assumed, a monadic predicate that just ascribes sentences (or
propositions, beliefs, etc.) the properties truth or falsehood. It is rather taken
to be a dyadic predicate that takes two arguments: a sentence and a context
of assessment. Sentences are not true simpliciter, but only relative to a context
of assessment. MacFarlane (2014: 49) claims that this is not as revisionary
as it sounds. Standard semantic theories do not ascribe sentences truth-values
simpliciter, but evaluate their truth relative to circumstances of evaluation (to
use Kaplan’s (1989a, 1989b) terminology). For example, sentences are only true
relative to possible worlds. The sentence
(1) Barack Obama is the 44th President of the USA.
is true relative to the actual world, but not the world in which John McCain won
the election in 2008. Some semantic models relativize sentences’ truth-values even
further. On Kaplan’s (1989a, 1989b) model, sentences are evaluated at an index
containing a world- and a time-parameter. A time-parameter is, on Kaplan’s view,
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necessary in order to account for temporal operators like ‘yesterday’, which shift
the time-parameter in the index. A sentence like ‘Yesterday I went to the shop’ is
evaluated by evaluating the sentence under the scope of ‘yesterday’ relative to an
index containing a world and whichever time ‘yesterday’ denotes.
To sum up, the truth-predicate of semantic theories is not monadic anyway.
In standard semantic theorizing, sentences are at least evaluated relative to a
possible-world-parameter, and in some cases even further parameters are added.
What is new about MacFarlane’s truth-relativism are two aspects. First, it adds
unusual parameters to the circumstance of evaluation, for example standards
of taste or information-states. Second, these parameters are not restricted to
parameters provided by the context of utterance.8 For example, we can think
of a view on which the sentence ‘S should do A’ expresses, ceteris paribus, the
same proposition at every context of utterance, but that the only information-
state against which it can be evaluated is the one provided by the context of
utterance. This view would agree with relativism that ‘S should do A’ is not true
simpliciter, but would stipulate that it is only true relative to the information-
state provided by the context of utterance.9 According to truth-relativism, by
contrast, this information-state is provided by the context of assessment. Since the
default information-state provided by the context of assessment is the assessor’s
evidence, it is often not the information-state provided by the context of utterance.
MacFarlane calls terms that are evaluated relative to unusual parameters provided
by contexts of assessment ‘assessment-sensitive’.
To illustrate the difference between contextualism and relativism, let’s look at
the Miners case, which I discussed first in subsection 2.5.1:
Miners. Ten miners are trapped either in shaft 1 or in shaft 2.
Floodwaters threaten to flood the shafts. Sean has enough sandbags
to block one shaft, but not both. If Sean blocks one shaft, all the
water will go into the other shaft, killing any miners inside it. If Sean
blocks neither shaft, both shafts will fill halfway with water, and just
8To be precise, this second condition is actually jointly sufficient and necessary for a semantics
to be relativist in MacFarlane’s sense. The first condition is only typical of the semantics
MacFarlane suggests for taste predicates, modals, etc. There is a possible relativist semantics
that relativizes sentences only to a possible-world-parameter (see MacFarlane 2014: 89f.).
9MacFarlane (2009) calls this position ‘non-indexical contextualism’.
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one miner, the lowest in the shaft where the miners are, will be killed.
Sean does not know in which shaft the miners are. He says:
(2) I should block neither shaft.
A physicist, who knows that the miners are in shaft 1, hears this and
says to Sean:
(3) No, you should block shaft 1.
We will look at this case in more detail in the next section, but for now let’s just
focus on the following point. On a possible, and natural, contextualist reading of
(2), Sean is speaking relative to his own information-state. That is, (2) is short
for:
(2*) In light of my [Sean’s] evidence, I should block neither shaft.
It follows that (2*), and thus (2), is true. Is (2) true according to relativism? In
contrast to contextualism, there is no straightforward answer to this. Whether it’s
true depends on the context of assessment it is evaluated from. Relative to Sean’s
context of assessment, it is true because the information-state provided by his
context of assessment is his own.10 This explains why Sean asserts (2). According
to the pragmatics that MacFarlane (2014: Ch. 5) suggests for assessment-sensitive
sentences, a speaker is permitted to utter such a sentence if it is true relative
to their context (in this case context of utterance and assessment are the same).
However, relative to the physicist’s context of assessment (2) is false as the
physicist’s context of assessment provides her information-state. This explains
why the physicist rejects Sean’s utterance of (2).
After this introduction to MacFarlane’s truth-relativism, I now turn to the
first challenge to Doxastic Contextualism, the doxastic integration problem.
7.3 The Doxastic Integration Problem
The doxastic integration problem is analogous to the practical integration problem—
as discussed by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), and
10However, as I’ll explain in subsection 7.4.3 below, relativists are not committed to the view
that the information-state provided by a context of assessment is always the assessors.
178
Dowell (2013)—which is that Practical Contextualism has difficulties explaining
how practical advisors manage to address their advisees’ questions. In this section,
I first introduce the practical integration problem and argue in agreement with
Dowell (2013), and pace Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), that it can be solved by
News-Sensitive Contextualism, a version of Practical Contextualism (subsection
7.3.1). Subsequently, I show that analogous to the practical integration problem
there is a doxastic integration problem, but that a doxastic version of News-
Sensitive Contextualism provides no remedy for it (subsection 7.3.2). Finally, I
present a solution to the doxastic integration problem (subsection 7.3.3).
7.3.1 The Practical Integration Problem
The practical integration problem, as it is dubbed by Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010),
is a problem for Practical Contextualism. On this view, the semantics for the
practical ‘should’ looks roughly as follows:
Practical Should For all contexts c that provide an ordering source g that
reflects practical normativity, ‘Subject S should do A’ is true at context c iff
doing A-ing is the g-best available action for S in light of the information-state i
provided by c.
The practical integration problem arises in cases where advice is given on what
to do. Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) introduce the Miners case to make this
point. The case also brings out the semantic assessment problem, which I’ll deal
with in the next section. Here I will only look at Miners with respect to the
practical integration problem.
It seems clear that the physicist advises Sean on what to do. Now, Kolodny
and MacFarlane (2010) claim that if the physicist advises Sean, ‘should’ needs to
have the same sense in (2) and (3). Otherwise, the physicist would be “talking
past” Sean (ibid.: 121). In this case, the physicist couldn’t be considered to be
advising Sean since, as Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 11) put it, she would “not
address the question over which [Sean] deliberates”. Similarly, Dowell (2013: 154)
writes that (3) must be “an answer to the same question” that Sean is answering
in (2).
One way to satisfy this constraint is for ‘should’ to be relativized to the same
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information-state in (2) and (3). If the contexts in which (2) and (3) are uttered
provide the same information-state, then (2) and (3) are answers to the same
question.
Simple forms of contextualism struggle with this. For example, on a view we
could call Speaker Contextualism, the information-state provided by the context
is always that of the speaker. On such a view, Sean would be talking about what
he should do in light of his evidence, while the physicist is talking about what
Sean should do in light of her evidence. The physicist is talking past Sean.
A first stab at solving the practical integration problem is to suggest that the
physicist is speaking to the collective evidence, that is, the pooled evidence of her
and Sean. Since Sean is publicly deliberating about what to do, it is furthermore
plausible that he’s not intending to speak just relative to his own evidence, but
to that of everyone he is speaking to, including the physicist’s (Kolodny and
MacFarlane 2010: 122). In this case, (2) is false. This can be made more palatable
by arguing that it indeed seems hasty of Sean to conclude that he should block
neither shaft if there are people around him who know where the miners are
(Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay 2010: 13).
Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 123) put pressure on such a view by giving
a case in which the physicist arrives unexpectedly on the scene some time after
Sean uttered (2) and then utters (3) (let’s call this case Miners-Unexpected).
Is the physicist part of the group whose evidence Sean was speaking relative to?
Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) argues that she is not. If she were, the evidence
an agent would need to attend to in practical deliberation would become too far
beyond the agent’s reach to possibly play a role in deliberation. It would include
even the evidence of people who are not present when one deliberates and are
also not expected to turn up later. On the other hand, if the physicist is not part
of the relevant group, the practical integration problem endures (Bjo¨rnsson and
Finlay 2010: 13).
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010) and Dowell (2013) propose a view called News-
Sensitive Contextualism, which is supposed to make the idea that the physicist’s
evidence belongs to the information-state Sean is speaking to more plausible.
When we’re deliberating about whether to do A or not, there is a certain time t by
which we have to decide whether to do A or not. In Miners, t is the time by which
the shafts are starting to flood and the first miner is risking to drown. Bjo¨rnsson
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and Finlay (2010) and Dowell (2013) suggest that what we’re deliberating about
is whether to do A in light of the information available to us by t. In this case, the
physicist’s evidence is part of the information-state Sean is speaking to and the
practical integration problem is avoided. Furthermore, (2) is false, but reasonable,
since Sean reasonably didn’t expect to receive evidence by t about where the
miners are.
Dowell (2013: 162) thinks News-Sensitive Contextualism solves the practical
integration problem. Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 14, fn. 21), on the other hand,
deny this. If News-Sensitive Contextualism is correct, then the physicist makes
Sean’s utterance of (2) false by making the evidence that the miners are in shaft
1 available to him. If she hadn’t told him this, (2) would have been correct. The
puzzle, for Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay, is how the physicist is then helping Sean to
“answer the question he is deliberating over” if Sean “would have been at least as
likely to get the answer to the question right if she [the physicist] had chosen not
to interfere” (ibid.:15).
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay suggest that this puzzle for Practical Contextualism is
instead resolved by the following consideration: since deliberating agents have
a preference for making decisions based on better information, Sean prefers an
answer to the question of what he should do in light of evidence that includes the
physicist’s knowledge of the miners’ whereabouts over an answer to the question
of what he should do in light of evidence that doesn’t include this information.
The physicist is answering the more interesting first question, and can therefore
be said to be advising Sean.
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay apparently accept that on this resolution of the puzzle,
the physicist is not addressing the question Sean actually had in mind when
uttering (2). They write: “agents’ fundamental concerns in deliberating are [...]
not simply to determine the correct answers to particular ought questions” (ibid.:
16). And further below:
“[I]f an advisor could make new and relevant information available to
the agent, the proposition formerly of interest would lose [its] practical
significance and become moot. Its significance passes to the question
of what he ought to do relative to the new and improved body of
information” (ibid.: 16).
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Notice that they are therefore not just arguing that News-Sensitive Contextualism
is not “sufficient to vindicate contextualism” (ibid.: 14, fn. 21), as they put it,
but that they are effectively rejecting it. They seem to say that the physicist
is addressing a different question than the one Sean had in mind, but that the
physicist can nonetheless be said to be advising Sean.
This means that they are giving up on the constraint that advisors need to
address their advisee’s original question. I think we can avoid this. A News-
Sensitive Contextualist can argue that the physicist is addressing the very question
Sean was deliberating about: ‘What should I do in light of the evidence available
at the time t by which I have to act?’, where this evidence contains the physicist’s.
It is just that if the physicist had not made her evidence available, this question
would have meant ‘What should I do in light of EHypo?’, where EHypo is the
evidence that would have been available to Sean by t in this hypothetical situation,
which would not have included the information that the miners are in shaft 1.
However, the physicist actually makes the information available, and thus Sean’s
question means ‘What should I do in light of EActu?’, where EActu is the evidence
that is actually available to Sean by t, which does include the information that the
miners are in shaft 1. To conclude, the news-sensitive contextualist can maintain
that the physicist does address Sean’s question. She helps him by making the
question he is deliberating about the more informative question ‘What should
Sean do in light of EActu?’, rather than the question ‘What should Sean do in
light of EHypo?’, which it would have been, had she not uttered (3).
To conclude, I agree with Dowell (2013) that News-Sensitive Contextualism is
capable of solving the practical integration problem. However, as I argue in the
following, we can’t apply this solution to the doxastic integration problem.
7.3.2 Extending the Practical Integration Problem
The doxastic integration problem has not been discussed in the literature, but
that it exists becomes clear if we look at a variant of Police, which was inspired
by Miners:
Police-Disagreeing. Detective Lester Freamon is pondering about
whether Omar or Marlo killed Bob, one of whom must have done it.
His evidence is even-handed, it is equally likely on it that it was either
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of them. He concludes:
(4) I should suspend judgement about who killed Bob.
His colleague Kima Greggs has solid evidence that it was Omar: her
reliable informant Bubbles told her that Marlo was at the other end
of town at the time of the murder. She hears Lester uttering (4) and
says:
(5) No, you should believe that it was Omar.
On a contextualist semantics, the question Lester is answering by (4) is ‘Which
doxastic attitude should I adopt to the proposition <It was Omar> in light of
the information-state ic4?’, where ic4 is the information-state provided by the
context in which he utters (4). (5), on the other hand, means ‘You should believe
that it was Omar in light of ic5’, where ic5 is the information-state provided by
the context in which Kima utters (5). The doxastic integration problem is that
Kima seems to be giving advice to Lester, but that it is hard for contextualism to
explain how Kima is addressing the question Lester is deliberating about.
One might think that a doxastic equivalent to News-Sensitive Contextualism
is motivated by the following variant of Police:
Police-Unexpected. Everything is as it is in Police-Disagreeing,
except that Kima is not present when Lester utters (4) at t4. He also
does not expect her to later contribute anything to the case. At t5,
Kima shows up unexpectedly, having collected the same evidence as
in Police. She utters (5).
The idea would be that if we want Kima to address the question Lester was
thinking about, we need him to speak about the information-state that will be
available to him at or after t5. Doxastic News-Sensitive Contextualism would
try to make this idea plausible by suggesting that when we are deliberating
doxastically, we are deliberating about which doxastic attitude we should adopt to
the relevant proposition P in light of the evidence that will be available to us by
the time we need to form a doxastic attitude to P . I reject Doxastic News-Sensitive
Contextualism for three reasons.
183
First, such a view needs to determine what the time is by which one has to
form a doxastic attitude. For certain propositions, there is no such time. These
include propositions that are of purely theoretical interest, which have no relevance
for practical purposes, and irrelevant propositions, e.g., the proposition that the
number of stars in the universe is even.
Second, there is a crucial asymmetry between the doxastic and the practical
‘should’, which makes Doxastic News-Sensitive Contextualism implausible. When
we are deliberating about what we practically should do, we’re often concerned
with the question of which of a set of possible actions we should perform in
the future (rather than right now). These are the kind of cases that motivate
Practical News-Sensitive Contextualism: where the time of deliberation and the
time of action are not identical. However, when we are deliberating about what we
doxastically should do, we never really seem to be concerned with which doxastic
attitude we should adopt in the future. Rather, we try to figure out which doxastic
attitude to adopt right now, at the time of deliberation. That is, it looks like the
time of deliberation and the time of ‘action’, i.e., of forming the relevant doxastic
attitude, are identical.
This asymmetry is crucial since it might be plausible to deliberate about what
one should do at a future time in light of the information one will have at that
time; it is absurd, however, to deliberate about which doxastic attitude we should
form now in light of the information we will have at some point in the future.
One reason why this is absurd is that it is never too late to change your mind.
The doxastic attitude to P you form now, you can easily revise at the time t when
you have to act on it, in light of the evidence you have then. Why would you then
deliberate about which doxastic attitude you should adopt now in light of this
future information-state?
Third, Doxastic News-Sensitive Contextualism fails a test that its practical
counterpart passes. If Practical News-Sensitive Contextualism is correct, then
Sean should react as follows if he is told that he will receive evidence about where
the miners are before the time he has to act:
(6) OK, I should not block either shaft then, but I don’t know yet
which of the two I should block. I will need to wait for the
information about where the miners are.
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This sounds like the correct response. It supports Practical News-Sensitive
Contextualism since Sean obviously speaks about what he should do in light of the
evidence that will be accessible to him in the future, not the one that is accessible
to him now.
On the other hand, if we tell Lester that in an hour, Kima will tell him who
killed Bob, it would sound infelicitous if he replied:
(7) # OK, I shouldn’t suspend judgement now then, because in light
of Kima’s evidence I should either believe or disbelieve that it
was Omar.
The appropriate response seems rather to be:
(8) I should suspend judgement on whether it was Omar for now
then.
If Doxastic News-Sensitive Contextualism was correct, (7) would be true and
reasonable, but (8) false and unreasonable. However, it seems to be exactly the
other way around.
I conclude that Doxastic News-Sensitive Contextualism is not a solution to
the doxastic integration problem.
7.3.3 Solving the Doxastic Integration Problem
I suggest that we address the doxastic integration problem as follows. First, with
respect to Police-Disagreeing I propose a rather straightforward solution. In
chapter 5, I have put forward the following view:
Collectivism. For any context of epistemic advice cA, ‘S should have D to
P ’ is true at cA iff adopting D to P accurately reflects how much the collective
evidence supports P .
On Collectivism, Kima is speaking relative to her and Lester’s collective evidence.
This helps with respect to Police-Disagreeing if we assume that Lester is
speaking relative to the same body of evidence. This is plausible. As Bjo¨rnsson
and Finlay (2010: 13) put it with respect to the practical ‘should’, where someone
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is deliberating publicly, that is, in a dialogue with others, they arguably see their
deliberation “as a shared problem, to be solved with collective resources.” On
this account, (4) is false, but we can give a good explanation for it. It is hasty for
Lester to conclude that he should suspend judgement on whether it was Omar, if
he could simply ask Kima what her evidence concerning the case is.
The story is a bit more complicated concerning Police-Unexpected. Since
Lester is not publicly deliberating—but rather privately on his own—we need
to assume that by uttering (4) he is answering the question of what he should
believe, in light of his own evidence, about who killed Bob.11 When Kima appears
and utters (5), she talks about what he should believe in light of their collective
evidence. It therefore seems like she is addressing another question.12
My main claim is that in some sense she is addressing the same question: They
are both trying to answer the question ‘What should Lester believe about who
killed Bob?’ True, according to Doxastic Contextualism this answer has different
contents if asked in Lester’s and Kima’s contexts respectively. Nonetheless, they
are in some sense the same.
Let me explain. Consider the following analogy: When Ann and Boris are
respectively asking ‘Who am I?’, they are in some sense asking the same question.
In some other sense, they are not. Ann’s question means ‘Who is Ann?’ and Boris’
question means ‘Who is Boris?’. They are the same questions in the sense that
their Kaplanian (1989a, 1989b) character is identical; they are different questions
in the sense that their Kaplanian content is different. The character of ‘Who am
I?’ is a function from contexts to contents, where the assigned content changes
with the speaker of the respective context. Let’s distinguish accordingly between
the character and the content of a question.
The question Kima is addressing has the same character as Lester’s.13 The
character of ‘What should Lester believe about who killed Bob’? is a function
11More precisely, he is answering the question of which doxastic attitudes he should adopt
towards the propositions <Omar killed Bob> and <Marlo killed Bob>. I use ‘what he should
believe’ as a short form for this.
12For more on the distinction between private and public doxastic deliberation, see section
5.2.
13This is not entirely correct. Since Lester formulates the question in the first person, his
question is ‘What should I ...?’, whereas Kima’s question is ‘What .... should Lester...?’. Because
Lester’s question contains the indexical ‘I’ and Kima’s the proper name ‘Lester’, the questions
actually do not have the same character. However, this difference in character is irrelevant to
the point I’m making.
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from contexts to contents, where the content differs with the information-state
that is provided by the respective context.
When Ann tells Boris the answer to her question ‘Who am I?’, she is hardly
helping him with his question ‘Who am I?’ Thus, one might think that the fact
that Kima is addressing a question which has the same character as Lester’s
doesn’t help solving the doxastic integration problem. However, there are cases
where addressing a question with the same character, but different content, seems
to help:
Score. Carlo is watching a football match between Borussia Dortmund
and Bayern Mu¨nchen. At 8 pm, the score is 0:0. His friend Diana
calls him at 8 pm and asks:
(9) ‘What is the score?’.
Before Carlo can reply, the telephone connection is interrupted. At
8.05 pm, Aubameyang scores for Dortmund. Carlo calls Diana and
says:
(10) ‘Hey! To answer your question: The score is 1:0.’
(10) sounds perfectly fine; Carlo seems to answer Diana’s question expressed by
(9). However, notice that there is a hidden indexicality in (9). (9) means ‘What’s
the score now?’ Carlo is answering the content this question has at the context
of his utterance of (10), that is, he’s answering ‘What is the score at 8.05 pm?’
However, the content of (9) at the context where Diana uttered it is ‘What is the
score at 8 pm?’ Nonetheless, (10) sounds right: Carlo is answering, at least in
some sense, Diana’s question.
To conclude, at least in some cases it looks like speakers are answering the
question of their addressee when they are answering the content of a question
that has the same character as the addressee’s question, but a different content. I
suggest that questions like ‘What should I believe about who killed Bob?’ are
in this respect more similar to questions like ‘What’s the score?’ than they are
similar to questions like ‘Who am I?’
One reason to think this is that it simply seems like Kima is answering Lester’s
question. And as Score shows, the mere fact that there is an indexical element
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in the question is not necessarily a theoretical reason undermining this intuition.
Furthermore, Score and Police-Unexpected share a property that makes it
likely that they are alike in the mentioned respect. Diana is more interested in an
answer to the content of her question relative to the context of 8.05 pm rather
than relative to the context of 8 pm. That is, she wants to know what the score
is at 8.05 pm, rather than what the score is at 8 pm. Similarly, Lester is more
interested in an answer to the content of his question at the context where Kima
utters (5) than at the context where Lester utters (4). Thus, where a speaker’s
and a subject’s questions have the same character but not the same content, the
speaker might be taken to answer the subject’s question if the subject is more
interested in an answer to the content of the speaker’s question rather than their
own. This also explains why it sounds wrong to say that Ann addresses Boris’
question ‘Who am I?’ by telling him the answer to the question ‘Who is Ann?’
Boris is not interested in an answer to this question, or at least not more than in
an answer to the question ‘Who is Boris?’
Notice that this is the same explanation as the one Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay
(2010) offer for how it is possible that the physicist can, legitimately, address a
question that is not the one Sean originally asked, but nonetheless be said to
advice Sean. The difference between us is only that Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010)
concede that the physicist is answering a different question, full stop. I, on the
other hand, argue that there is no need to make such a concession. The physicist
is answering the same question in the sense that it has the same character. In
the end, Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010) would probably be happy to accept this
improvement on their account.
Contra Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), I argued that Practical News-Sensitive
Contextualism can solve the practical integration problem. However, the same
reasoning I just outlined with respect to the doxastic integration problem can
arguably also be applied to solve the practical integration problem. I will leave
the question of whether the latter is to be preferred to Practical News-Sensitive
Contextualism to future research and turn now to the second challenge to Doxastic
Contextualism.
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7.4 The Semantic Assessment Problem
The semantic assessment problem actually consists in a set of problems that
concern how speakers semantically evaluate and interpret their own and each
other’s statements about what should be done and believed. More specifically,
contextualist accounts of the deontic ‘should’ have difficulties explaining the
following three phenomena: First, it seems that in cases like Miners and Police
advisors and advisees can disagree. Second, it looks as if speakers can successfully
report and refer to statements about what should be done and believed. Third, it
appears appropriate for speakers who later on receive more relevant information
to retract their previous statements of this sort.
I will attend to these problems in turn in the following. All of them apply
equally to Practical and Doxastic Contextualism and hence almost all of the
solutions that I present solve the respective problem for both views. Furthermore,
the problems are not restricted to contextualist semantics for the deontic ‘should’,
but have received much attention in the literature on the semantics for epistemic
modals. I will make reference to this literature where it helps clarity.
7.4.1 Disagreement
Remember, in Miners, Sean comes to conclude:
(2) I should block neither shaft.
This is countered by a physicist, who knows that the miners are in shaft 1 and
who says to Sean:
(3) No, you should block shaft 1.
The practical integration problem arises since the physicist is advising Sean. The
problem we are concerned with here, let’s call it the disagreement problem, arises
because it seems as if the physicist and Sean are disagreeing.14 On a natural
picture, disagreement occurs where one agent accepts a proposition P and another
agent rejects P . This presents a simple form of contextualism, on which the
contextually provided information-state is always the speaker’s, with a difficulty.
According to it, (2) means
14I already touched on the issue of disagreement in subsection 6.4.4.
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(2*) In light of my [Sean’s] evidence, I should block neither shaft.
and (3) means
(3*) In light of my [the physicist’s] evidence, you should block shaft 1.
Thus, that Sean accepts (2) doesn’t mean that he rejects (3) and that the physicist
accepts (3) doesn’t mean that he rejects (2). Doxastic Contextualism has the
same problem as Lester and Kima appear to be disagreeing with each other.
Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010: 143) point to this disagreement data as
evidence in favour of relativism. According to relativism, two parties disagree if (i)
they respectively accept and reject a proposition P and (ii) accepting and rejecting
P aren’t simultaneously accurate relative to any context of assessment (MacFarlane
2007: 26f.). Since Sean accepts and the physicist rejects the proposition <Sean
should block neither shaft>, and either accepting or rejecting this is accurate at
a context of assessment (depending on which information-state is provided by this
context), but not both, Sean and the physicist are disagreeing.
One way to solve this problem for contextualism is to stipulate that Sean
and the physicist (or Lester and Kima) are in fact speaking relative to the same
information-state. This is the strategy Dowell (2013) chooses by advocating Prac-
tical News-Sensitive Contextualism. Both in Miners and Miners-Unexpected,
Sean and the physicist are talking about the same issue: whether Sean should
block a shaft in light of the evidence that will be available to him by the time
he has to decide. Sean accepts this, while the physicist rejects it, so they are
disagreeing. Unfortunately, News-Sensitive Contextualism is not an adequate
model for the doxastic ‘should’, so at least with respect to the doxastic ‘should’ it
won’t help solving the disagreement problem.
An alternative way to address the disagreement problem is to argue that there
can be disagreement between the parties, even though there is no proposition that
one agent accepts and the other rejects. Maybe the disagreement is not due to a
conflict between beliefs, but rather due to a conflict between preferences (Finlay
2014: 219). By uttering (2), Sean expresses a preference for blocking neither shaft,
whereas the physicist express a preference for him to block shaft 1. Similarly,
Lester is expressing a preference for withholding judgement on who killed Bob,
whereas Kima expresses a preference for Lester to believe that Omar killed Bob.
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Sean and the physicist, as well as Kima and Lester, are accordingly disagreeing
since they have conflicting preferences.15
The limits of this approach lie with scenarios in which speakers explicitly refer
to and deny what another agent has said. For example, the physicist could just
as well say in response to Sean:
(11) That is false. You should block shaft 1.
Or:
(12) What you said is false. You should block shaft 1.
In the first sentence of (11) and even more in the first sentence of (12), the
physicist is explicitly referring to and denying what Sean said. When the physicist
responds to Sean in this this manner, it is hard to defend that the disagreement
between Sean and the physicist is purely one of preferences. It is not just that they
want things that are inconsistent and can’t both be obtained, but the physicist’s
utterance implies that they also say (and hence believe) inconsistent things (Finlay
2014: 239).
In their original defence of Practical Contextualism, Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay
(2010) propose a pragmatic solution to the disagreement problem, which ac-
knowledges that in Miners-Unexpected (2) and (3) actually do not express
inconsistent propositions since Sean and the physicist are speaking relative to
different information-states. They claim that the first sentences of (11) and (12)
are, nonetheless, not false. The physicist is not referring to the proposition Sean
actually expressed when he uttered (2), but rather to the proposition he would
express if he uttered (2) in the physicist’s context. If (2) was uttered in the
physicist’s context, it would express that in light of the collective evidence Sean
should block neither shaft, which is wrong and is what the physicist is denying.
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 22) argue that the physicist is correctly referring to
this proposition because should-sentences pragmatically function as recommen-
dations. Since recommendations should be checked against the best available
15Stevenson (1944) proposed this idea of a ‘disagreement in attitude’ as part of his emotivist
account of moral language. Huvenes has mobilized the idea to defend contextualism about taste
predicates (2012) and epistemic modals (2015) in the face of disagreement data.
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information, the physicist accurately evaluates (2) as uttered in her context rather
than Sean’s context, as it provides a better-informed information-state.
Finlay (2014: 240f.) has come to reject this proposal as “too cavalier about the
role of the demonstrative ‘that’, or talk about what the speaker ‘said’ or ‘believed’
”. I think he’s right. It seems absurd to claim that by ‘what you said’ Sean could
refer to a proposition that Sean did not assert, i.e., precisely something that Sean
did not say. Even with respect to ‘that’ it appears clear that it must pick out
what Sean actually said.
Instead of this pragmatic solution, Finlay (2014) prefers to attribute semantic
blindness to speakers. The physicist in fact refers to the proposition that Sean
expressed and thus errs in her assessment of Sean’s utterance as false. This does
not mean to give up on the idea that there is disagreement between Sean and the
physicist (or Lester and Kima), since it still holds that their preferences conflict.
However, it admits that there is no conflict in their beliefs and that the physicist
mistakenly thinks so. I adopt Finlay’s (2014) suggestion here. If Kima were to say
(13) What you said is false, Lester. You should believe that it was
Omar.
the first sentence of this would be false.
What are the theoretical costs of positing semantic blindness? Finlay (2014:
241) says they are not too high and calls mistakes like Sean’s a “benign kind of
confusion.” This confusion arises for two reasons. First, if you assess a should-
sentence that was uttered in a context that provides a different information-state
than yours and then want to give advice on what to do (or to believe), you
have to attend to two different perspectives at (almost) the same time, which is
cognitively challenging. This is certainly right. Advisors are, naturally, focused
on giving advice and therefore attend to the collective evidence. This fixation
makes a shift to their advisee’s evidence in order to assess their advisee’s utterance
harder. Second, ordinary speakers might have difficulties tracking the difference
between disagreements due to a conflict between beliefs and those due to a conflict
between preferences. Disagreement in belief is expressed via evaluations like
‘That/what you said is false’. The physicist might have detected correctly that
there is disagreement between her and Sean, and then chosen a phrase we often
192
use to express disagreement, overlooking that it’s not appropriate for the kind of
disagreement at hand.
Not only can we explain the semantic blindness of speakers like the physicist,
it also looks like that such speakers are quite willing to admit to a mistake if
pressed (ibid.: 243). Again, imagine that the physicist explicitly disagrees with
Sean in Miners-Unexpected:
(12) What you said is false. You you should block shaft 1.
Now, consider someone overhears the physicist and approaches her:
(14) Actually, Sean was speaking truly. He must have been talking
about what he should do in light of his evidence, and this is
certainly to block neither shaft.
It is very plausible that the physicist would react as follows:
(15) Fair enough, given his evidence he came to the right conclusion.
But given that I know that the miners are in shaft 1, he should
block shaft 1!
The physicist’s retraction of her earlier statement sounds perfectly natural. There-
fore, attributing semantic blindness to her when she utters (12) is probably exactly
what we should do. We can easily imagine Kima retracting (13) if someone chal-
lenged her in a similar manner by pointing out that Lester must have been talking
to his own evidence. To sum up, the disagreement data can be explained in accor-
dance with Practical and Doxastic Contextualism by reference to the phenomenon
of disagreement between preferences and the phenomenon of semantic blindness.
7.4.2 Reports
We have already touched upon the issue of said-that-reports in the previous
subsection. I agreed with Finlay (2014) that speakers at times get confused by
the information-sensitivity of the deontic ‘should’ and go wrong when trying
to evaluate what others said about what should be done. In this subsection, I
will address the question of how, on a contextualist account of the information-
sensitivity of the deontic ‘should’, it is possible at all to report what others say
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or believe about what should be done or believed. Let’s dub this the reporting
problem.
Miners-Unexpected helpfully illustrate the problem. Here is another possi-
bility of how the physicist could choose to assess Sean’s utterance:
(16) You said that you should block neither shaft. But this is false.
You should block shaft 1.
The main difference between (12) and (16) is that in (16) the physicist reports
what Sean said by saying ‘You said that you should block neither shaft’ instead
of just referring to it with ‘what you said.’ As it turns out, it is actually tricky
for contextualism to explain how the first sentence of (16) can accurately report
what Sean said. The information-state provided by the physicist’s context is the
collective evidence. So it suggests itself that this is the information-state that
‘should’ in the first sentence of (16) is relativized to. The sentence would then
mean:
(16*) You said that, in light of the collective evidence, you should block
neither shaft.
However, this fails to report what Sean said. Rather, what we want it to mean is:
(16**) You said that, in light of your evidence, you should block neither
shaft.
Egan et al. (2005: 138) point to this phenomenon with respect to epistemic modals.
When epistemic modals are embedded in a belief-that- or said-that-construction,
the information-state they are relativized to shifts from the one originally provided
by the context of the report to the information-state provided by the context of
the reported speech act or belief.
Finlay (2014: 237) claims that this makes sense since “reporting a person’s
speech or thought makes her content or perspective salient.” While a contextualist
semantics for the information-sensitivity of the deontic ‘should’ indeed requires
this, it is far from clear that this is unproblematic. What Finlay does not mention
is that such behaviour cannot be observed in standard context-sensitive terms
like indexicals (Egan et al. 2005: 148):
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(17) Tim: I’m hungry
(18) Go¨rkem: Tim said I’m hungry.
When ‘I’ or other indexicals like ‘now’ or ‘here’ are embedded in a said-that-
construction, the contextual parameter fixing their reference does not shift away
from the default one. The reference of ‘I’ in (18) is the speaker of the context of
utterance, Go¨rkem, and does not shift to Tim, even though Tim is the speaker of
the context of the speech act that Go¨rkem is reporting. In other words, indexicals
cannot be disquoted in said-that-reports across contexts, whereas modals like
‘might’ or ‘should’ can.
Egan et al. (2005: 149) claim that this speaks against the context-sensitivity of
epistemic modals. If uncontroversially context-sensitive terms cannot be disquoted,
but epistemic modals can, why should we assume that epistemic modals are
context-sensitive? Obviously, the same argument works for deontic modals.16
Notice that a relativist semantics can avoid the reporting problem altogether. As
sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ (or ‘It might be that P ’) do not, ceteris
paribus, change their content across contexts on relativism, there is no question
how, on this semantics, the first sentence of (16) could accurately report what
Sean said.
However, there are other context-sensitive term, such as ‘local’, ‘nearby’, or
‘enemy’, which share this property with epistemic and deontic modals. Disquota-
bility does therefore actually not undermine contextualism.17 While Egan et al.
(2005) even cite ‘local’ as support for their position, we’ll see that it in fact works
against them.
‘Local’ is a plausible candidate for context-sensitivity since if I speak of a ‘local
bar’ while I am in Edinburgh and you speak of a ‘local bar’ while you’re in St
Andrews, I mean ‘a bar in Edinburgh’ and you mean ‘a bar in St Andrews’. That
is, the content of ‘local’ varies with the location of the context. Egan et al. (2005:
148) present the following dialogue as evidence that ‘local’ cannot be disquoted:
16To be clear, Egan et al.’s (2005) argument is only directed at the claim that the information-
sensitivity of epistemic modals is a form of context-sensitivity. They do not challenge that the
different flavours of modality of modals, i.e., epistemic, deontic, circumstantial, are a form of
context-sensitivity.
17Cappelen and Lepore (2006: 475), Humberstone (2006: 315), and Cappelen and Hawthorne
(2009: 39f.) have made this point.
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Local Bar. Brian is calling from Providence, Hud and Andy are in
Bellingham.
(19) Brian: When I get all this work done, I’ll head off to a local bar
for some drinks.
(20) Andy: How much work is there?
(21) Brian: Not much. I should get to the bar in a couple of hours.
(22) Hud: Hey, is Brian in town? Where’s he going tonight?
(23) # Andy: He thinks he’ll be at a local bar in a couple of hours.
I agree that Andy fails to report Brian’s utterance of (21) in his utterance of (23).
There is only one plausible way in which Hud could interpret Andy: that Brian
said that he’ll be in a local bar in Bellingham. However, notice that the case is
set up in a very peculiar way to achieve this effect. Hud is asking Andy whether
Brian will be “in town”, i.e., in Bellingham18. Andy does not deny this and then
says that Brian said he’ll be in a local bar in a few hours. By not denying, and
therefore implicitly confirming that Brian will be in Bellingham later, Andy seems
to intend to communicate with (23) that Brian will be in a bar in Bellingham
later.
Things look quite different if a case like this is set up differently:19
Concerned Parents. Arun is calling his parents from Manchester,
where he is going to university. His parents, Dhara and Raj, live in
London.
(24) Dhara: How are things? Do you have any plans tonight?
(25) Arun: I’ll be going to a local bar later with some of my friends.
(26) Raj: So, how is our son in Manchester?
(27) Dhara: Oh, he seems fine. He said he’ll be going to a local bar
later tonight.
18For the non-American reader: Bellingham is the largest city, and the county seat, of
Whatcom County in the State of Washington, USA.
19Humberstone (2006: 315f.) describes a very similar case.
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The last sentence of (27) sounds absolutely fine and seems to perfectly report
Arun’s plans. It appears that the location parameter is switched from Dhara’s
location to Arun’s and ‘local bar’ therefore comes to mean ‘bar in Manchester’.
What did the trick was that Raj made ‘Manchester’ the salient location in the
conversation, which Dhara’s use of ‘local’ could feed on.
To conclude, a presumably context-sensitive term like ‘local’ can, at least on
some occasions, be disquoted. Accordingly, the fact that modals can be disquoted
should not be counted as clear evidence against their context-sensitivity as Egan
et al. (2005) argue. Admittedly, I struggle to think of any case where a deontic
‘should’ cannot be disquoted due to its information-sensitivity, whereas ‘local’ can
at least not be disquoted in Andy’s utterance of (23). However, once we see that
some context-sensitive terms are only sometimes incapable of being disquoted
across contexts, it does not seem that implausible that some context-sensitive
terms are never incapable of disquotation across contexts. If there is other evidence
supporting the term’s context-sensitivity, its ‘disquotability’ should not bother us
too much. That speakers actually seem to be aware of the context-sensitivity of
the deontic ‘should’, as for example the physicist is when she retracts her previous
judgement of Sean’s utterance in (15), is such evidence.
7.4.3 Retraction
Retraction occurs when a speaker withdraws an earlier statement and declares
that they have been wrong. Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 18, n. 26) describe the
following case as the kind of data relativists could point to:
Miners-Retract. Everything is as in Miners (p. 177), except that
after Sean comes to conclude that he should block neither shaft and
states (2), the physicist does not show up. Rather, shortly before the
shafts get flooded, Sean finds out himself that the miners are in shaft
1. He says:
(28) I was wrong. I should block shaft 1.
The idea is that (28) sounds right, but that contextualism can’t account for this
if it posits that Sean is talking relative to different information-states when he’s
stating (2) and (28). If this were the case, Sean should not retract what he said
197
earlier since blocking neither shaft is what he should have done in light of the
evidence he had at the time. Again, relativism has no difficulties with this. When
Sean utters (2), (2) is true relative to the information-state of this context of
utterance. When he later retracts it, he does so in a new context of assessment,
whose information-state has been updated with the whereabouts of the miners,
such that (2) is false relative to this new context, which makes the retraction
appropriate.
I only know of Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010) who consider retraction data as
a potential threat to their Practical Contextualism, and am not aware of any
relativist who actually uses retraction data to argue for relativism about deontic
modals. However, MacFarlane (2011: 148) uses data of this sort to motivate
relativism about epistemic modals, and it is thus worthwhile to discuss this
retraction problem for Doxastic and Practical Contextualism. As it turns out
though, it seems to me the least worrisome of our three problems. First, it is
important to notice that (28) is uttered before the shafts get flooded. While (28)
already sounds a bit off to me, (29) in the following variant of the case definitely
does:
Miners-Post. Everything is as in Miners-Retract, except that
Sean only finds out that the miners were in shaft 1 after the shafts
have been flooded and one of the miners died.
(29) I was wrong. I should have blocked shaft 1.
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010: 18, n. 26) write that such post-mortem retractions
are not “as natural” as the retraction in Miners-Retract. I would say that they
aren’t natural at all. Clearly, Sean is too hard on himself. His original judgement
was correct, given the information he had. In fact, blocking shaft 1 would have
been irresponsible given that he would have risked letting ten people die.20
This leaves us with Miners-Retract. As the reader might have noticed, the
case does not cause difficulties for Practical News-Sensitive Contextualism. (28) is
uttered prior to the time when Sean has to decide whether to block one of the shafts
or not. On Practical News-Sensitive Contextualism, (2) and (28) are therefore
20In line with this, von Fintel and Gillies (2008) argue that retractions of statements containing
epistemic modals are sometimes not very natural either, even though predicted by relativism.
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spoken relative to the same information-state, namely the evidence available to
Sean by the time he needs to act. And relative to this information-state, (2) was
in fact wrong.
This is not to endorse Practical News-Sensitive Contextualism, but it shows
that the contextualist who wants to treat (28) as true has options. However, as
I have argued in section 7.3.2, News-Sensitive Contextualism does not work for
the doxastic ‘should’. Thus, I am committed to the view that whenever someone
correctly changes their previous judgement of what they should believe based on
new evidence they have gathered, they cannot reasonably retract this previous
judgement since it was true relative to the impoverished evidence they had at the
time. I do not see this as a bug, but rather as a feature of my view. Consider the
following variant of Police:
Police-Retract. Lester is pondering about whether Omar or Marlo
killed Bob, one of whom must have done it. His evidence is even-
handed, it is equally likely on it that it was Omar as well that it wasn’t.
He concludes:
(4) I should suspend judgement about who killed Bob.
Later that day, Kima tells him that Bubbles testified that he saw
Marlo at the other end of town at the time of the murder. Lester
reacts to this as follows:
(30) I was wrong. I should have believed that it was Omar.
Lester’s reaction is mistaken. He was not wrong when he uttered (4), suspending
judgement is what he was supposed to do when his evidence was even-handed.
One might think that Police-Retract is even evidence against relativism
since the relativist needs to claim that (30) is correct given that relative to the
information-state of Lester’s context of assessment (4) is false. This is not the
case though. MacFarlane (2014: 298) remarks that his model allows that the
information-state provided by a context of assessment does not always have to
be the evidence of the assessor at the time of assessing. When one is looking at
one’s own or others’ past doxastic attitudes, for example, the information-state
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can shift to the evidence of the respective person at the time. Police-Retract
hence favours neither contextualism nor relativism.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended Doxastic Contextualism against two potential
relativist challenges. The first challenge was the doxastic integration problem,
which I solved by pointing out that an epistemic advisor can be seen as addressing
the question of their deliberating advisee even if the advisee and the advisor are
speaking relative to different information-states. The trick is that even though
they are concerned with questions that have a different Kaplanian content, their
questions share the same Kaplanian character.
The second challenge was the semantic assessment problem, which consists of
three different problems. The retraction ‘problem’ is not much of a problem at
all as I dispute that it is felicitous for speakers to retract previous judgements
after their evidence has changed. The reporting problem is more serious since
it points to a semantic difference between standard context-sensitive terms like
indexicals and the doxastic ‘should’, namely the latter’s disquotability. As we have
seen, however, other context-sensitive terms, like ‘local’, can also sometimes be
disquoted. Thus, disquotability should not be considered as sufficient for excluding
a term from the context-sensitivity club. Finally, I have sided with Finlay (2014)
in arguing that the disagreement problem is to be addressed in a piecemeal fashion.
To a large degree, our disagreement intuitions can be explained by referring to a
conflict in preferences. Where speakers explicitly deny another person’s claim by
stating ‘That is false’ or ‘What you said is wrong’, these speakers fall prey to a
mild form of semantic blindness.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In chapter 2, I introduced Doxastic Contextualism and located it in the current
semantics literature. I showed that the Kratzer-style contextualist semantics for
the information-sensitivity of the deontic ‘should’ provided by Silk (2012), Dowell
(2013), and Carr (2015) can model the information-sensitivity of the doxastic
‘should’. That Charlow (2013) and Cariani’s (2013) semantics cannot do this is
an interesting finding of my investigation and is evidence against their theories.
Subsequently, I presented a simplified account of the truth-conditions of sentences
of the form ‘S should have D to P ’ according to which they are true at a context
of utterance iff the information-state provided by this context licenses adopting
D to P .
I discussed a first instance of this context-sensitivity of the doxastic ‘should’,
the distinction between the subjective and the objective doxastic ‘should’, in
chapter 3. Whereas it probably wouldn’t be contested that the doxastic ‘should’
has a subjective sense, it is certainly more controversial to claim that it has an
objective sense, too. Hence, I provided evidence that in ordinary discourse we
sometimes talk about what we objectively should believe. The upshot of this for
normative epistemology is that there is no conflict between the truth norm for
belief and more subjective norms, like the justification or knowledge norm.
The focus in chapter 4 was on higher-order evidence and the debate about
it between defenders of Steadfastness and Conciliationism. I argued that their
positions are actually not opposed to each other. We can accept both since those in
favour of Steadfastness are talking about what one should believe in light of one’s
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first-order evidence, whereas Conciliationists are talking about what one should
believe in light of one’s higher-order evidence. Accommodating both positions is
desirable as there are strong arguments in support of both.
Chapter 5 and 6 turned to the practice of epistemic advice. Since this practice
has so far not been discussed in the literature, I provided an account of it in
chapter 5. Then, I argued for Collectivism—the view that in contexts where we
give epistemic advice, we’re employing what I called the collective doxastic ‘should’
rather than, for example, the subjective or objective one. The doxastic ‘should’ is
collective when it is relativized to the collective evidence, the combined evidence
of the speaker and their addressees. A nice feature of Collectivism is that it
solves Turri’s (2012) supposedly unsolvable puzzle about withholding. In chapter
6, I looked closer at how Collectivism could be precisified. I discussed different
ways how to pool the speakers’ and the addressees’ evidence into the collective
evidence; I expressed scepticism, for the most part, that the literature on group
justification can be of much help for the purpose of precisifying Collectivism;
and I argued that advice of the form ‘S should believe P ’ can be true even if P is
false.
Chapter 7 closed this thesis with a defence of Doxastic Contextualism against
several objections of relativists against contextualist semantics of deontic modals
in general. Concerning the objection that on such semantics advisors are not
addressing their advisees’ questions, I showed why Dowell’s (2013) news-sensitive
contextualism for the practical ‘should’ cannot be used to solve the problem for
the doxastic ‘should’. Instead, I proposed that since advisors are addressing the
question with the same Kaplanian character as their advisees, they can be said to
address the same question, even if it does not have the same Kaplanian content.
Concerning the problems surrounding speech reports and retraction, I challenged
the data relativists present, and in the case of disagreement I agreed with Finlay
(2014) that speakers suffer from semantic blindness if they think they disagree
with others who are using another sense of ‘should’ than they are.
In general, I hope to have shown that the doxastic ‘should’ is fully information-
sensitive and that this sheds light on a number of debates in normative episte-
mology. I believe this raises a variety of questions future research could address.
One important issue is how the different senses of the doxastic ‘should’ relate
to each other. While I have tried to stay neutral on this, I have suggested in
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chapter 4 that at least some of them stand in a hierarchical relation to each other,
namely, that believing what one shouldHOE is second-best to believing what one
shouldFOE . A full account of the different senses would describe the network of
their relations. This network could be strictly hierarchical (with, for example, the
objective doxastic ‘should’ at the top); strictly egalitarian, such that no sense is
derived from another; or a mix of these two alternatives. Another topic for future
research is epistemic advice. Since it has not found much attention, there are
naturally aspects of it that can be further clarified. For example, I did not try to
answer whether the collective evidence is factive and how it is formed, but I only
laid out options. Comparing these options could not only contribute to a better
understanding of correct epistemic advice, but maybe also tell us something about
the nature of evidence.
Finally, normative epistemology can benefit from a semantic analysis of the
doxastic ‘should’ in other ways than by looking at its information-sensitivity.
Since Kratzer-style semantics make it easy to distinguish between a doxastic and
a practical ‘should’, one could conclude that debates about whether we should
believe what we have epistemic reasons to believe or rather what we have practical
reasons to believe are misguided and simply rooted in a confusion of language.
Furthermore, in chapter 2, I mentioned that it seems to me that we rarely talk
about what we must, in comparison to what we should believe. I wonder whether
this could be evidence against epistemic supererogation, i.e., the phenomenon
that there are propositions we should, but don’t have to believe. Lastly, Finlay
(2014) proposes an end-relational semantics for ‘ought’ according to which every
ought-statement is about what people should do in light of certain ends, even if
they do not actually pursue those ends. His arguments, I believe, could be used to
defend epistemic instrumentalism against the charge that it cannot explain why
people should follow epistemic norms even if they are not pursuing an epistemic
goal.1
Long story short: semanticists should, for the foreseeable future, not run out
work to do in normative epistemology.
1I have his remarks on pragmatic catgeoricity in Finlay (2014: sec. 7.2) in mind.
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